Kim Myongsob and I, Cited by Chih-Yu Shih (Zhiyu Shi) on East Asia . . .

Getting Schooled
Google Images

In chapter 8 ("Justifying non-intervention: East Asian Schools of International Relations") of Civilization, Nation and Modernity in East Asia (2012), Chih-Yu Shih (Zhiyu Shi) briefly cites Kim Myongsob and me (in the underlined, bold-fonted words) within the context of a discussion on international relations (IR) in East Asia:

In fact, the quest for a proper role for one's own nation does not belong exclusively to a rising power. Asian intellectuals aspire for indigenous schools of IR that reflect their historical experiences and implicate plausible international norms for a much wider audience (Acharya and Buzan, 2007). However, the recent call for indigenous schools of IR in Asian communities may backfire for two reasons. The first reason is related to the epistemological limitation. The quest for an indigenous school of IR in East Asian communities has its origin in the English School, which conceives IR as a 'society' as opposed to a 'system' in the American IR literature (Little, 2000). For other indigenous schools of IR, the task is to demonstrate that there are different kinds of societal norms other than English anarchy or natural law such as the Chinese all-under-heaven (Zhao T., 2009; Shih, 1990), Japanese Asianism (Mori and Hirano, 2007; Iriye, 1997a), Indian subaltern sensibility and non-alignment (Chatterjee, 1993; Nandy, 1994), Korean civilizational in-betweenness (Kim and Hodges, 2006; 2005), the ASEAN way (Haccke, 2005), and Taiwanese non-sovereign agency (Ling, Hwang and Chen, 2010; Chen C., 2009), etc. However different these societal norms may appear, they reinforce the English School ontology that international relations are not scientific systems or context-free patterns independent from their spatio-temporal settings and hence are epistemologically European in origin.

That's on page 141. The bibliographical entry is on page 223, and to my surprise, I find two items:

Kim, Myongsob and Horace Jeffery Hodges. 2006. 'Korea as a Clashpoint of Civilizations'. Korea Observer 37, 3 (Autumn): 513–545.
Kim, Myongsob and Horace Jeffery Hodges, 2005. 'On Huntington's Civilizational Paradigm: A Reappraisal'. Issues and Studies 41, 2 (June): 217-248.

Most of my scholarly collaborations with Kim Myongsob drew upon the civilizational theory of Samuel Huntington.That's another interest of mine. From the various citations shown over the past several days, I suspect that readers can see why I do, in fact, merit the label "Gypsy Scholar," for I wander hither and yon in search of knowledge.

What North Korea Wants to Gain by Threats of Nuclear War

Kim Jong-un with Scepter
"Oh . . . right. That's west. I forgot we're North Korea."
Picture: AP
April 4, 2013
Metro News

Does North Korea want war?

Family and friends back in the States and other places have been sending me worried emails, asking if I'm afraid the North Korean regime might start a war, so I thought I might as well quell the fears of others by assuring everybody that war is the last thing that North Korea wants since that would likely bring its entire system down, thereby ending the elite's luxurious lifestyle and effectively rendering them powerless and subject to judgment for their crimes against their own people.

But if they don't want war, what's all the bluster about?

It's an old game carried to unprecedented extremes this time. For too long, the North would fabricate a crisis whenever it needed food aid or political concessions or something else from the outside world. The world would grow alarmed and offer something. The North would accept and be on good behavior for a while . . . until it needed something new, when it would fabricate another crisis.

But why are they sounding so much more extreme this time?

Two reasons.

First, the game isn't working this time because everybody's figured out how it works and everyone now refuses to play the game, so the North is trying harder to scare everybody into fearing the bluster is genuine.

Second, Kim Jong-un needs to look tough, and what's more, given his youth and inexperience, he has to look even tougher to get the respect of the military, the party, and the people.

So . . . has he gone too far to back down since he's receiving nothing from the outside world?

He hasn't gone too far, and he won't have to back down at all. He has claimed that the yearly, routine, defensive Field Training Exercise (FTX) conducted by South Korea and the United States is a preparation for invasion of the North using nuclear weapons, so when this exercise is finished, he will be able to claim that North Korea's resolve and military power, based on its own nuclear weapons program, intimidated the imperialistic Americans and saved the North from invasion.

That's how I see things, so you can all stop worrying about me . . . unless Kim Jong-un miscalculates, goes insane, or turns out to be really, really stupid.

In which case, thanks for your loyal readership . . .

