Bye-Bye, North Korea?

GDP Per Capita, 1950-2010

Sokeel Park, director of research and strategy for Liberty in North Korea (an NGO that works with North Korean refugees), tells us "6 Reasons Why Kim Jong Un Is Screwed" in a recent issue of the Atlantic (June 20, 2013). Here's a quote from the first reason:

The difference between North and South Korea's economies is already the biggest of any two neighboring countries in the world. Just 30 years ago, China was poorer than North Korea; now North Koreans who manage to travel to China (or even just look across the river) are amazed at the bright lights and development they see there.

The quote accompanies the above chart depicting the North's dire situation and destabilizing circumstances. Meanwhile, the regime is growing ever more corrupt:

North Koreans consistently tell us that to get ahead or even just survive in North Korea, you have to break the regime's rules, and that money enables all of those rules to be broken. Corruption is therefore steadily eroding the regime's control and authority over society, and there is no effective way to rein this in unless the system itself changes.

As Park notes, this sort of corruption undermines the regime. In addition to these two reasons -- "Economic Divergence" and "Explosion of Corruption" -- Park notes four others, "Grassroots Glasnost," "Refugees Bridging Back Into North Korea," "Jangmadang (Market) Generation," and "Bonds Between the People." All six of these, Park claims, are working against the regime's authority, stability, and power.

The article is relatively short and puts into clear, simple language a lot of what I've been thinking over the past few years, so go and read . . .

An Encounter: ROK Squads Fresh from Exercises Near Uijeongbu?

Quirky Frog Fountain
Amphibious Exercise?
Not ROK Soldiers!
Visit Seoul

I can hardly yet still scarcely grasp that, due to my heavy workload, well over a year had passed since my previous bike ride (a serious one, I mean), but truth is that only on Thursday two days ago did I actually find time for a long longed-for long ride along the long nearby Jungnang Stream (Jungnangcheon: 중랑천), a tributary of Seoul's Han River. I've written before about bike trips along this urban-to-rural-to-urban stream. Although I start out from our apartment, I first enter the bike path along the stream just over the levee from the quirky frog fountain seen above. From that point, everything's uphill as I ride upstream several kilometers to the the familiar pathside beer place, which I finally revisited the day before yesterday, too.

But some kilometers along the way, just after reaching the bridge that I always take in crossing the stream, I encountered a squad of Korean soldiers walking single-file behind an officer and a flagman -- maybe ten to fifteen men -- soon followed by another squad with a different flag, then another, and another, and another, and on and on, the soldiers bearing arms, a few even bazookas! I must have passed more than 200, maybe more than 300. Could have been 500. If I'd been more alert, I'd have counted the flags and calculated from that number. They were all heading south as I biked north in the direction of Uijeongbu.

Something was going on, an exercise of some sort, but I only found out yesterday in my copy of Korean Peninsula Through the Lens (KPTL, Volume V, Issue 97, Friday, 17 May 2013):

A South Korean soldier cleans his gun after a CBR (chemical, biological and radiological) warfare training at Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi Province, north of Seoul on May 16, 2013. Held between Korean and U.S. military, the exercise is meant to affirm and improve their joint management system.

That explanation came with a photo, but I could neither copy nor link to it, so here's the link to a different site showing scenes of the same exercise (which I also couldn't copy). Here's yet another site, which allowed copying.

This is from Tempo (May 16, 2013), in an article titled "Anticipation of Chemical Weapons":

U.S. soldiers scan two South Korean soldiers during their decontamination training against possible chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats at Steel Zenith Field Training Exercise in Yeoncheon (16/5). REUTERS/Lee Jae-Won

Yeoncheon is north of Seoul (as noted in KPTL), further north than Uijeongbu, but the latter also has a lot of U.S. and Korean military bases to account for what I saw, though I didn't notice any gas masks, and my impression was that the soldiers were finished with an exercise of some sort.

That encounter reminded me that this divided peninsula remains not entirely at peace . . .

Professor Suh Ji-moon on Namdaemun (Sungryemun)

My friend Professor Suh Ji-moon (English Literature, Korea University) and I recently advised the Korean government's Cultural Heritage Administration -- part of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism -- on the English translation of the plaque that offers historical information on the restored Namdaemun (Great South Gate, aka Sungryemun, set ablaze by an arsonist in 2008), and she sent me some photographs with an email:

I'd put aside yesterday afternoon to go and see the restored Sungryemun and the plaque, and I did go, in spite of the rain -- which was not heavy, but enough to interfere with photo taking. There are two identical plaques on two sides of the gate plaza (if the small space can be called that) . . . . Before the fire, it never occurred to me to go near the gate to observe it at close range. I overheard, at the gate, people saying that before the fire, viewers were allowed to go up the stairs to see the gatehouse but that the house is closed to public now, becuase that's how the arsonist had access to the house and set fire . . . .

I guess the English part of the plaque couldn't be much better, given its basis on the Korean . . . . Anyway, thanks again for your kind help.

Such were her words about their work . . . and ours. Also, here are her photos:

Above are the gate and restored walls, and below are some of the decorations:

Below is the historical marker, or plaque:

If you click on the image, you'll be able to read the plaque's words, which Professor Moon translated and I edited -- except that the people who actually constructed the plaque changed our punctuation slightly and twice left out the essential space required before a parenthesis.

They may even have reworded a slight bit. I'm not sure . . .

Seoul Incarnate!

