When Domestic Political Rhetoric Harms Foreign Policy Objectives

Obama and Hillary Founded ISIS!
MEMRI TV Clip No. 5623

Anyone who keeps up with what goes for political analysis in the Middle East knows that the discourse is full of conspiracy theories shaped to explain how the US is at fault for everything wrong with the Muslim Arab world.

One particularly egregious, widespread conspiracy theory in the Middle East is that the US founded the Islamic State.

This is false, of course, but when a candidate in this year's election makes the same claim,and even doubles down on the claim (before watering the claim down a week later), the conspiracy theorists in the Middle East feel themselves powerfully confirmed in their belief that the primary intention of the US in the Middle East is to sow discord and reap the destruction of Arab societies.

For more on this MEMRI report, see this video and its transcript.

Sights from Lima, Peru . . .

My wife is sending me photos without captions from South America - her most recent message read:

"From Lima - A quick  sending  before  leaving  soon  for  Ica."

She means Ica, Peru, of course. Anyway, I will post the photos, and readers can perhaps fill in the details. Here are some photos she took in Lima, Peru:

Lima 1

Lima 2

Lima 3

Lima 4

Lima 5

Lima 6

Lima 7

Okay, faithful readers, what are these sights, and where in Lima are they to be found?

David J. Danelo: Obama's 'Realist' Foreign Policy

David J. Danelo

FPRI

When David J. Danelo, writing in "The Thin Red Line: Policy Lessons from Iraqi Kurdistan" (E-Notes, FPRI, May 2014), referred to Obama's foreign policy as "realist," I stopped skimming the article, read more closely and carefully, and saw that "soft power realism" was meant: "President Obama's foreign policy has been lifted entirely from a soft power realist's playbook." The problem is that states like Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Syria don't believe that soft power will get them what they want -- unless it's America's soft power, which does get them what they want. Not that Danelo is quick to push any military buttons, but here's what he does think:

Great nations do not go to war recklessly, but they do not repeatedly draw rhetorical red lines without consequence. Beyond drone strikes and special operations raids, Obama Administration officials seems to view American military force -- and U.S. hard power in general -- as a necessary evil to be suffered rather than a tool to be prudently employed. In Syria, when the President imposed and removed a red line on chemical weapons, and Ukraine, when he bluntly stated the U.S. would not use direct military action to deter Russian aggression, the President has, in Adam Garfinkle's words, engaged in "gratuitous diplomatic self-mutilation."

Although the President lectures Americans that his Russian counterpart's bullying signifies weakness, eastern Ukraine's instability suggests the opposite. Having lost credibility twice (Syria, Ukraine) from Russian red line diplomatic maneuvering, the Obama Administration must demonstrate through actions, not rhetoric, what red lines it will fight for if crossed. Such a statement may come across as bombastic, but enlightened exploits are as critical to realism as practical restraint. In a multipolar world, such tactics must be part of a realist's policy calculus. Pragmatic choices after considering options represent wisdom; white flags after red lines denote spinelessness. Preserving peace requires preparing, and perhaps even posturing, for war.

Danelo's message is an old one: "If you want peace, prepare for war." In Latin, that's "Si vis pacem, para bellum," and it's said to be a rewording of a statement penned by Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus in Book 3 of his tract De Re Militari (4th or 5th century A.D.), not that I know very much about that.

Anyway, I doubt that the Obama administration will change much. Obama doesn't seem to like foreign policy, but sees himself as a domestic policy president instead, in which there are also problems . . .

FPRI's Jakub Grygiel on Putin's Aims . . .

Jakub Grygiel

FPRI

For some thoughts on Russia and Ukraine that stress "reality," see Jakub Grygiel, "Ukraine and Three Forgotten Realities: What Would Robert Strausz-Hupé Say?" (FPRI)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an unwelcome reminder of time-tested realities that we have been tempted to forget over the past two decades. These realities, namely [1] that history is written by men, [2] that force must be met with force, and [3] that wars are rarely local affairs, appear throughout history and are undoubtedly unpleasant because they do not lead to sunny optimism. It is not surprising therefore that we prefer to ignore them. But we ignore them also because of an arresting naïveté about the world and a perennial wish to see an irresistible march toward freedom in history. The now notorious statement by Secretary of State John Kerry that Russia is behaving "in a 19th century fashion" -- suggesting that Moscow has failed to adapt to modern, or post-modern, times -- is indicative of this worldview.