Granieri on the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the Power of Individuals, and the Unpredictability of History

Ronald J. Granieri

FPRI

Professor Ronald J. Granieri, a historian of modern Germany, has written a timely article for those of us living in South Korea during these unstable, unsettling times, "The Fall of the Berlin Wall, the Power of Individuals, and the Unpredictability of History" (E-Notes, FPRI, March 2013). Here's how he opens his paper:

German unification was one of the most dramatic developments in contemporary history, as well as one of the most unexpected. After decades during which the press and public measured political wisdom according to how well leaders managed the apparently permanent realities of German and European division, leaders in 1989 had to improvise responses to the literal collapse of the most concrete of those realities in Berlin. As much as German politicians had claimed for years to be hoping for this day, none had actual plans ready. Into this potentially dangerous vacuum stepped a most unlikely improviser. Helmut Kohl was a reasonably successful party leader of enormous bulk and moderate political gifts, generally underestimated even by his political allies and known neither for creativity nor dynamism. To the surprise of all, he proved remarkably adept at managing the international and domestic complications of 1989. Within thirteen months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he rode successful reunification negotiations to a landslide victory in the first all-German democratic elections since 1932. Even if many of his decisions during those months can be (and have been) questioned, his place in history is assured.

And here's Granieri's main point:

Kohl's story provides but one of many crucial insights into how the story of German reunification displays both the limits of realism and the unpredictability of history. That unpredictability reminds us of the role that individuals can still play in the modern world, even in the face of enormous complexity. For it was the combined actions of individuals, neither beginning nor ending with Kohl, who changed the world in 1989, and all students of international affairs can profit from reexamining that dramatic story.

The combined actions, yes, but Granieri makes clear in the paragraphs that follow these opening ones that a leader other than Kohl might have made a misstep. I remember those days, for I was living in Germany at the time. Kohl read the timepiece of history correctly, unlike many German politicians, and took bold steps that were possible for two reasons: 1) people trusted him because 2) they thought he wasn't smart enough to be crafty. But like Reagan, Kohl was smarter than people gave him credit for, though he was fairly honest for a politician, so people were half right, but for the wrong reason.

Why is this article timely? Because it chastens us from making bold predictions about what might happen up North, or about who might step into the breach of history here in the South during a time of crisis . . .

China's 'Policy' Toward North Korea

China

Wikipedia

Hanyang University law professor Lee Jae-min asks a good question in his Korea Herald column this week: "Why do we keep losing this game?" (March 20, 2013). By that, he means why does North Korea continue to have the advantage over South Korea in getting what it wants in its nuclear aims. Part of the answer is China, which is the North's ally, of course, and supports it for that reason, but more important than the alliance is China's fear that enforcing sanctions on the North could precipitate its collapse and destabilize Northeast Asia. Professor Lee knows all this, of course. But things have changed since the North's third nuclear test recently, he notes, and he offers a suggestion:

Perhaps one thing to consider in this regard is how to make Beijing fully aware that an unbridled, nuclear-armed North Korea would undermine its national interest. In light of this, it is interesting to watch the reportedly growing complaints in China against North Korea after its nuclear test.

This ought to be simple enough since a nuclear-armed North Korea is very destabilizing for Northeast Asia, but China should have recognized this twenty years ago, when we already knew that the North was pursuing a nuclear program. Individual Chinese did see the problem, and commented on it as against China's interests, but the Chinese government was less clear. Why has the Chinese leadership failed? Seton Hall University professor of international relations Zheng Wang asks a pertinent question in the New York Times: "Does China Have a Foreign Policy?" (March 18, 2013). Here's what he says:

While many Western analysts focus on the balance of reformers and conservatives in China's new leadership, most overlook the absence of career diplomats and foreign affairs experts at the highest level of power in Beijing . . . . [T]he position that foreign policy occupies in the Chinese political system is very low . . . . China watchers have a tendency to overstate the sophistication of Beijing's foreign policy and ambitions, but the truth is that China's foreign policy is highly deficient . . . . The absence of clear policy . . . partly explains why China lacks decisive influence even over strategic allies who depend most on its support, like North Korea . . . . North Korea's recent nuclear test and decision to nullify the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War is but the latest example. If a country [such as China] does not have a clear foreign policy, it will not know when, where and how to use its power. It cannot provide a road map for its allies to follow.

If Professor Wang is right, then helping Beijing see its national interests in the North Korean conundrum might prove difficult.

We can only try . . .

A Kinder, Gentler, Less Corrupt DPRK Workers' Party?