Seoul's Gangnam
Photo by Zeng Han
NYT Magazine

The New York Times Magazine has an interesting, if somewhat superficial, article on Seoul by Phoebe Eaton, cleverly titled "The Reincarnation of Seoul" (March 22, 2013):

"Pali! Pali!" everybody likes to say. Faster! Faster! South Korea has been sprinting down the road to recovery since the end of the Korean War. As fast as PSY's "Gangnam Style" anthem, mocking Seoul's Ferrari-and-furs nouveaux riches, galloped to the top of the Western music charts this year, the city has emerged as one of the most hip (and most underrated) cultural capitals in the world. Cruise-line-proportioned flagships, architecturally bombastic headquarters, museums celebrating traditional houses to handbags, haute and hot restaurants are all competing for the attention of its 10 million increasingly affluent residents.

Koreans have the reputation for being nose-to-the-grindstone, study-smarties. But looking around Seoul today, one can only conclude they're ready to enjoy themselves. It's no longer the city voted least favorite layover in the Far East. Let everyone rabbit on about how places like Shanghai are The Future: Seoul residents are smarter dressers; its restaurants feel more fussed over, more daring; and after an early force-feed of education, everyone's creative, individualist side is emerging.

South Korea never just apes the West but puts its own topspin on music, fashion, food, technology. Apple may have won its patent-infringement lawsuit against Samsung, but Samsung's Galaxy S III is neck and neck with the iPhone 5 in stores, early to the notion that people wanted smartphones with bigger screens. Samsung has overtaken Sony as the world's biggest maker of TVs. "Apple takes forever to develop a jewel of a phone, but Samsung, they just throw it out there. Bam-bam-bam!," says the architect Euhlo Suh. "People don't like this feature? Let's make another one. Bam-bam-bam!"

That's just the hardware. Content has arrived, too. The cultural wave rolling from these shores already has a name -- hallyu -- literally, the Korean Wave, coined by awestruck Chinese who were the first to acknowledge Korea's revised profile in Asia. Its "K-pop" music and television shows have been embraced with such a Pacific Basin bear hug that money from these sectors alone buoys South Korea's economy by $4.5 billion a year. This year, Korean directors transitioned from Hallyuwood to Hollywood, and will open their first English-language films, starring Arnold Schwarzenegger and Nicole Kidman.

Seoul is reincarnating itself as a world-class city with daring architecture and an eye for art and fashion. Quite an exciting place to be right now, even for an old man like me! The article doesn't exactly do the city justice, but it's a fun read, especially for a resident foreigner who can chuckle over exaggerations like "the all-powerful mayor" and "the economy-minded socialist government" -- meaning the city government, of course, which has a mayor with leftist views, but Seoul doesn't have a socialist government, nor is the mayor omnipotent, so Ms. Eaton is perhaps joking? Pyongyang, Seoul ain't.

I'd comment more on the article, but I'm too busy, and you can click on over there and read for yourself, or go directly to the interactive slide show, or even plan your itinerary of where to eat, drink, and stay on a visit to Seoul.

What North Korea Wants to Gain by Threats of Nuclear War

Kim Jong-un with Scepter
"Oh . . . right. That's west. I forgot we're North Korea."
Picture: AP
April 4, 2013
Metro News

Does North Korea want war?

Family and friends back in the States and other places have been sending me worried emails, asking if I'm afraid the North Korean regime might start a war, so I thought I might as well quell the fears of others by assuring everybody that war is the last thing that North Korea wants since that would likely bring its entire system down, thereby ending the elite's luxurious lifestyle and effectively rendering them powerless and subject to judgment for their crimes against their own people.

But if they don't want war, what's all the bluster about?

It's an old game carried to unprecedented extremes this time. For too long, the North would fabricate a crisis whenever it needed food aid or political concessions or something else from the outside world. The world would grow alarmed and offer something. The North would accept and be on good behavior for a while . . . until it needed something new, when it would fabricate another crisis.

But why are they sounding so much more extreme this time?

Two reasons.

First, the game isn't working this time because everybody's figured out how it works and everyone now refuses to play the game, so the North is trying harder to scare everybody into fearing the bluster is genuine.

Second, Kim Jong-un needs to look tough, and what's more, given his youth and inexperience, he has to look even tougher to get the respect of the military, the party, and the people.

So . . . has he gone too far to back down since he's receiving nothing from the outside world?

He hasn't gone too far, and he won't have to back down at all. He has claimed that the yearly, routine, defensive Field Training Exercise (FTX) conducted by South Korea and the United States is a preparation for invasion of the North using nuclear weapons, so when this exercise is finished, he will be able to claim that North Korea's resolve and military power, based on its own nuclear weapons program, intimidated the imperialistic Americans and saved the North from invasion.

That's how I see things, so you can all stop worrying about me . . . unless Kim Jong-un miscalculates, goes insane, or turns out to be really, really stupid.

In which case, thanks for your loyal readership . . .

A Near Miss . . .

Here's Looking at You, Kid!

Google Images

My cyber-friend Malcolm Pollack, who blogs at Waka Waka Waka, landed in Seoul last Friday morning at 4:00 a.m. and was delayed at the airport until 4:00 p.m. for his flight on to China:

We are here now. Our flight from JFK touched down at Incheon at about 4 a.m. (as I write, it's about 6 a.m. local time).

Our 9:40 flight to Guangzhou has now been delayed until 4 p.m. due to bad weather in Guangzhou. We will be weary travelers indeed by the time we get there . . .