Drawing on the view of FPRI's founder, Robert Strausz-Hupé, Grygiel elaborates on these three realities, countering current-day postmodern assumptions (with my emphases):

[1] The first reality that we tend to forget is that history is made by men, not by impersonal forces. What this means is that there is no clear and irresistible progressive direction in it. Men can change history's course for the better, but often for the worse . . . . Strausz-Hupé observed, "World history is not a succession of happy endings." We do have strong and willful enemies who will use every opportunity to undermine and weaken us and our friends, and who want to defeat us and our world view . . . . Russian troops in Crimea, and the armored columns along Ukraine's eastern border, are a reminder that there is nothing -- not democracy, not wealth, not globalization -- inevitable in history.

[2] The second forgotten reality is related to the first one. We tend to believe that we can win simply because of passing time, as history moves inexorably toward the desired objective. There is therefore little need to oppose an enemy with force: rumbling tanks will be defeated by the allure of democracy and the spread of globalization. Moreover, once a victory has been achieved, our belief is that the outcome is settled, firmly written in history . . . . This, of course, is not true. It never was, but the war in Ukraine made it abundantly clear. Europe from London to Kiev is not secure. Again, to quote Robert Strausz-Hupé . . . "Europe is debated ground . . . . As in the past, the menace of [Russia as an] Asia[n power] presses now upon a Europe that is plunged into a general malaise compounded of lassitude of power and the alienation of society." The fragility of the European peace, threatened by the westward push of Putin's Russia, is again made evident.

[3] Finally, third, we have been lulled into believing that a local war is simply that, local. The post-modern faith in the gradual disappearance of violent conflict leads us to see wars as little localized bursts among peoples and nations who have been lagging in the march of history. Russia's war in Ukraine is, in this view, a small local vestige of ancient thinking, destined to remain limited to that area. It's a small island of 19th century behavior amidst a sea of 21st century thinking . . . . In reality, all wars are local, and all local wars have global connotations. World wars did not start globally, but in very precise places, often with the widespread belief that they would be limited to that locale . . . . Strausz-Hupé put it thus: "Historical analogies are like the wings of butterflies: firmly grasped they crumble into particles which may be of interest to a biochemist but no longer evoke the marvelous whole of functional and aesthetical perfection" . . . . Nonetheless, they do convey the idea that a local skirmish often is part of a much wider contest and may lead to geographically more expansive violence.

How, then, are we to understand Putin's Ukraine policy:

Putin did not invade Crimea simply because he wanted direct control over that peninsula, or even because he wants to exercise influence over Ukraine writ large. He acts locally but thinks globally. He wants to alter the post-1991 order by proving that the Western order is predicated on an empty promise of security. Hence, while President Obama defines Russian as a mere "regional" power whose reach is limited to small, globally insignificant places, Russian leaders define the region as "Eurasia," a big piece of [the] world's real estate. Ukraine is thus a local war fought with a much larger geopolitical game in mind . . . . The principal theatre of operations is now, as it has been for nearly three centuries, eastern and southeastern Europe, and Russian policy in the Middle and Far East has been largely derivative. Only when Russia was blocked in Europe, on the Baltic and Moldavian Plains, only then did she turn to Asia. Russia exercised pressure on the Asiatic rim-lands, especially on Britain's positions in southwestern Asia, in order to obtain concessions in Europe. Russian expansionism, although it harvested rich territorial gains in central and eastern Asia, did not let itself be deflected from its primary goals, to wit, Russia's strategic frontiers in the West.

To this view, I would add my opinion that Russia is an essentially expansionist power, given that its borders are unstable, for which reason, it looks both east and west, coveting and conquering ever greater territory, seeking that stability that requires firm borders, but such are never available, for the more Russia presses for them, the less firm they become.