Kim Jong Un

Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries

of the Workers' Party of Korea

I receive an open-source intelligence missive on Northeast Asia each weekday, and in yesterday's Korea Open Source Digest (Volume VI, Issue 21, Thursday, 31 January 2013), I read the translation of an important address that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, presented on January 30, "Kim Jong Un Delivers Address at the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the Workers' Party of Korea." This speech was published by the (North) Korean Central News Agency, and North Korean press releases are almost invariably boring and analytically useless, but this caught my attention because Kim Jong Un raised the issue of Party corruption:

I would like to refer to some problems arising in enhancing the functions and role of Party cells . . . . The most important task facing Party cells at present is to prepare the Party members as genuine . . . and true comrades and comrades-in-arms of our Party . . . . Particular attention should be paid to implanting the Party members with love for the people and spirit of serving them devotedly . . . . It is the firm determination of our Party to respect our people and devote everything to them . . . . Party cells should . . . serve and love the people . . . . From the very beginning after he founded our Party the President saw the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices manifested among officials as the most dangerous poison a working class ruling party should guard against and ensured that a consistent struggle was waged against them. The General . . . devoted energy and soul to developing our Party into a motherly party serving the people faithfully, not a party that indulges in power abuse and bureaucracy. However, whenever the Party underlined the need to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices, Party organizations simply called meetings for criticizing ideological defects and punished some officials . . . . Abuse of power and bureaucracy are not merely a matter of personal character or work style of officials, but a matter of their ideology. When they abuse their power and work in a bureaucratic manner, officials will not merely lose their popularity among the masses and get a blot on their political integrity, but impair the Party's authority and the prestige of socialism, which will end up leading the revolution and construction to ruin . . . . The Party Central Committee is firmly determined not simply to weed out but to root out the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices that are like the poisonous weeds sprouting on the garden of socialism centered on the masses of the people. The campaign against power abuse and bureaucracy is a Party-wide undertaking in which all Party organizations and their members . . . . should wage an intensive, principled struggle against power abuse and bureaucracy . . . . Party cells should create a strict atmosphere of criticism and ideological campaign and intensify criticism from bottom up in particular to give comradely help to officials to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices and prepare themselves as the true servants of the people. Party cells should clearly distinguish between demands of officials and bureaucracy. When abuse of power and bureaucratic practices are manifested among officials even in the slightest degree, they should not neglect them but wage a struggle against them promptly. All Party cells should not be indifferent to the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices of the officials who do not belong to them but actively struggle against them; as for serious cases, they should report on them to higher Party organizations, including the Party Central Committee, before it is too late.

Does this mean an open acknowledgement that the Workers' Party is falling into greater corruption, or is it merely one of those periodic calls for diligence, or is it advance notice of a coming purge? What it does not mean is reform. Bureaucracies never reform themselves by relying on the better nature of bureaucrats. Even the threat of punishment depends upon the workings of the bureaucracy itself, or perhaps of yet another, higher bureaucracy. What is needed for a check on bureaucratic corruption is some form of separation of powers, along with a free press to uncover and publicize bureaucratic corruption. I don't foresee that sort of reform in North Korea. But the North's elite does recognize that the system has problems, and Kim Jong Un's further remarks suggest genuine concern about disaffection among the populace:

The masses are the grass-roots foothold the Party relies on . . . . . [W]e should fully grasp the public sentiments and win over as many people as possible through efficient work with them. As rallying broad masses of people around the Party is an important issue decisive of the destiny of the Party and revolution, an amnesty was proclaimed last year . . . . It was ensured that most of the participants in the celebrations of the 66th anniversary of the Korean Children's Union were the children of ordinary workers, farmers, service personnel and intellectuals, rather than those of cadres, and the children of those who committed offences against the country were not discriminated [against] in being chosen as delegates if they were exemplary in study and organizational life of the Children's Union. The embrace that cares more for sick and wounded children, gives them love and affection, cures their sour wounds, helps them up and puts them forward again, instead of blaming them, this is the embrace of our motherly Party . . . . People have emotions and express their feelings differently according to their characters . . . . We should not indiscriminately discard people, even though they are unwilling to accept the Party's ideas. If so, it will result in a gradual decrease in the number of the people to be rallied around the Party. Party cells should not cram the Party's ideas into the heads of the masses, but educate them persuasively and perseveringly so that they would willingly accept the Party's ideas. It is very important to place trust in the people in winning over the masses. Political trust is followed by loyalty, but distrust produces betrayal . . . . [A] man may make mistakes in his work and life and even commit unforgivable crimes. No matter what serious mistakes or crimes he may make, and even though we find in him 99 per cent of demerits and only one per cent of merit or conscience, we should value his conscience, boldly trust him and lead him to start with a clean slate. People who have deep-seated mental agonies should be treated more kind-heartedly and particular attention should be paid to freeing them from worries lingering in their minds.