Friday being a very busy day for me, I had no freedom to drop by the airport, so I wish his time in the airport had been on a Saturday:

Sorry to hear of the delay . . . though if today were Saturday, I'd come meet you at the airport for a drink.

Have a good trip!

In response to that, I received an email:

Thanks Jeff!

This flight on Korean Air, and visit to the airport, has made me more curious than ever about Korea, and I'm sure we'll be back. (As long as Kim Young 'Un) doesn't do anything too insane.

Speaking of which, what's the mood like in the South about all this saber-rattling? Are people seriously concerned about the possibility of an attack?

I replied to the full extent of my ignorance:

Noticeable about the rhetoric emanating from the North this time are its specificity and its dire character, so people have certainly taken note. But we are reassured -- and I agree -- that the North has no desire for a war that would bring down its system. Moreover, the North has continued to welcome Chinese tourists and has emphasized [to them] that there will be no war. The North is probably aiming much of its rhetoric at its domestic audience, trying to make the 'Young'un' look like a tough leader. The only danger is the possibility of a miscalculation.

Malcolm had flown on to China by then, so I heard no more. A near miss. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un's war rhetoric waxes ever more weird, but I'm hoping for nothing worse than a "near miss" there, too . . .

Granieri on the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the Power of Individuals, and the Unpredictability of History

Ronald J. Granieri

FPRI

Professor Ronald J. Granieri, a historian of modern Germany, has written a timely article for those of us living in South Korea during these unstable, unsettling times, "The Fall of the Berlin Wall, the Power of Individuals, and the Unpredictability of History" (E-Notes, FPRI, March 2013). Here's how he opens his paper:

German unification was one of the most dramatic developments in contemporary history, as well as one of the most unexpected. After decades during which the press and public measured political wisdom according to how well leaders managed the apparently permanent realities of German and European division, leaders in 1989 had to improvise responses to the literal collapse of the most concrete of those realities in Berlin. As much as German politicians had claimed for years to be hoping for this day, none had actual plans ready. Into this potentially dangerous vacuum stepped a most unlikely improviser. Helmut Kohl was a reasonably successful party leader of enormous bulk and moderate political gifts, generally underestimated even by his political allies and known neither for creativity nor dynamism. To the surprise of all, he proved remarkably adept at managing the international and domestic complications of 1989. Within thirteen months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he rode successful reunification negotiations to a landslide victory in the first all-German democratic elections since 1932. Even if many of his decisions during those months can be (and have been) questioned, his place in history is assured.

And here's Granieri's main point:

Kohl's story provides but one of many crucial insights into how the story of German reunification displays both the limits of realism and the unpredictability of history. That unpredictability reminds us of the role that individuals can still play in the modern world, even in the face of enormous complexity. For it was the combined actions of individuals, neither beginning nor ending with Kohl, who changed the world in 1989, and all students of international affairs can profit from reexamining that dramatic story.

The combined actions, yes, but Granieri makes clear in the paragraphs that follow these opening ones that a leader other than Kohl might have made a misstep. I remember those days, for I was living in Germany at the time. Kohl read the timepiece of history correctly, unlike many German politicians, and took bold steps that were possible for two reasons: 1) people trusted him because 2) they thought he wasn't smart enough to be crafty. But like Reagan, Kohl was smarter than people gave him credit for, though he was fairly honest for a politician, so people were half right, but for the wrong reason.

Why is this article timely? Because it chastens us from making bold predictions about what might happen up North, or about who might step into the breach of history here in the South during a time of crisis . . .

China's 'Policy' Toward North Korea

China

Wikipedia

Hanyang University law professor Lee Jae-min asks a good question in his Korea Herald column this week: "Why do we keep losing this game?" (March 20, 2013). By that, he means why does North Korea continue to have the advantage over South Korea in getting what it wants in its nuclear aims. Part of the answer is China, which is the North's ally, of course, and supports it for that reason, but more important than the alliance is China's fear that enforcing sanctions on the North could precipitate its collapse and destabilize Northeast Asia. Professor Lee knows all this, of course. But things have changed since the North's third nuclear test recently, he notes, and he offers a suggestion:

Perhaps one thing to consider in this regard is how to make Beijing fully aware that an unbridled, nuclear-armed North Korea would undermine its national interest. In light of this, it is interesting to watch the reportedly growing complaints in China against North Korea after its nuclear test.

This ought to be simple enough since a nuclear-armed North Korea is very destabilizing for Northeast Asia, but China should have recognized this twenty years ago, when we already knew that the North was pursuing a nuclear program. Individual Chinese did see the problem, and commented on it as against China's interests, but the Chinese government was less clear. Why has the Chinese leadership failed? Seton Hall University professor of international relations Zheng Wang asks a pertinent question in the New York Times: "Does China Have a Foreign Policy?" (March 18, 2013). Here's what he says:

While many Western analysts focus on the balance of reformers and conservatives in China's new leadership, most overlook the absence of career diplomats and foreign affairs experts at the highest level of power in Beijing . . . . [T]he position that foreign policy occupies in the Chinese political system is very low . . . . China watchers have a tendency to overstate the sophistication of Beijing's foreign policy and ambitions, but the truth is that China's foreign policy is highly deficient . . . . The absence of clear policy . . . partly explains why China lacks decisive influence even over strategic allies who depend most on its support, like North Korea . . . . North Korea's recent nuclear test and decision to nullify the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War is but the latest example. If a country [such as China] does not have a clear foreign policy, it will not know when, where and how to use its power. It cannot provide a road map for its allies to follow.