What does Grygiel suggest we do? He concludes: "history is not a string of successes, force needs to be met with force, and the larger geopolitical context is present even in small local wars." But how are we to act on this? How do we face up to this reality? Isn't the reality here that Putin now has the Crimean Peninsula? What can be done about that? Force has to be met with force? I don't think this means open war. Rather, Europe needs to become a potent military power through the EU's shedding of its postmodern assumptions about security through economic integration, and the US needs to retain its potent military force and not fall for the postmodern illusions about history's inevitably 'progressive' direction. Russia takes a long view. So should the West.

China's 'Policy' Toward North Korea

China

Wikipedia

Hanyang University law professor Lee Jae-min asks a good question in his Korea Herald column this week: "Why do we keep losing this game?" (March 20, 2013). By that, he means why does North Korea continue to have the advantage over South Korea in getting what it wants in its nuclear aims. Part of the answer is China, which is the North's ally, of course, and supports it for that reason, but more important than the alliance is China's fear that enforcing sanctions on the North could precipitate its collapse and destabilize Northeast Asia. Professor Lee knows all this, of course. But things have changed since the North's third nuclear test recently, he notes, and he offers a suggestion:

Perhaps one thing to consider in this regard is how to make Beijing fully aware that an unbridled, nuclear-armed North Korea would undermine its national interest. In light of this, it is interesting to watch the reportedly growing complaints in China against North Korea after its nuclear test.

This ought to be simple enough since a nuclear-armed North Korea is very destabilizing for Northeast Asia, but China should have recognized this twenty years ago, when we already knew that the North was pursuing a nuclear program. Individual Chinese did see the problem, and commented on it as against China's interests, but the Chinese government was less clear. Why has the Chinese leadership failed? Seton Hall University professor of international relations Zheng Wang asks a pertinent question in the New York Times: "Does China Have a Foreign Policy?" (March 18, 2013). Here's what he says:

While many Western analysts focus on the balance of reformers and conservatives in China's new leadership, most overlook the absence of career diplomats and foreign affairs experts at the highest level of power in Beijing . . . . [T]he position that foreign policy occupies in the Chinese political system is very low . . . . China watchers have a tendency to overstate the sophistication of Beijing's foreign policy and ambitions, but the truth is that China's foreign policy is highly deficient . . . . The absence of clear policy . . . partly explains why China lacks decisive influence even over strategic allies who depend most on its support, like North Korea . . . . North Korea's recent nuclear test and decision to nullify the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War is but the latest example. If a country [such as China] does not have a clear foreign policy, it will not know when, where and how to use its power. It cannot provide a road map for its allies to follow.

If Professor Wang is right, then helping Beijing see its national interests in the North Korean conundrum might prove difficult.

We can only try . . .

Clint Watts on "No Al-Qaeda?"

Clint Watts

Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)

I've not posted on Al-Qaeda in a while, though they also never write, never call, but there may be a reasonable excuse for their long silence if Clint Watts is correct in his FPRI article, "What If There Is No Al-Qaeda? Preparing For Future Terrorism" (July 2012):

Today, in comparison to ten years ago, al-Qaeda does not have the ability to execute attacks on a regular basis due to its declining mass -- a function of limited safe havens, dwindling recruits, loss of critical human capital (leaders and technical experts), and a reduction in financial support. Al-Qaeda has not executed a successful attack on the West in the West since the London subway bombings of 2005. Three of the most credible al-Qaeda plots in recent years have arisen from an affiliate, AQAP [Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] in Yemen, rather than the group's central leadership in Pakistan. Does this mean that al-Qaeda will dry up and never attack the U.S. again? Absolutely not! But the decline in the pace of al-Qaeda's attacks illustrates the group's broader struggles to recruit foreign fighters, prepare operations, and effectively resource missions.

But Al-Qaeda's problems don't mean that the threat of Islamist jihadi groups is past:

While the battle with al-Qaeda is not entirely over, the U.S. and its allies should begin imagining how the remnants of the old al-Qaeda threat will re-emerge as a new manifestation among regional and transnational extremist upstarts. The West should work vigorously to identify what this new frontier in terrorism will look like.