Implicit in these words is an acceptance of diverse opinions among non-Party members, at least in the sense that they are free to speak their minds so long as the Party has the paternalistic upper hand, but I foresee a lot of backtracking on even this minor concession to free speech if ordinary people start to argue with the Party and discover that the Party has no persuasive answers. These fine words will once again prove empty promises if people do speak out.

At the very least, however, the two issues raised by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un indicate that the leadership has an inkling that something is deeply wrong. They just don't know how to fix it . . .

Resolution of Conflict in Korea, East Asia and Beyond

2011 Civilization and Peace

The papers presented last October at the "2011 Global Forum Civilization and Peace" were recently published, officially in April, but my copy arrived only yesterday, courtesy of The Academy of Korean Studies. The back covers tells us that the forum:

. . . was attended by a number of audiences and scholars including the keynote speaker Professor Jürgen Kocka, the vice president of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Under the main theme "Resolution of Conflict in Korea, East Asia and Beyond: Humanistic Approach", we tried to look into many aspects of conflicts in the modern global world and gathered to find alternatives for the harmonious resolution. This is the collection of papers that were presented at "2011 Global Forum Civilization and Peace". I hope to share the forum's rewarding experience of intellectual exploration with the public through this publication

The "I" is unnamed, but I reckon it's Professor Chung Chung-kil, president of The Academy of Korean Studies because it reads like a summary of his "Preface." Among the papers referred to is also my own, "Points Toward a Culture of Discussion," to be found on pages 89-114. Readers may recall my posts on this paper last autumn, such as this report, in which I offered my presentation's conclusion:

Let us remind ourselves that this year's Global Forum on Civilization and Peace focuses on the "Resolution of Conflict in Korea, East Asia and Beyond," specifying "A Humanistic Approach," and our session is concerned with "Difference and Discrimination." I began, humanistically enough, with a conflict between a high-status university professor in the West who advocated critical discourse without reference to hierarchical status but who felt justified in physically attacking a 'lowly' graduate student who had insulted him. We then looked at hierarchy within Confucian Civilization in East Asia and noted some of the problems that result from Confucianism's suppression of open discussion, the implication being that Confucianism needs to find some means of accommodating critical discourse. We considered Huntington's thesis concerning the clash of civilizations, but reflected upon his appeal for intercivilizational understanding as well and noted the possibility of cultural commonalities and even commonalities grounded in our meta-civilizational human nature, especially our mortality. We saw how this common mortality can offer a basis for a culture of critical discourse in which reasons and evidence are privileged over hierarchical status even in strongly hierarchical societies. We drew attention to a necessity for the freedom to insult since even substantive points grounded in reason and evidence can be taken as insults, regardless of intention. All of these things point to the truth that a harmonious society cannot be imposed at the outset but can only be understood as an aim to be attained at the end of a discursive process, if such harmony is ever even to be attained at all. Finally, if this paper has raised issues controversial enough to stimulate critical discussion, then I will have succeeded in my goal.

There's usually a Korean version of the articles published simultaneously, but not this year. I'm not sure why. Anyway, for those interested, the book can be ordered from the site linked to above, and I'll link again here. Ironically, even though the forum was for both foreigners and Koreans, the page linked to bears the heading "Books for Foreigner," but one needs to read Korean to order a copy of the book.

I therefore suspect that my call for a culture of discussion in Korea (and elsewhere) will go unread . . .

Culture of Discussion: Response to Discussant

Response by Presenter Horace Jeffery Hodges to Discussant Lee Taek-Gwang

My presentation at this week's Forum was discussed by Professor Lee Taek-Gwang (이택광) of Kyung Hee University, who raised two questions about my advocacy of a culture of discussion in East Asia to overcome the limits to free discourse set by Confucian hierarchy, namely, that hierarchy exists everywhere and that my ideal of discussion is utopian. I've posted my response below:

I thank Professor Lee Taek-Gwang for his remarks, which are well taken. He raises two main points:

1) Hierarchy: Isn't hierarchy characteristic of every society?

2) Utopian: Isn't my presupposition about discussion utopian?

Concerning Number 1: This is a problem. All societies have hierarchy, and it does tend to inhibit a culture of discussion. For this reason, we need to emphasize the right to discussion and support it both culturally and legally.