If Professor Wang is right, then helping Beijing see its national interests in the North Korean conundrum might prove difficult.

We can only try . . .

Deng Yuwen and China's Relations toward North Korea

Deng Yuwen
"'Give up on Pyongyang,' says China insider"

JoongAng Daily

According to Deng Yuwen, deputy editor of Study Times, journal of the Central Party School of China's Communist Party, in an article, "China should abandon North Korea," written for the Financial Times (February 27, 2013), China should cut North Korea loose, especially since the North's recent nuclear test. Why? Five reasons:

First, a relationship between states based on ideology is dangerous.

Ostensibly, China's foreign relations should be based on China's national interests.

Second, basing China's strategic security on North Korea's value as a geopolitical ally is outdated.

North Korea offers not security, but insecurity! Its provocative actions draw animosity toward China.

Third, North Korea will not reform and open up to the world.

If the North reforms, it will collapse. Why should China support a regime that will eventually fail?

Fourth, North Korea is pulling away from Beijing.

Why hold to close relations with a regime that shows no gratitude to China, a regime that has even excised from its history China's support during the Korean War?

Last, once North Korea has nuclear weapons, it cannot be ruled out that the capricious Kim regime will engage in nuclear blackmail against China.

The North shows actual animosity toward China, implicitly using its nuclear card against the Chinese. Deng's conclusion:

Considering these arguments, China should consider abandoning North Korea. The best way of giving up on Pyongyang is to take the initiative to facilitate North Korea's unification with South Korea. Bringing about the peninsula's unification would help undermine the strategic alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul; ease the geopolitical pressure on China from northeast Asia; and be helpful to the resolution of the Taiwan question.

This would probably work for China only if US troops were withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula, as Deng makes clear in an interview with the JoongAng Daily. That might be worth the result . . .

Enormous Cadaver Shattered by North Korean Knife!

North Korean Flag

Google Images

I mentioned the other day that I receive the Korea Open Source Digest weekdays. Well, yesterday, Volume VI, Issue 31 (Friday, 15 February 2013) arrived with a wonderfully unbalanced article by a certain Tong T'ae-kwan for North Korea's Rodong Sinmun (2/14/13). Titled "Time Will Prove," it argued that North Korea was right about conducting the recent nuclear test, and the rest of the world wrong in condemning it, because the United States was misleading every other country by pretending to speak for the world through the United Nations. The best line was this one:

We can raise the knife of justice and break into pieces the enormous cadaver that tries to hide its true identity concealed underneath noisy twisted logic and its blood-smeared face borrowing the face of the UN. (page 1-24)

To write a sentence like that one -- in which a dead body uses twisted logic and a UN face mask to hide its true, bloody-faced identity until shattered by a juridical knife -- requires a special literary sort of linguistic genius! The South Koreans can only manage a poor substitute for tortured English, as with the caption from this photograph for the JoongAng Daily, "Better than tractors":

Young students stomp the ground covered

with barley sprouts yesterday in Ulju County, Ulsan,

as fresh spouts have come up with the warmer weather.

It is common practice to pack the ground

as the soil unthaws after winter.

Let that ground 'unthaw' as much as it wants, it'll never match the logic-twisting cadaver!

Speaking Irony to Suspicion

Balbina Hwang
Not the sort to lose face . . .
Korea Herald

Sometimes, when the context doesn't require speaking truth to power, it might offer opportunity for speaking irony to suspicion, as Professor Balbina Hwang does with journalist Song Sang-ho in this Korea Herald interview, "Obama won't budge unless N.K. acts first" (January 11, 2012)

KH: How do you analyze the true intentions behind President Obama's recent reference to China as an "adversary" as well as a potential partner?

Hwang: Foreigners are often overly suspicious about "true intentions" or motives behind U.S. leaders. There is no hidden intention or meaning, other than exactly what President Obama stated: that on some issues, China is and should be a partner, but on many others, China is an adversary.

I like the implied retort: The hidden intention is the one hidden by suspicion of a hidden intention. Just take Obama's words at their face value, folks. In short, accept the obvious. I appreciate that Professor Hwang is the one explaining this to the Korea Herald, for having a Korean point it out raises the credibility among Koreans.

Or maybe not. Koreans might suspect Professor Hwang of trying to hide something, and therefore ask themselves, "What are her true intentions?"

Think of the Tablo case . . .

Dokdo Shown as Korean Territory in Japanese Textbook?

Dokdo in Japanese Textbook?

Korea Herald

Any expat who's spent a bit of time in Korea -- say, five minutes -- has already heard an earful on the Dokdo issue, those two rocks in the Sea of Japan (known to Koreans as the East Sea) that are claimed by Japan but possessed by Korea. Both countries point to maps as proof of valid possession, but the maps are often obscure and the arguments convoluted. Officially, my position is that Dokdo belongs to Korea. Unofficially, how would I know? I'm no expert. But to my relatively uninformed mind, Korea has a stronger claim, and for two reasons.

First, when Japan officially declared Dokdo (which they call Takeshima) to be Japanese territory in 1905, they did so on the basis of terra nullius, namely, that the rocks were land unclaimed by any state, evidence that Japan was not basing its official claim on longstanding Japanese possession.