The greatly weakened Al-Qaeda thus still poses a residual threat, but it is just one jihadi group among many in a decentralized terrorist world. And there are some ironies stemming from Al-Qaeda's misfortunes:

A current assessment might instead suggest those groups most closely aligned with al-Qaeda seem to be shedding the "al-Qaeda" name to strengthen their local credibility, while those groups least connected to al-Qaeda and harboring little popular support have taken on the moniker to boost their global credibility.

The Islamists closest to Al-Qaeda are embarrassed to admit the connection, while those farthest away try to wrap themselves in the faded black flag of its failing legitimacy.

I forwarded the article to one of my contacts in the military who served with NATO in Afghanistan, where he was directly focused on the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism missions, and who still associates with individuals at US Central Command and US Special Operations Command, and he wrote back, "Very interesting and updated. Thank you for sharing."

Maybe some readers will feel the same way . . .

Menand Remembers Kennan

George F. Kennan

Pinnacle of Power
1952

Photo: AKG Pressebild-Ullstein Bild/Granger Collection

The New Yorker

Another fascinating article on George Kennan appeared recently, this one in The New Yorker, written by Louis Menand and titled "Getting Real: George F. Kennan's Cold War" (November 14, 2011), and it's even longer than Kissinger's article, or seems longer, and provides a fuller view of Kennan's life. Unlike Kissinger, Menand isn't concerned with defending his own legacy, for he never served in government making policy at the pinnacle of power. He's a Harvard professor of literature, not a political scientist. But he offers an interesting point about Kennan as the author of America's "Containment Policy" -- Kennan resented the attribution despite his seminal "Long Telegram" and his follow-up article, signed "X," published in Foreign Affairs:

Kennan's second major Cold War treatise [the first being the "Long Telegram"] was the 1947 article for Foreign Affairs, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." The essay began as a paper written for Forrestal. In many respects, it was an eloquent re-statement of the Long Telegram, and it is famous for a single sentence: "It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."

This gave a name to American Cold War policy, and, with a few tweaks and many exceptions, what Kennan had called "containment" remained American policy until the Presidency of Ronald Reagan. Wherever there was "Communist aggression," the United States pushed back. As long as the Communists remained in their box, the United States did not (except rhetorically) seek to intervene. And, as Gaddis says, even Reagan, despite talk of liberation and "rollback," stayed largely true to containment policy.

The article was signed with an "X" because Kennan did not want it to seem that, as a State Department employee, he was stating policy, but his identity was quickly revealed, and for the rest of his career he was known as the author of containment. He had reasons to resent this.

Menand explains the reasons underlying Kennan's resentment:

[A]s someone who proposed policy rather than administered it, Kennan was susceptible to the standard fate of policy intellectuals. Either he could get credit for providing a rationale for what was already the government's de-facto policy or his recommendations could be harnessed to purposes he did not endorse.

Kennan's fate was to have his idea of containment conflated with the Truman Doctrine's promise in March 1947 of military aid "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This might sound like containment if the outside pressure were Soviet Russia, but Truman made a general call to arms, and that was apparently not Kennan's intention:

Kennan was appalled when he read the draft of Truman's speech, and for the rest of his life he protested that he had meant containment to be a policy of selective confrontation, and its means to be diplomatic and economic, not military. But he was construed otherwise.

One wonders if Kennan doth protest too much. Knowing Russian history as well as he did and having had personal experience of the Soviets from his time in the diplomatic service in Moscow, did he really believe that diplomatic and economic confrontation alone would contain the Soviet Union? Absent the back-up threat of military confrontation? Diplomacy without strength offers merely a comforting blanket woven of words in a Hobbesian world of naked power, and economic sanctions alone would make a Bolshevik laugh. Kennan must have known these things. Perhaps he would not have pressed military confrontation in places like Vietnam, but one wonders if his resentment had less to do with foreign policy disagreement and more to do with the doors that closed him off from the corridors of power.