Concerning Number 2: I grant that my conception of a culture of discussion offers an ideal to strive for. Is that utopian? Possibly. But it is also a criterion by which to measure our approximation to that ideal situation. We should have evidence and reasons for our views.

I think that a more difficult question -- if I might query myself -- is that of action. We have to act in the world, often when we lack time for sufficient discussion. Knowing when to halt the discussion and act is not simple, easy, or obvious. I suppose that we just have to do the best we can with what little time we have.

But what I would like to emphasize are two points about Samuel Huntington. (1) He's famous for his borrowed expression -- taken from Bernard Lewis -- "clash of civilizations," but he himself stresses the need for intercivilizational understanding, finding common values upon which we can agree even if we have differences to discuss. (2) He alludes to what we share as a species beyond cultural differences, and I suggest that a core similarity is our mortality, our shared human frailty, as a motive for developing a culture of discussion in every society.

Those were my remarks in response to Professor Lee. He seemed satisfied, though he might have merely adopted a courteous demeanor, for we were all exceedingly nice to one another at this Forum.

Other scholars, however, later noted that they agreed with certain points that I had made, though perhaps nobody agreed wholeheartedly . . .

2011 Global Forum Civilization and Peace: "Points Toward a Culture of Discussion"

2011 Global Forum Civilization and Peace

Center for International Affairs

I've now had a night's sleep and can write a bit more, though not much since my classes start early today. I usually post introductions when I note a publication, paper, or presentation, but I'll instead post a conclusion this time:

Let us remind ourselves that this year's Global Forum on Civilization and Peace focuses on the "Resolution of Conflict in Korea, East Asia and Beyond," specifying "A Humanistic Approach," and our session is concerned with "Difference and Discrimination." I began, humanistically enough, with a conflict between a high-status university professor in the West who advocated critical discourse without reference to hierarchical status but who felt justified in physically attacking a 'lowly' graduate student who had insulted him. We then looked at hierarchy within Confucian Civilization in East Asia and noted some of the problems that result from Confucianism's suppression of open discussion, the implication being that Confucianism needs to find some means of accommodating critical discourse. We considered Huntington's thesis concerning the clash of civilizations, but reflected upon his appeal for intercivilizational understanding as well and noted the possibility of cultural commonalities and even commonalities grounded in our meta-civilizational human nature, especially our mortality. We saw how this common mortality can offer a basis for a culture of critical discourse in which reasons and evidence are privileged over hierarchical status even in strongly hierarchical societies. We drew attention to a necessity for the freedom to insult since even substantive points grounded in reason and evidence can be taken as insults, regardless of intention. All of these things point to the truth that a harmonious society cannot be imposed at the outset but can only be understood as an aim to be attained at the end of a discursive process, if such harmony is ever even to be attained at all. Finally, if this paper has raised issues controversial enough to stimulate critical discussion, then I will have succeeded in my goal.

This is from my presentation at a conference titled "2011 Global Forum Civilization and Peace." The paper was titled "Points Toward a Culture of Discussion."

I've not yet seen any newspaper reports directly on this year's conference, but the Korea Herald does have an article on a statement made by the keynote speaker, Jürgen Kocka, before the conference began, and that can be read online. I hope that his paper is eventually put online, for it's a very interesting analysis of German reunification that emphasizes how history can "surprise" us, and it brought back a lot of memories from my years in Germany, which covered that period, for I went to Germany in August 1989.

But more on this conference if the papers cover it, for I've got to prepare for teaching.

Back from a Conference . . .

Academy of Korean Studies

The clock says 9:00 p.m. Tuesday evening, and I've just returned from a two-day forum sponsered by the Academy of Korean Studies and hosted at the Seoul Plaza Hotel. I'll report tomorrow but wanted to touch base at my blog just to let readers know that I haven't died.

I was invited to give a 40-minute talk, and I chose to speak on East Asia's need for a culture of discussion, a point that I've sometimes raise on my blog. But more on this tommorow. Right now, I've got to reply to a few emails . . .


Robert Kaplan on China's Geographic Power over Korea

Robert D. Kaplan

Quizzical Journalist

(Center for a New American Security)

Robert Kaplan has a recent article that I first read in yesterday's Korea Herald, for it states something about China's designs concerning the Korean Peninsula, but which first appeared in the International Herald Tribune, where one can also read it: "The Geography of Chinese Power" (April 19, 2010). The portion that deals with things Korean is this:

Central Asia, Mongolia, the Russian Far East and Southeast Asia are natural zones of Chinese influence. But they are also zones whose political borders are not likely to change. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is different. No one really expects China to annex any part of the Korean Peninsula, of course, But although it supports Kim Jong-il's Stalinist regime, it has plans for the peninsula beyond his reign.