Second, Japan actually seems to have considered the islets as Korean possessions, according to an article in Wednesday's Korea Herald, "Japan's old textbooks show Dokdo as Korean territory" (August 29, 2012):

Japanese textbooks from the late 19th century, written and published by the country's Culture Ministry at the time, indicate Dokdo as Korean territory, the Independence Hall of Korea announced on Tuesday[, noting that these] . . . textbooks -- mostly from the 1880s and some from the early 1900s -- prove that Japan's current claim over the islets is false . . . . "These books were written and published by the Japanese government at the time," said the Independence Hall of Korea institution, after unveiling five textbooks and two sets of maps of Japan to the public . . . . "This shows that the Japanese government did not consider Dokdo as part of their territory before Japan took over the islets during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. This is another clear proof that Japan stole Dokdo even before it annexed Korea."

I'm a bit perplexed, however, by the map shown above, for its English caption reads as follows:

A map in a Japanese textbook published by the nation's Culture Ministry in 1896 shows Dokdo as belonging to Korea. The shaded areas around the Korean Peninsula indicate Korean territory and Dokdo is shown within them.

The Korean caption, however, uses the date 1887, which left me wondering if that were the actual date given for the textbook in the photo. Both dates are before 1905, of course, and either date would therefore establish Korea's prior claim -- if the tiny easternmost island depicted on the map represents the Dokdo islets (very likely) and if the shaded areas do indicate possession (entirely plausible) -- but carelessness never inspires confidence. I tried contacting the Korea Herald with the following query:

Dear Ms. Lee,

In the online article on Dokdo:

Here.

I see two different dates beneath the map: 1887 in Korean and 1896 in English.

I am intending to post a blog entry on this textbook, so I need to know which date is correct.

Also, does the textbook explicitly state that the shaded areas are national territory?

I ask not to challenge (since I side with Korea on Dokdo) but to clarify.

Best Regards,

Jeffery Hodges

In return, I received this from the "Postmaster" at the Korea Herald:

Action: failed

I tried from a different email. My wife then tried from hers. All three failed. So much for the Herald's openness to its readers. Meanwhile, the JoongAng Daily, in an article by Kim Hee-jin, "Old Japanese textbooks state 'Dokdo is Korea's'" (August 30, 2012), seems to clarify the date as 1887, for apparently the same map is depicted. Neither map identifies the island, so far as I can see, though the island definitely looks correct for Dokdo's position.

But I'd still like to know for certain if the Japanese textbook with this map explicitly states that the shaded areas are national territory . . .

Appa Gangland Style!

Kim Seung-Youn
Image from 2007
Google Images

I remember Kim Seung-Youn! As Choe Sang-Hun reminds us in his article "Seoul Judge Surprises Tycoon With Prison Term" (New York Times, August 16, 2012):

In 2007 he was briefly jailed for an attack on bar workers who had attacked his son in a drunken brawl. While his bodyguards watched, Mr. Kim assaulted one of the victims with a metal pipe . . .

Appa Gangland Style! As I recall, he was given a light sentence at that time because he had acted out of "love for his son," for everyone knows that the finest expression of fatherhood is to kidnap somebody who got into a fight with your son and beat him with a metal pipe!

I showed the news of Mr. Kim's recent conviction for embezzlement to my wife, who remarked that she hopes his company doesn't suffer financially because we have insurance from it. Turns out, we're paying this guy protection money?

I better keep my head down.

Postscript (August 23, 2012): Just in case future readers miss the joke, the title of this post is a pun on the currently very popular song Oppa Gangnam Style.

Margaret Heffernan: "Dare to Disagree"

Margaret Heffernan

Homepage

Yesterday via LinkedIn, I was given a link to a TED lecture by Margaret Heffernan titled "Dare to Disagree," a presentation that I realized fits with my views on a culture of discussion and that needs to be deeply reflected upon by Koreans. Expressing disagreement is never easy, as Ms. Heffernan acknowledges:

[R]ecently, I worked with an executive named Joe, and Joe worked for a medical device company. And Joe was very worried about the device that he was working on. He thought that it was too complicated and he thought that its complexity created margins of error that could really hurt people. He was afraid of doing damage to the patients he was trying to help. But when he looked around his organization, nobody else seemed to be at all worried. So, he didn't really want to say anything. After all, maybe they knew something he didn't. Maybe he'd look stupid. But he kept worrying about it, and he worried about it so much that he got to the point where he thought the only thing he could do was leave a job he loved.

Think about that. Joe was almost more willing to quit his job than disagree with others. And that was in the West! Imagine the barriers in Korea, where hierarchy sets up multiple roadblocks! What did Joe do:

In the end, Joe and I found a way for him to raise his concerns. And what happened then is what almost always happens in this situation [in the West]. It turned out everybody had exactly the same questions and doubts. So now Joe had allies. They could think together. And yes, there was a lot of conflict and debate and argument, but that allowed everyone around the table to be creative, to solve the problem, and to change the device.

The royal road to truth is through conflict and debate, not through superficial harmony, as becomes clear by another of of Ms. Heffernan's anecdotes. A brilliant doctor in the 1950s named Alice Stewart linked childhood cancer to the practice of X-raying pregnant women, but the medical establishment was against her, so she had to be sure that she was right:

So, how did she know that she was right? Well, she had a fantastic model for thinking. She worked with a statistician named George Kneale, and George was pretty much everything that Alice wasn't. So, Alice was very outgoing and sociable, and George was a recluse. Alice was very warm, very empathetic with her patients. George frankly preferred numbers to people. But he said this fantastic thing about their working relationship. He said, "My job is to prove Dr. Stewart wrong." He actively sought disconfirmation. Different ways of looking at her models, at her statistics, different ways of crunching the data in order to disprove her. He saw his job as creating conflict around her theories. Because it was only by not being able to prove that she was wrong, that George could give Alice the confidence she needed to know that she was right.