Kennan's life was no tragedy, but he did suffer the melancholy consequences of having been at the pinnacle of power and influence relatively early in his career, only to see his personal influence decline as he drifted further and further from the center of power in a long life of protest, like the anonymous voice in T.S. Eliot's poem Prufrock: "That is not what I meant at all. That is not it, at all."

Kennan lived to be 101 and died in 2005.

Kissinger Remembers Kennan . . .

George F. Kennan

1952

Bettmann/Corbis Photo

The New York Times

As part of her English lesson yesterday evening, my soon-to-be-fifteen-year-old daughter and I read a fascinating article by Henry Kissinger in which he analyzes the man George F. Kennan as a foreign policy thinker. Titled "The Age of Kennan" and written for The New York Times (November 10, 2011), it displays Kissinger's own brilliance as much as Kennan's. For instance, at one point in our lesson, Sa-Rah read the following paragraph to me:

[N]o other Foreign Service officer ever shaped American foreign policy so decisively or did so much to define the broader public debate over America's world role. This process began with two documents remembered as the Long Telegram (in 1946) and the X article (in 1947). At this stage, Kennan served a country that had not yet learned the distinction between the conversion and the evolution of an adversary -- if indeed it ever will. Conversion entails inducing an adversary to break with its past in one comprehensive act or gesture. Evolution involves a gradual process, a willingness to pursue one's ultimate foreign policy goal in imperfect stages.

When she had finished reading this aloud, I stopped her and pointed out that Kissenger was speaking about himself and his own views as much as he was talking about Kennan and Kennan's views. I added, "When one great man analyzes the work of a great predecessor, you should be alert to signs that he's also defending his own legacy, as is especially the case in this passage." I urged her to keep this in mind, to read with an ear attuned to different levels. Kissinger, I explained, worked with one eye to the distant evolutionary goal and the other eye to the imperfect step to be taken now. He is defending his own method against charges of cynicism and opportunism, I told her.

After we'd finished, I asked her what she'd learned about Kennan, and she replied that he'd formulated the concept of containment in response to what he considered Soviet Communism's intrinsic aggressiveness, a concept that was elaborated in practical U.S. foreign policy as America's strategy during the Cold War.

Not that she used those exact words . . .

A Role for Caricature in Toppling the Kim Regime?

The Korea bloggers over at The Marmot's Hole have an open thread this weekend on the question of how to deal with the sinking of the Cheonan if -- as looks to be the case -- the North Korean government turns out to be responsible:

How about this week's open forum devoted to brainstorming creative and mostly non-military ways to make North Korea pay for this [i.e., the Cheonan]?

The discussion is not always serious, and not even always on topic, but the issue is something to think about, and I added my own, half-serious suggestion:

Now as for the main point of this open thread, namely, how to destabilize the North, perhaps my son En-Uk’s Kim Jong-il series would be of some effect:

Kim Jong-il

Kim Jong-il Smell

Kim Jong-ugly

Kim Jong-il Long Leg

Kim Jong-il On Fire

Kim Jong-il Spikey Hair

I have no idea why my ten-year-old son is on such a Kim Jong-il kick, but the caricatures are definitely topical — and could help do something to topple the Kim Family Regime if sent northward with the balloons.

Ridicule can work wonders if the king has no clothes . . .

Interestingly, En-Uk mentioned his intention to create a comic strip about Kim Jong-il! I’ll have to see that to believe it, though . . .

Let's look at En-Uk's caricatures, for I left one out in the links above, and he's since added another. The masterpiece is his first one, titled merely Kim Jong-il:


With this and every caricature, En-Uk includes an explanatory message:

This drawing is called "Kim Jong-il." Kim Jong-il made his hair go up so he would look like he is tall. He is the North Korean dictator. He is a bad man. I don't like him. I made a song. It goes, "With the Jong-il, the mighty Jong-il, the lion seeks to fight . . ." It was funny. Bye.

En-Uk's second caricature, Kim Jong-il Smell, is still serious, I think, but moves into explicit ridicule in its depiction of the dictator, not merely in the message:


Note the amusing wordplay in En-Uk's explanatory message:

This drawing is called "Kim Jong-il Smell." I made this drawing because I love making fun of Kim Junk-ill. Bye.