Beijing would like to eventually dispatch there the thousands of North Korean defectors who now are in China so that they could build a favorable political base for Beijing's gradual economic takeover of the region.

I do wonder how Kaplan knows that China would like to send "thousands of North Korean defectors" back to North Korea to "build a favorable political base for Beijing's gradual economic takeover."

Kaplan might be right, for all I know, but China isn't exactly following policies to endear North Korean defectors to its hegemony. It already sends defectors back to North Korea, where they face harsh interrogation and subsequent imprisonment in labor camps set up to starve prisoners slowly to death. Not such a grand strategy, that.

But to be fair to Kaplan's views on China's designs, we should read them in full. The IHT article is an abbreviated version of a far longer article appearing in the May/June 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs -- "The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?" -- and the relevant passage is as follows:

Central Asia, Mongolia, the Russian Far East, and Southeast Asia are natural zones of Chinese influence. But they are also zones whose political borders are unlikely to change. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is different: the map of China is particularly truncated there, and there political borders could well shift.

The hermetic North Korean regime is fundamentally unstable, and its unraveling could affect the whole region. Jutting out from Manchuria, the Korean Peninsula commands all maritime traffic to and from northeastern China. No one really expects China to annex any part of the Korean Peninsula, of course, yet China remains inconvenienced by the sovereignty of other states there, particularly in the north. And although it supports Kim Jong Il's Stalinist regime, it has plans for the peninsula beyond his reign. Beijing would like to eventually send back the thousands of North Korean defectors who now are in China so that they could build a favorable political base for Beijing's gradual economic takeover of the Tumen River region, where China, North Korea, and Russia meet and which has good port facilities across from Japan on the Pacific Ocean.

This is one reason why Beijing would prefer to see a far more modern, authoritarian state develop in North Korea -- such a state would create a buffer between China and the vibrant, middle-class democracy of South Korea. But reunification on the Korean Peninsula would also eventually benefit Beijing. A reunified Korea would be nationalist and harbor some hostility toward China and Japan, both of which have sought to occupy it in the past. But Korea's enmity toward Japan is significantly greater than its enmity toward China. (Japan occupied the peninsula from 1910 to 1945, and Seoul and Tokyo continue to argue over the status of the Tokdo/Takeshima islets.) Economic relations would be stronger with China than with Japan: a unified Korea would be more or less under Seoul's control, and China already is South Korea's biggest trading partner. Finally, a reunified Korea that tilted slightly toward Beijing and away from Japan would have little reason to continue hosting U.S. troops. In other words, it is easy to conceive of a Korean future within a Greater China and a time when the United States' ground presence in Northeast Asia will diminish.

This certainly puts Kaplan's statements into a far more coherent context, but my skepticism remains concerning his statement that "Beijing would like to eventually send back the thousands of North Korean defectors who now are in China so that they could build a favorable political base for Beijing's gradual economic takeover." I don't doubt that China has designs on the the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, but I see no evidence in Kaplan's article for his statement on the role of thousands of North Korean defectors.

I suspect that China would be more interested in influencing North Korea's technocratic elite within a stable state, but if the North begins to collapse, China might have a more forceful back-up plan.

But I defer to the experts on this . . .

North Korea's 'Great Apology': A Slowly Collapsing State?

Kim Yong-il

Premier of North Korea

(Image from One Free Korea)

Readers will remember some recent posts on North Korea's great currency debacle, which triggered both economic and social chaos -- and gave rise to actual protests by ordinary people, a thing unprecedented in the North.

The problems, and especially the protests, have triggered something else unprecedented for the North, a public climbdown and abject apology by the government, voiced by Premier Kim Yong-il, a rather significant, remarkable event since the man is officially the third most powerful figure in the regime's "power hierarchy after autocratic leader Kim Jong Il and Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly," according to reporter Kim Hyung-jin, writing as an AP newswriter for the Washington Post in his article "NKorea's premier apologizes over currency revamp" (February 10, 2010).

As premier, Kim Yong-il is responsible for economic policy, so he's certainly the logical choice to make an apology, but the buck really stops upstairs where it started, with Kim Jong-il, as the people in the North certainly realize, so when the premier apologizes, we know what that means: blame shifting by 'infallible' leader Kim Jong-il. Here's the regime's 'sincere' apology, articulated by Premier Kim Yong-il:

"Regarding the currency reform, I sincerely apologize as we pushed ahead with it without a sufficient preparation so that it caused a big pain to the people."