It's a fantastic model of collaboration -- thinking partners who aren't echo chambers. I wonder how many of us have, or dare to have, such collaborators. Alice and George were very good at conflict. They saw it as thinking.

And that's what we -- Westerners, Easterners, Koreans -- need to master, the art of disagreement! We need to accept the likelihood of being wrong -- and called on it -- for the unlikelihood of being right!

The link given above is to a YouTube video, but some will be able to view the video directly on the TED site, where one can also read the transcript not only in English but also other languages, including Korean.

Brief Vacation: One Night, Two Days East of Seoul

Sa-Rah excepted, for she preferred sighting Seoul sites, our family took our own 1 Night 2 Days (cf. 1박 2일) vacation last week east of Seoul, in and around Cheongpyeong, where we were greeted by the locals in a friendly, smiling manner.

En-Uk stood undaunted in the face of such fierce friendliness, and returned the smile.

We took a walk along that road where we'd received such a lively greeting.

After a change of clothes, a walk along along a more distant road, intent on hiking up a small mountain.

We took the 'broken bridge' crossing to the mountain side of the stream.

Halfway up the mountain, we stopped, looked down upon the reservoir formed by Cheongpyeong Dam, which supplies drinking water for Seoul but is currently threatened by green algae due to a paucity of rain.

One day and another change of clothes later, we drove around on Nami Island, which has playfully declared itself independent of Korea and called itself the "Republic of Nami," but I didn't see a national assembly, so it doesn't appear to be a democracy. Indeed, I saw no evidence of government, so the place is perhaps an anarchist state . . . if that's not an oxymoron.

Although the Republic of Nami lacks a government, it does have a national religion, for its people worship the Truly Great Big Mother.

She's nourishing her two children and seems unconcerned that the one standing is also relieving himself on her feet!

Here, you see their size, compared to En-Uk and me. En-Uk, impervious to the fear and trembling that otherwise accompanies encounters with "The Holy," thinks this is all very amusing and takes liberties with the idolatry, but I expected no less from a boy undaunted by a stone-strong tiger!

And that was this simmering summer's short vacation, with photos by my wife, who's camera-shy only in front of a camera . . .

Noteworthy 'Progress' in Korean Leftist Politics . . .

Oxymoronic 'United Progressive' Party Brawl

Korea Herald

As the above photo suggests, the United Progressive Party (UPP) may be a party, but it's hardly united or progressive, though -- as journalist Lee Hoo-Jee reports -- this so-called "Progressive party [is] on [the] verge of collapse" (Korea Herald, May 13, 2012), so there's at least some movement. Let's look a bit more closely at what's taking place -- and be aware that the reporter is using "mainstream" where "majority" would be more appropriate:

The UPP's mainstream party members clashed violently with the non-mainstream members at the central committee meeting convened to discuss the replacement of the current leadership with an interim emergency committee.

The mainstream members, also known as the "National Liberation" group, have refused to accept the party's internal investigation that ruled there were widespread irregularities during the voting of candidates for the party's proportional parliamentary seats. One of the winners of the proportional seat on the UPP ticket is Lee Seok-gi, who is considered one of the key NL factionists.

"They have now shown the public clearly that they will attempt to protect their status at all cost," said Yoon Pyung-joong, a politics professor at Hanshin University.

"It is a great shame as it was indeed an epochal development in Korean politics when the UPP came out the third largest parliamentary bloc (in the general elections), enabling aligned moves by various progressive forces in the future, which also reflected the spirit of the times."

That analysis comes from my old friend Professor Yoon Pyung-joong, whom I got to know during my three years at Hanshin University and who was one of the Leftist protesters against the rightwing dictatorship in Korea during the 1970s and 1980s but who has moved to the center over the past 15 years or so. His point is that the National Liberation faction of the UPP has thrown away the far Left's opportunity for political participation by demonstrating that it will turn to violence even against fellow Leftists to force its way. At issue is a vote-rigging scandal among Leftists that has already caused great dissatisfaction in Korea. I'm guessing that the NL's violent response to the findings of the UPP's own investigation implies that the NL itself is culpable for a lot of the vote-rigging.

Indeed, if reporter Kim Hee-jin is correct -- "UPP's internal meltdown was a long time coming" (Korea JoongAng Daily, May 14, 2012) -- the NL is hardly a democratic faction, but rather a group willing to play dirty for political power:

[B]ehind the vote-rigging debate is a significant ideological gap between the UPP members.

They were mostly former socialist student activists during the democratization movement in the 1970s and 1980s, but split into two groups: the so-called National Liberalization (NL) group, which followed North Korea's juche (self-reliance) ideology, and the Marxist-Leninist group called the People's Democracy (PD).

The party's largest faction is made up of former members of the Gyeonggi Dongbu Alliance, a regional chapter of NL members based in eastern Gyeonggi. Lawmaker-elect Lee Seok-gi is reportedly the leader of the alliance.

Although the two groups fought against the dictatorial administrations in the 1970s and 1980s and have some common policies such as advocating for minorities and labor activists, the PD members still haven't agreed on the largest faction's fringe, far-left socialism and reunification ideology that would have Pyongyang absorb the South.

The three co-chairmen of the UPP are also divided: co-chairwoman Lee Jung-hee is with the NL and Rhyu and Sim the PD.