Next is the caricature that I inadvertently left out in the links above, Kim Jung-il Crazy:


About this wildly energetic caricature, En-Uk again refers to "Kim Junk-ill" in saying:

This drawing is called "Kim Jung-il crazy." I made this drawing because Kim Junk-ill is really crazy. Bye.

He certainly looks like a wild-and-crazy guy on a Saturday Night Live kick! Next comes a caricature titled Kim Jong-ugly, which definitely resembles the dictator after one of those wild-and-crazy, late-night Saturday night cognac parties on a Sunday morning coming down:


En-Uk offers an ironic comment:

This drawing is called "Kim Jong-ugly." I made this drawing because Kim Jong-il is really ugly, but still the drawing of Kim Jong-il is better looking than the real Kim Jong-il. Bye.

The real Kim Jong-il is so much worse than Dorian Gray that even his image can't keep the pace! En-Uk's next image of Kim Jong-il -- Kim Jong-il Long Leg -- enters the realm of the surreal:


Of this one, En-Uk tells us:

This drawing is called "Kim Jong-il Long Leg," but it is too long for his short body, and it is not really long -- he just stretched it. Bye.

The Great Dictator was apparently attempting to enhance his height but stopped halfway when the coffers went empty, as happened with the Ryugyong Hotel. Anyway . . . next comes Kim Jong-il On Fire:


En-Uk offers not only a comment, but even a song to go with the fiery dance:

This drawing is called "Kim Jong-il On Fire." I made this drawing because Kim Jong-il's hair is really on fire. Oh, and I made a poem. It is:

Kim Jong-il On Fire

Kim Jong-il's on fire.
Some say he touched a wire.
He says his house exploded,
but they say it was loaded.

Was it fun? Please write a comment, and let me know. Bye.

In this song, En-Uk might have expressed the secret longing of many North Koreans these days, for according to reports since the Great Currency Fiasco, much of the populace openly hates the little man. At any rate, En-Uk doesn't let up on the man, as shown in this next caricature, Kim Jong-il Spikey Hair:


Here, Kim Jong-il reminds me of some rock star gyrating his entire body so rapidly that his hair streams out long and straight from the centrifugal force . . . though with a few grey streaks, he'd resemble the Bride of Frankenstein. Whatever the intent, En-Uk's comment informs us that one doesn't want to get too close to the dictator:

This drawing is called "Kim Jong-il Spikey Hair." I made this drawing because it is dangerous to get close to his hair. Bye.

An excellent insight. The most dangerous place to be in such a regime is too close to the leader. Last in this series is En-Uk's most recent caricature, one in which the king truly has no clothes, Kim Jong-il Fat:


Of this latest image, En-Uk tells us:

This drawing is called "Kim Jong-il Fat." I made this drawing because Kim Jong-il is very really fat in the belly, like a baby. Bye.

I rather like the syntactic oddity, "very really fat," for it requires the reader to focus on Kim Jong-il's condition as one of the few fat individuals among all of the hungry people in the starving nation of North Korea.

As I suggested above in my comment from The Marmot's Hole, thousands of images like these sent by balloons into North Korea could do their small part in effecting regime change.

Michael Radu: "The Islamist Ghost Haunting Europe"

Michael Radu

(Image from FPRI)

The late Michael Radu has a posthumous book published recently, Europe's Ghost: Tolerance, Jihadism, and the Crisis of the West. The title makes the book sound interesting.