The significance of this is that the pressure of public opinion has finally forced the North's government into a very public climbdown and apologetic promise to reverse some policies. People will again be allowed to use foreign currency and trade in private markets. More important than the specific details are the ramifications, as Joshua Stanton points out in his blog entry on this issue, "North Korean Premier Apologizes for Great Confiscation," over at his fine blog, One Free Korea:

[I]n a system where power is a zero-sum commodity, for the first time, people fought the system and lived to fight again. To a lot of people used to being under the heel of absolute power, an apology is going to look like weakness. It will invite more challenges.

I think Joshua is right, though where this will lead is anybody's guess, for so much depends upon China, which has an interest in not allowing North Korea to fail . . . though the Chinese government would perhaps be happy to be rid of the Kim family that rules the North and be able to deal with a government in the North more oriented to economic reform.

But times are certainly getting interesting on the Korean peninsula.

Don't fence me in . . .

Not Steven Sin . . .

. . . but close enough to 'sin'

Touché!

(Image from Saber Fencer)

The image above Steve Sin's blog is apparently of Sylwia Gruchala . . . a Polish fencer. Not the 'cowgirl' sort of fencer, but I won't argue the point with her. She can take whatever label she wishes, for she she seems pretty tough, having most recently won a gold medal in the 2007 World Championship for Team Foil . . . and several other medals over the past 10 years.

Excuse me, but I've been distracted.

What I meant to post was that my military friend, Steven S. Sin, has split his blog into two separate blogs -- one on A Fencer's Musings, the other on Northeast Asia Matters. Steve is the man who posted in response to my blog entry on the difficulties encountered by my daughter in Korean middle school.

Steve is also the man from whom I receive regular emails on open-source information about North Korea, prompting my recent posts on the North's decline. Posts like this one on Sylwia Gruchala.

Oops . . . distracted again. Sorry.

As I was saying, Sylwia Gruchala. No, dammit, not Sylwia Gruchala. I really don't mean Sylwia Gruchala. I'm certainly not obsessed with Sylwia Gruchala. I've never even heard of Sylwia Gruchala.

Okay. Focus. Think of the empire. The military. The enemy.

Kim Jong-il.

That did it.

Northeast Asia and the Two Koreas: Metastability, Security, and Community

Northeast Asia

and

the Two Koreas

(Image from Yonsei Press)

Readers of this blog with an interest in Korean studies might be pleased to know that Yonsei Press has recently published a book of articles treating issues relevant to the Korean peninsula, namely, Northeast Asia and the Two Koreas: Metastability, Security, and Community.

I mention this recent publication here on Gypsy Scholar because it illustrates an intellectual manifestation of my gyspy character, for I was intimately involved in the work on this book.

In what way?

I co-authored with Myongsob Kim an article titled "Korea as a Clashpoint of Civilizations," I translated Jean Klein's originally French article "Relevance of the European Model for Regulating Security Problems in Northeast Asia," and I proofread the entire book though I am not one of the official editors.

Those editors are Hyung-Kook Kim, Myongsob Kim, and Amitav Acharya, but they recognized my efforts:

"We would like to acknowledge our indebtedness to Professor Horace Jeffery Hodges for his meticulous and insightful cooperation in the editing of this book."

That's thoughtful of them, for the proofreading and even editing that I was involved in turned out to be a truly monumental task. After Myongsob and I had gone through the entire volume and given it to Yonsei Press, we had to twice re-read the galley proofs because Yonsei Press's software program proved incompatible with our own and thus introduced a lot of errors.

I hope that we caught every single one, but that's like hoping that I can resolve Zeno's paradox by achieving an infinite progression of steps in finite time. Some might be up to it, but I'm not.

In case anyone wants to know the meaning of "metastability," here's what the book's very first footnote explains:

As a physical term, "metastable state" describes a state characterized by an apparently firm but actually precarious stability whose delicately balanced factors can suffer a destructive chain reaction if subjected to a sudden impact. Homeostatic conditions are maintained within fixed limits, but if these limits are exceeded, the system can shift wildly in a wholly new, often far less desireable direction. Such catastrophic shifts may occur through an escalation of political "tit-for-tats." As one application of this concept to Northeast Asian international politics, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 107.

For those not yet put off, here's more information: the book is 356 pages and costs 20,000 won (about 20 dollars), an astonishingly good price for an academic tome.

