De-Radicaliztion Works!

Hitler's Change of Heart

Hat Tip, Carter Kaplan

Yeah, that Hitler dude. Good thing he got de-radicalized in prison. Uh . . . what ever happened with that guy, anyway? Was he ever heard from again? We could maybe borrow the de-radicalization techniques used on Hitler and apply them to Islamist jihadis returning to Europe from the now defunct Islamic State.

Jihadi Culture: "a highly seductive subculture"?

Thomas Hegghammer
Website

Thomas Hegghammer, director of terrorism research at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, has written an insightful piece titled "The Soft Power of Militant Jihad" (NYT, December 18, 2015), because Jihadis aren't always fighting. Here's an excerpt:

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor to the Islamic State, . . . became known in jihadi circles as the Slaughterer[, but few] people in the West are aware that he also went by the nickname He Who Weeps a Lot. Mr. Zarqawi was known for weeping during prayer and when speaking about Muslim women’s suffering under occupation . . . . [This dichotomy helps explain why] tens of thousands of people from around the world [have] chosen to live under the Islamic State's draconian rule and fight under its black flag . . . . To understand this phenomenon, we must recognize that the world of radical Islam is not just death and destruction. It also encompasses fashion, music, poetry, dream interpretation. In short, jihadism offers its adherents a rich cultural universe in which they can immerse themselves . . . . To really understand a community, we need to look at everything its members do. Using autobiographies, videos, blog posts, tweets and defectors’ accounts, I have sought a sense of the cultural dimensions of jihadi activism. What I have discovered is a world of art and emotions. While much of it has parallels in mainstream Muslim culture, these militants have put a radical ideological spin on it[, and as] the West comes to terms with a new and growing threat - horrifically evident in the recent attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, Calif. - we are not only confronting organizations and doctrines, but also a highly seductive subculture. This is bad news. Governments are much better equipped to take on the Slaughterer than they are He Who Weeps a Lot.

This is why a rival religious subculture often has more success in attracting these radicals, which might explain why the apostate-Muslim atheist Ayaan Hirsi Ali has suggested that Christianity, with its own "highly seductive subculture," could meet the spiritual needs of Muslims while also providing a rather more peaceful expression of religious fervor.

Hal Brands on a 'Lesson' of the Cold War

Hal Brands

FPRI

Hal Brands, a senior fellow for the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), has published an article on "American Grand Strategy: Lessons from the Cold War" (E-Notes, August 2015). Brands finds eight lessons, but his second lesson interests me:

Lesson 2: American engagement is the bedrock of international stability

A second key debating point regarding U.S. grand strategy today involves the question of what this defense spending and global engagement actually buy in terms of securing the international order. Does U.S. engagement foster stability and peace, as American officials have long claimed? Or does it primarily invite blowback and other undesirable behavior, as critics allege? The history of the Cold War lends some support to both arguments, but the balance lies overwhelmingly with the former perspective.

Perhaps the lesson from the history of the Cold War applies solely to the Cold War's history. Here's the support for stability:

U.S. global engagement during the Cold War was a response to the fact that the absence of such engagement had helped cause the catastrophic instability of the interwar era. And during the Cold War, it was precisely the U.S. decision to embrace the responsibility of organizing and protecting the non-communist world that allowed key regions like Europe and East Asia - particularly the former - to break free of their tragic pasts and achieve remarkable levels of stability. U.S. policy helped deter Soviet aggression and dissuade other disruptive behavior; it helped mute historical frictions between countries like Germany and Japan, on the one hand, and their former enemies, on the other; it helped foster the climate of security in which unprecedented economic growth and multilateral cooperation could occur. U.S. policy was not the only factor in these achievements, but it was the common thread that connected them.

This is a fact about the past. American engagement in the world during the Cold War is properly seen to have been a force for international stability. But does this fact about the past permit us to apply the same reasoning today? Brands himself asks this question:

What relevance does this history have for grand strategic debates in a period that seems so different from the Cold War? The relevance is simply to remind us that stability - and all of the blessings that stability makes possible - is not an organic condition of the international environment. Rather, it must be provided by powerful actors who are willing to confront those forces - national rivalry, aggression by the strong against the weak - that have, historically, so often pushed international relations toward instability and conflict. At a time when many of those forces again seem to be rearing their heads from East Asia to Eastern Europe - and when there is still no compelling candidate to replace Washington as primary provider of international stability - this lesson is especially important to bear in mind.