"The NL members are biased toward pro-North ideology and it doesn't fit with today's democracy," said Shin Yul, a politics professor at Myongji University. "But the PD group is relatively rational, following European socialism, and they are critical of North Korean economics and politics."

Gyeonggi Governor Kim Moon-soo told reporters on May 5 that he is aware of the political ideology of the so-called NL members.

"I spent a year with the NL members in prison, so I know them very well through conversation," Kim said. "They think those who don't follow the [North Korean] leader are traitors. They also think they could do whatever the 'dear leader' said and not feel guilty."

The upshot is that whereas the People's Democracy group is a Marxist-Leninist faction that has evolved into something of a reformist party in a development that perhaps reflects (albeit more rapidly) the history of the European Social Democrats, the National Liberalization (NL) group is a hardcore Leftist faction that has failed to develop, toes the North Korean line, and makes no commitment to liberal democracy, but is instead fuly prepared to use violence to protect its political advantage gained in the recent elections, an advantage that looks to me to have been gained through vote-rigging by the NL itself, given its rejection of the UPP's own investigation. If the NL is willing to attack and brutally beat fellow Leftists, imagine how they'd treat their ideological opponents on the right!

Click on all three articles to read more -- that includes the link below the photograph -- and if anyone knows more about this NL group, let us know whether the initials stand for "National Liberation" or "National Liberalization."

Changing Beer Tastes in Korea?

Beer Imports in Korea

JoongAng Ilbo

Good beer is the next big thing in Korea. Get in quickly if you're an investor because change happens fast in the land of mourning calm long gone -- just look at the astonishingly abrupt change in the taste for coffee. As recently as 2005, I was still bemoaning the paucity of good coffee here in Korea. Now, it's available everywhere! Likewise, tastes in beer are changing, and Korean drinkers -- having traveled and experienced the worldwide brotherhood of beer -- are no longer willing to accept low standards here in their own country:

Budweiser . . . [is] classified as [a] domestic [product] . . . because . . . [it is] produced under license by Korea's Oriental Brewery. This has led to complaints that . . . [it doesn't] taste as good here as in . . . the United States.

Well . . . okay, but Korean tastes have to start changing somewhere, and believe me, they'll improve and change fast. Very fast. Anyway, the same article, "Miller time for foreign beers as tastes change" (yeah, I know, but God's millers also grind slow), which was published in the JoongAng Daily for April 28, 2012 and written by business reporter Kim Mi-ju, notes other, far better beers that Koreans are beginning to drink:

Now it is easy to find a pint of Guinness on tap in fashionable Seoul nightspots like Hongdae or Gangnam . . . . Meanwhile, franchise bars such as Wa Bar have even set up shop near City Hall to offer tired civil servants a choice of over 90 foreign beers from as far afield as Austria, South Africa and India . . . . [R]etailers and beer manufacturers here are zeroing in on the changing tastes of local consumers and their developing taste for richer hops and malts . . . . Homeplus said it will expand its selection of beers from 141 last year to 230 in 2012 as it places its faith in the domestic market's clamor . . . for diversity and quality . . . . Distributor Diageo Korea brought Irish red ale Smithwick's to Korea earlier this month to tap the growing desire for premium imported beers . . . [and] already distributes Guinness Irish stout . . . . Around 3,500 pubs and restaurants sell Asahi draft . . . . Heineken Korea said sales of its Dutch beer went up 1.7 percent last year . . . . Foreign beers are estimated to grow to 10 percent of Korea's total beer market in a few years . . . . Retailers have been expanding their foreign beer portfolios since 2010 in tandem with the mushrooming number of pubs that specialize in selling them . . . . [S]ales of domestic beers and soju dropped by 7 percent each in the first quarter of this year, [while] sales of foreign beers rose 21 percent . . . . On a similar note, Lotte Mart said it will increase its selection of imported beers by more than 15 percent to 150 after it saw on-year sales grow 16.8 percent in the first quarter.

Apologies to various individuals for mashing together their quotes from the article, but I wanted to summarize the central point succinctly, namely, that tastes in beer are changing fast and that the market for good beer is primed to grow. Investors should get in now if they want to make money, for there's money to be made, not only in imports, but also in the growth of the local craft beer sector.

But, of course, the best beer in Korea is still to be found at the Craftworks Taphouse . . .

The Gypsy Gets Interviewed . . .

Tiffany Zappulla

Linked In

Some weeks ago, Ms. Tiffany Zappulla contacted me about an article that she was writing on English teaching in Korea and asked for my perspective on the university sector, along with other questions. She has now published her article, "ESL in the Fast Lane: Lessons in Teaching English in South Korea" (Vagabond Journey, April 24, 2012), which distills the views of various instructors of English here in Korea. Here's where she presents me and my views:

Jeffery Hodges of the blog Gypsy Scholar, who earned his doctoral degree in history at UC Berkeley, tutored in Switzerland and taught in Germany, Australia, and several academies and universities in South Korea before settling at Ewha University's English Program Office in 2009, where he teaches writing and also does editing and translations on the side. Altogether, Hodges has been living and teaching in South Korea for 12 years (and plans to retire there), an impressive stint considering that many who come as fresh graduates don't last out their year-long contracts.

In general, Hodges feels that adult learners are more motivated to learn English, but that students' pre-college education poses limits to Western-style learning: "Students here are too passive and tend to plagiarize because they haven't been taught not to and because their education is mostly rote memorization and doesn't encourage creativity," Hodges said.