Disclaimer: Though I was paid for my editing work, I don't receive any financial gain from the sales of this book.

However, should any generous souls wish to further reward all of my hard work, I'm not averse to private contributions...

Robert Kaplan on China's interest in North Korea

Goguryeo's Territory

(Image from Wikipedia)

Robert Kaplan has recently published an article, "When North Korea Falls," in The Atlantic Monthly (October 2006), and -- perhaps fitting for a writer on military issues -- he's been taking a lot of flak from the expatriate blogging community here in Korea. I agree that Kaplan has given a distorted picture of some things here in Korea. For instance (to borrow a quote from the Marmot's copy of the entire article):

As the saying goes among American soldiers, "There is no peacetime in the ROK." (ROK, pronounced "rock," is militaryspeak for the Republic of Korea.) One has merely to observe the Patriot missile batteries, the reinforced concrete hangars, and the blast barriers at the U.S. Air Force bases at Osan and Kunsan, south of Seoul -- which are as heavily fortified as any bases in Iraq -- to be aware of this.

One military man, Capt BBQ, took contentious issue with Kaplan on this point:

So this is the Kaplan guy I hear talked up so much? He's a good story teller at least. Spending 3 and 1/2 years in the USFK has perhaps given me an unfair standard to judge him by, but how can I take his analysis of a secretive regime seriously when he fails so miserably portraying the US military? I've never heard of more than half the crap he claims we say:

"which are as heavily fortified as any bases in Iraq"

My barracks were guarded by a combination of any two from a group of three narcoleptic old men, a grandma and a retard ... that is, Grown-man-on-bike-with-training-wheels retard.

Capt BBQ might be guilty of a little humorous exaggeration himself, but he's surely right. The U.S. bases here in Korea are not even remotely "as heavily fortified as any bases in Iraq."

But I'm not posting on Kaplan to critique, praise, or bury him, but to quote him on China's interest in North Korea, which he illustrates in the case of a Kim Family Regime (KFR) collapse:

Whereas Japan's strategic position would be dramatically weakened by a collapsed North Korean state, China would eventually benefit. A post-KFR Korean peninsula could be more or less under Seoul's control -- and China is now South Korea's biggest trading partner. Driving along the coast, all I saw at South Korean ports were Chinese ships.

Other factors also work in Beijing's favor. China harbors thousands of North Korean defectors that it would send back after a collapse, in order to build a favorable political base for China's gradual economic takeover of the Tumen River region -- the northeast Asian river valley where China, Russia, and North Korea intersect, with good port facilities on the Pacific. De facto control of a future Tumen Prosperity Sphere would bolster China's fiscal strength, helping it to do economic battle with the United States and Japan. If China's troops could carve out a buffer zone in the part of North Korea near Manchuria—where China is now developing massive infrastructure projects, such as roads and ports -- Beijing might then sanction the installation of an international coalition elsewhere in the North.

This is the sort of scenario that has concerned me since first learning of China's Northeast Project about three years ago when I was working with my Hanshin University colleagues Yoon Pyung-Joong (윤평중) and Kim Myongsob (김명섭) on a research project concerning Korean reunification.

You can read about this Northeast Project and the attendant controversy in an article by Yonson Ahn, "The Korea-China Textbook War -- What's It All About?" (3/6/2006), but if I may oversimplify China's position, the Northeast Project is a research program funded by the Chinese government that presents the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo as part of China. This is problematic for Koreans and for the prospect of future unification on the Korean peninsula because Koreans have long considered Goguryeo as part of Korean rather than Chinese history and because China's claim to Goguryeo raises territorial issues since Goguryeo extended halfway down the peninsula. If the claim is allowed to stand, China could appeal to history as a legitimate cover for intervention in a crumbling North Korean state.

Kaplan -- though without mentioning Goguryeo -- thinks that China is already planning for this:

Meanwhile, China's infrastructure investments are already laying the groundwork for a Tibet-like buffer state in much of North Korea, to be ruled indirectly through Beijing's Korean cronies once the KFR unravels. This buffer state will be less oppressive than the morbid, crushing tyranny it will replace. So from the point of view of the average South Korean, the Chinese look to be offering a better deal than the Americans, whose plan for a free and democratic unified peninsula would require South Korean taxpayers to pay much of the cost.

Kaplan may very well be right about China's plans, but he underestimates Korean nationalism (okay, I am critiquing). If Koreans are already angry about China's claim to Goguryeo, then they're very unlikely to be sanguine about Chinese control over the North.

Rather than being sanguine, the Koreans could get sanguinary.