Brands's answer seems to be that since nobody else can provide stability, only the US can. That is not a very compelling argument. In a sense, the Cold War itself provided stability, a framework that pushed the two sides to find mutual benefit in agreements. Our opponents at that time were not suicidal. Today, however, we face enemies who are not rational in the sense that the Soviet Union was. The Islamic jihadists say that they love death, which makes them irrational from a secular perspective. American intervention against jihadists in Afghanistan and Iraq have not stabilized the forces of order but have strengthened those of disorder. Maybe the rule of tyrants like Saddam Hussein kept order in their world comparable to how the rule of Communist dictators like Stalin kept order in theirs. Perhaps the order sought would have to have been kept by a certain distance of disengagement.

But it's too late for that now, so we face the dilemma of engaging and bringing more chaos or of disengaging and leaving more chaos. So . . . which is the lesser chaos?

Egyptian Cleric Mostafa Al-Adwy: Turn About is Not Fair Play

Moustafa Al-Adwy
Memri

Rather, turn away is fair play.

We see in Memri (May 16-31, 2015), Clip No. 4947, that "Egyptian Cleric Mostafa Al-Adwy Explains Jihad, States: Christians Cannot Promote Their Religion in Muslim Countries":

[As for defensive jihad against an invader,] the Muslims must fight this enemy, or serve the people fighting, so that they can continue their Jihad . . . . Offensive Jihad, on the other hand, occurs when we want to conquer some country. May Allah facilitate the Muslim conquest of all the infidel countries. In offensive Jihad, we raid a country. If we call upon them to convert to Islam and they refuse, we raid their country, in order to oust their leaders, and usher people in droves into Islam . . . . [As for the Christian, his religion] is false to begin with . . . . I am a Muslim, and . . . talk . . . in the language dictated by my religion . . . . I have [divine] orders. I do not have an opinion of my own in this. Allah said: "Fight them so there will be no strife."

That's quite clear, then. Al-Adwy admits he doesn't think for himself, but only follows the "dictates" of his religion, which he says encourages the spread of Islam - either through persuasion or through offensive jihad - but doesn't allow Christians to spread their religion..

Most interesting of all, he makes no attempt to hide the fact that "jihad" is used primarily to mean war, and thus differs to little or no degree from how the Shariah judges of the Islamic State interpret Islamic law.

Clint Watts: 'We have met the enemy, and he is us'?

Clint Watts
FPRI

Recently in Geopoliticus: The FPRI Blog, Clint Watts asks, "Are We Our Own Worst Enemy? The Problems in Countering Jihadi Narratives and How to Fix Them." I was particularly intrigued by one approach he describes as a way to discourage the radicalization of Muslims by the Islamic State:

Pinpoint Vulnerable Audiences: Identify those radicalizing online communities of ISIS enthusiasts most attracted to ISIS content . . . . Develop engaging "telenovela" style defector video content: Defector accounts . . . remain the most effective counter narrative . . . . [The] ISIS defector content must be able to engage the radicalizing individual[s] and sustain their attention. I . . . propose the development of three dramatic retellings of actual defectors and foreign fighters lost amongst different jihadi conflicts, illuminating ISIS and al Qaeda's betrayal of their own principles and troops. I would script out three, "telenovela" style videos that would initially stand-alone but would later be networked together . . . . [These] videos would not be fiction, but instead dramatic retellings of actual debacles involving foreign fighters. I'd recommend . . . three movies . . . describ[ing] the treachery of three fratricidal jihadi campaigns:

Tentative Title: "Fitna" – Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS foreign fighters killing each other in Syria

Tentative Title: "Bandit" – AQIM's fracturing, infighting and criminality as they are overrun by French forces in Mali.

Tentative Title: "Ansaris and Muhajirs" – al Shabaab's killing off of their own foreign fighters and clan based infighting inside the group.

Each of these movies would be provided in different languages to more directly appeal to specific radicalizing audiences and they would illuminate several themes of folly and despair encountered by actual foreign fighters embroiled in these jihads.