The austere hierarchy system -- a remnant of Korea's Confucian past -- can also stifle analytical and critical thinking. "In Korea, decisions are made above and handed down without allowing for much feedback, which is a bit frustrating," Hodges explained. "Know that contracts are not sacrosanct, that decisions are made from above, and discussion won't take place. Also, don't get angry at student plagiarism; just catch it, and explain that it will get students a low grade."

. . .

Hodges also touched upon one aspect of adaptation that holds a lot of weight in a neo-Confucian society: obedience and realizing the goals of the group as a whole. "My method: Do the job, don't complain, be helpful and cheerful," he explained. "I get along with my co-workers, who are mostly Western, so there's little cultural misunderstanding. I also have friendly relations with Korean co-workers and staff." First impressions are universal, and one-time events can come back to haunt you, especially in the workplace.

I wish that I'd known these things from the beginning of my teaching career in Korea. Much would have worked out better. But I can't really complain much -- nor should I, if I follow my own advice!

For the entire article, which includes the views of other instructors, go here.

Table Talk: Homesickness?

Kaye Blegvad, Artist
New York Times

Susan J. Matt, a professor of history at Weber State University (Ogden, Utah), but writing an op-ed for the NYT (March 21, 2012), tells of how "The New Globalist Is Homesick":

In nearly a decade's research into the emotions and experiences of immigrants and migrants, I've discovered that many people who leave home in search of better prospects end up feeling displaced and depressed.

This might not seem especially surprising, for everyone has experienced homesickness, but a statistic provided by Professor Matt did catch my eye, namely, that "20 to 40 percent of all immigrants to the United States ultimately return to their native lands"! Migrants returning doesn't surprise me, but immigrants? Surprising. Even more surprising was the shift in attitudes about admitting to homesickness:

In the 19th century, Americans . . . admitted that mobility was emotionally taxing . . . . Stories of the devastating effects of homesickness were common . . . . Today, explicit discussions of homesickness are rare, for the emotion is typically regarded as an embarrassing impediment to individual progress and prosperity.

Think about that. Those tough men and women of the 19th century gave voice to their emotions. I'd always imagined them stoical, but we contemporary folk seem more closed-mouth about our feelings than they were . . . with respect to homesickness, anyway.

I'm also silent about feeling homesick, but that's because I don't feel any homesickness at all, despite my many years abroad -- indeed, probably because of them. I'm used to being away from home. My only adult case of homesickness occurred during my first year at Baylor University, way back in 1975 to 1976, when I was still adjusting to life in the 'big' city of Waco, Texas and powerfully missing the Arkansas Ozarks.

In Korea, by contrast, I feel no homesickness at all. Neither voluble nor stoical about any putative homesickness, I am perfectly satisfied, even happy here.

There must be something wrong with me . . .

Multicultural 'Deceit' in Korea?

Monument to Multiculturalism
Francesco Pirelli
Some cultures would destroy this statue . . .
Wikipedia

I read a disturbing article in yesterday's JoongAng Daily about cases of migrant workers in Korea deceiving Korean women into marriages of convenience. This is the sort of thing one ought to expect, but according to Yim Seung-hye in "Woman recalls deceit in migrant marriage" (February 23, 2012), the women are naively taken advantage of in many 'multicultural' marriages involving a particular subgroup of migrant workers:

As the number of international marriages continues to rise, there is no shortage of stories painting multiculturalism in a positive light. But one such marriage has left a woman fighting for custody of her son in a trend of marital deception that appears to be growing.

The woman, who asked to be identified only as Oh, 38, is part of an Internet group with thousands of members who have suffered as a result of marriages with Pakistani and Bangladeshi men. The Korean women writing there have shared stories of being tricked into marriages with migrant workers from the two countries as well as verbal and physical abuse.

The most disturbing point is that this sort of deceitful marriage has happened to thousands of women. I wish some statistics had been provided, but if the reference to "an Internet group with thousands of members" is accurate, then this may be a huge problem indeed, for this internet group could be just the tip of a very large iceberg. Most of the stories that we read in the papers about so-called 'multicultural' marriages focus on Korean men marrying foreign women, and if those marriages fail to work out, blame often gets placed on the Korean husbands or the Korean in-laws, but the focus in most articles is on successful marriages and on how Koreans need to change and be more open to foreign ways. That message has its downside, as Ms. Oh's case shows:

"There are so many women who have similar stories as mine. Most of us were hesitant to marry a migrant worker, but all of the TV shows and news stories beautifying multiculturalism and the stories of multicultural families living happily in Korea comforted us," Oh said. "But now, all of us are suffering from broken marriages. I just don't want to see any more victims like myself."

My advice to Korean women considering marriage to foreigners is twofold: Get to know the man well first and also get to know the man's culture. Don't depend only on what he says. Read about his home country and the treatment of women there. Find out what his religion teaches about the treatment of women. Don't rely on sources with an interest in painting a rosy picture of other cultures. Look for the dirt that's being swept under the rug. Turn over a few stones and see what turns up. Think hard about the future with a foreigner. For instance, consider what might happen if you did marry a foreigner and had children with him. Could you be certain that on a visit to his home country, your children could not be taken from you by your in-laws? That could happen in some countries where the husband has the legal control over his children.

This advice is sound no matter what the statistics concerning cases such as that of Ms. Oh.

UPDATE: Readers in comments have expressed skepticism about the prevalence of such cases, a point on which I also had questions, but my doubts were very carefully couched, so I've now added a question mark to this blog entry's heading to indicate that I have lingering questions.