Dr. Radu, a Romanian immigrant to the US, was an FPRI expert on Europe and a scholar whose e-circulars I had been reading for several years until his unfortunate, premature demise about one year ago at the age of 61, so receiving a recent e-note about his book brings mixed feelings, gratitude mingled with melancholy. Accompanying the notice, and adapted from his book, was an essay, "The Islamist Ghost Haunting Europe," and I quote a brief passage here concerning the dilemma faced by Islam in Europe:

[H]ere is the key dichotomy that Muslims living in Europe face (or, more often, avoid): either agree with the radicals, who are [also] Muslims, that Islam is under threat globally and violence is the answer, or reject the main premise [of the radicals] and admit [along with moderate Muslims and most non-Muslims] that Islam has to adapt to different circumstances because Muslims now live under various circumstances. The latter conclusion would require cooperating with [non-Muslim] authorities and, most importantly, willingly accepting adjustments to traditional Islamic (or pseudo-Islamic) customs and beliefs: intolerance toward gays and denial of women's rights, but also practices such as polygamy, female genital cutting (FMG), and honor killings. The alternative is grim: the continuous rise [among native, non-Muslim Europeans] of populist, anti-immigrant demagogues, serious attempts to stop Muslim immigration, and eventually a general cultural clash in most, if not all, European countries. Of course, the creation of an Islam of Europe, adapted to the postmodern cultural environment, would solve all such problems. But that process is, at the very best, in its incipient, baby-steps stage.

Most European Muslims making noise these days are the radical sort, nor is there much sign of a 'European' Islam -- whatever that might mean -- but given the power and ruthlessness of the Islamists, we should hardly be surprised that moderate Muslims generally don't speak up. Nor should we be surprised that no strong moderate Islam is emerging, for Islamism is radicalism of Islam not at the margins but at the center. Islamists draw on deep sources in Islam, which they perhaps distort and misapply, but the texts that they cite are not marginal, as I've previously noted.

Dr. Radu's point, anyway, is that unless Muslims reinterpret Islam for non-Muslim contexts -- specifically, a European context -- then the Islamists will provoke populist reactions among Europeans. If that happens, then in my opinion, Europe will break up like Yugoslavia did, for populism in Europe takes the form of ethnic nationalism, and Europeans won't just be attacking Muslims in Europe, they'll be attacking each other along ethnic lines.

"I have seen the future . . ."

Seward's Folly, Lincoln's Wisdom?

Abraham Lincoln

and

Cabinet

Image from FPRI)

If you think that politics today is corrupt and Machiavellian, then consider this anecdote about President Abraham Lincoln and his Secretary of State William H. Seward in "The Foreign Policy of Abraham Lincoln" (2010) from the pen of Harvey Sicherman, writing in an E-Note for the Foreign Policy Research Institute:

April 1, 1861, must rank as one of the most amazing April Fool's Days in our history. For on that day, Seward did two things. He wrote a letter to Lincoln, saying that it was clear that despite the crisis there was no policy direction in the Cabinet. So Seward proposed that while Lincoln remain President, he should announce that, henceforth, the conduct of affairs would be controlled by the undersigned, Mr. Seward. Now on that same day, Lincoln had authorized the preparation of an expedition in New York to reinforce Fort Sumter. There was another fort, Fort Pickens in Florida, that was also in danger, but Fort Sumter was in much worse shape. Seward thought it was a very bad idea to reinforce Sumter, lest this provoke a war. Consequently, he promptly had orders written out in the name of the Secretary of War and the President of the United States indicating that the expedition should go to Fort Pickens. He slipped the papers among others that were full of appointments, and taking advantage of Lincoln’s busy schedule, insisted that all had to be signed immediately, which Lincoln did, unaware of their contents. Apprised by the secretary of the navy of the change, Lincoln later countermanded the order.

Now, just imagine all of this happening on the same day, and yet Lincoln did not fire Seward! Instead, he wrote a letter to him saying in effect that yes, it was true that there should be one person in charge of giving the lead and, as Lincoln put it, "I suppose that person is me." He thanked Seward for his advice and signed off. Nor did he chastise Seward for the substitution of the papers. Judging that Seward's dismissal at that point would have been catastrophic for his political situation, he did something else, defended him to the Cabinet while taking the blame because he'd been careless in examining his papers. This saved Seward's honor and cemented their relationship. And it would not be the last time that Lincoln would defend him. Confronted with the kind of insubordination that must have boiled his blood, Lincoln subordinated his emotions to his principle of unity.

Any ordinary individual confronted by such insubordination would have fired Seward or fallen prey to his machinations, but Lincoln was extraordinary. No one knew that at the time, of course . . . not even Lincoln, though he perhaps had an inkling since he believed that knew how to handle the 'team of rivals' that made up his cabinet:

The so-called "team" so unnerved one of Lincoln's confidants that he said to Lincoln, "They will eat you!" To which Lincoln replied, "No, they will eat each other."

Such a remark expresses not just self-confidence but also extraordinarily intelligent insight, and Lincoln would need this sort of intelligence for at least two reasons, both grounded in his ignorance:

As for Lincoln, there is no evidence that he had virtually any thoughts on foreign policy at all before he became president.

. . .

Unfortunately, although Seward and Lincoln were both trained as lawyers, their knowledge of international law was defective.

Even in the 1860s, ignorance of international affairs was a detriment for an American president, but Lincoln was lucky in that the Europeans were unlucky . . . as you can discover by reading Sicherman's entire article. And this gives me some hope for America these days.

Not that I wish any bad luck on the rest of the world, for I am, after all, living out here in the 'rest' of the world.

An exciting evening among the diplomats

Coat of Arms

(Image from Wikipedia)

Despite the pen name "Gypsy Scholar," I don't get out very much. Last night, however, I braved Seoul's rough streets and made my way utterly on my own toward the Grand Hyatt Hotel to attend a special reception "On the Occasion of the 31st Anniversary of the Independence of Papua New Guinea," personally invited by Ambassador Kuma Aua.

You see, the Gypsy knows people in high places ... even if he doesn't get out very much.

Anyway, I was immensely enjoying the very bearable lightness of being alone until my arrival at the Hyatt, where I followed the directions provided and inadvertently strolled into a wrong room, intially mistaking it for the Regency Ballroom. Finding myself confronted by a long mirror, several sinks, and the instant, unexpected focus of intense female attention -- a strong clue in my case that something is amiss -- I quickly backed out, found the actual ballroom through an entrance a bit further to the right, and drowned my embarrassment with a glass of refreshing white wine that the steward couldn't identify but that I tracked down as a sauvignon blanc from Australia.

One meets all sorts of people at such functions, even outside of women's restrooms. For instance, I met the marketing manager for Arabicas Limited, Eung Joe Bae, who imports coffee beans from Papua New Guinea to South Korea. I told him that if he's introducing Koreans to genuine coffee, then he's doing a commendable thing. He generously offered to supply me with their special roast, which I might take him up on.

I had an even more exciting encounter with a journalist from the Korea IT Times. I happened to be alone for a moment, sipping an Australian shiraz and musing about maybe testing that special Arabicas roast, when a Korean man approached me to introduce himself. He was a perceptive fellow, for he already had me pegged as a professor and asked if I taught literature.

In our ensuing conversation, he learned that I had previously taught at Hanshin University. At this point, he became animated and informed me that he had majored in German at Hanshin. I responded by switching to German, and he impressed me not only by replying in German but also by continuing our talk in that language.

I say "impressed" because many Korean students in Korea are not especially serious about their major, and one often meets people here who know very little about the field that they 'studied.'

Anyway, I was just about to hand him my card, when a rather burly fellow who was clearly deep into his cups came over, grabbed the journalist, spoke some angry words in Korean, and began pushing the poor fellow. Astonished by this sudden irruption, I could only stare as my conversation partner was pushed halfway across the room. Other people intervened to separate the two, the aggressive man was escorted out, and my journalist returned to accept my card and supply his own before exiting with determination in his eyes.

I wonder what that was about ... and what came of it.

A New Zealand couple that I know had been watching the entertainment and asked me if I knew why it had happened. I admitted to my ignorance but observed that although Koreans are generally peaceful, courteous people, they can also suddenly erupt in anger, and turn to violence ... albeit controlled violence. For example, once or twice a year, the political parties in the Korean parliament get angry at each other, square off, and start shoving. Their brawling usually limits itself to that and doesn't degenerate into uncontrolled melees.

The occasional punch, however, does get thrown ... but not last night.