How would these stories be shown? As follows:

Each of the videos would follow a similar build up . . . . The videos would need to appear, in at least the first three episodes, to be somewhat sympathetic to joining a jihad - tracing the introduction, immersion and initial reception of a foreign fighter. After three episodes, dreams of jihad glory would fade as softer themes undermining ISIS enter the storyline - foreign fighters participating in criminal activity for example. As the story continues, the video would shift to real stories of horrid ISIS behavior - barbaric torture, sexual enslavement, killing of innocent women and children. The video series would conclude with a foreign fighter watching the fratricidal killing of a fellow foreign fighter at the hands of a corrupt jihadi leader. The foreign fighter would manage to defect from ISIS to return home, finding he had shamed his family.

Are these movies fiction? No, not exactly that, the "videos would not be fiction," rather, "dramatic retellings":

Engaging videos, mirroring the production format and quality of ISIS and describing the horrors experienced by ISIS defectors provide the ideal vector for engaging those in the 'Radicalizing' stage of ISIS recruitment.

In other words, dramatize the actual experience of disillusioned foreign fighters. Watts points out that such a program would not cost much, and hints that if the government won't, or can't, produce such a program, then perhaps someone private might fund one.

As for today's blog heading . . . well, I'm on a Pogo shtick.

Westerners Disbelieving the Jihadists

Muhammad on a Camel and Jesus on a Donkey
Jesus Ahead by A Head
HNN

I recently mentioned a conference held on May 3-4, 2015 at Boston University (BU) on "Apocalyptic Hopes, Millennial Dreams and Global Jihad," and one of the readers of my blog sent me a link to a report on that conference by one of the participants, Timothy R. Furnish, "Talking Honestly About Islamic Hate Speech" (History News Network, May 9, 2015). Among other things, Furnish cited Dr. Jeffrey Bale, who described a tendency among Westerners to disbelieve jihadists:

Dr. Jeffrey Bale, of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, . . . . focused on the phenomenon of "mirror imaging" among Westerners - the tendency to assume that the other "thinks like me," or at least not too differently . . . . Thus, no matter how many times ISIS or al-Qa'idah or Boko Haram or the Taliban states, unequivocally, that they are waging jihad fi sabil Allah ("holy war in the path of Allah"), unbelieving Westerners try to explain it as really being motivated by political grievances, lack of jobs, or Western meddling in the Middle East.

I get some of this when I explain that the so-called "sword verses" in the Qur'an abrogate the earlier verses of peace, but some people prefer to cling to the "no compulsion in religion" verse even though it's been abrogated.

I understand them . . . I also prefer that verse, but reality tells me otherwise . . .

Al-Tunisi's informs France: 'Your Women And Children Will Be Sold By Us In The Markets'

Al-Tunisi

Memri

According to a Memri Report for March 30, 2015, "Issue VIII Of 'Dabiq' Includes [an] Interview With [the] Assassin Of [the] Tunisian MP [Mohammad Brahmi, killed in July 2013 by Al-Tunisi], Who Urges Muslims In France To Emulate Terrorist Attacks In Europe, Threatens [the French]: 'Your Women And Children Will Be Sold By Us In The Markets':

On March 30, 2015, the Islamic State (ISIS) published the eighth issue of its English-language magazine Dabiq. The issue features an interview with Abu Muqatil Al-Tunisi, the assassin of Tunisian PM Mohammad Brahmi, who was killed in July 2013 . . . . Al-Tunisi also addresses Muslims in France, calling upon them to fight the enemies of Allah and to emulate other terrorist attacks that were committed in Europe. "I call them to follow the method of the brothers who executed operations in Europe . . . . Do not look for specific targets. Kill anybody. All the kuffar [i.e., unbelievers, non-Muslims] over there are targeted." Al-Tunisi further warns the unbelievers in France that ISIS is getting closer to France (namely after it established itself in Libya): "Soon, by Allah's permission, you will see the banner of 'la Ilaha Illallah' fluttering over the Elysee Palace. The Islamic State is close now. Between us and you is the sea . . . The march is advancing towards you. And inshallah, your women and children will be sold by us in the markets of the Islamic State."

The Islamist threats grow ever more bloodthirsty and depraved, almost enough to convince me of reprobation, the state of those so sunken in evil that they are beyond hope, having long ago crossed the event horizen of evil's massively attractive force.

But we can hope that Al-Tunisi and his troops follow through on one threat: "Between us and you is the sea . . . [Our] march is advancing towards you." Good, they can keep right on marching, straight down into the sea. Let's see if Al-Tunisi can part its waters . . .

Yes, we have the right to insult!

"I am Charlie (Hebdo)"

Google Images

By now, most readers will have seen news of the horrific terrorist attack upon the offices and personnel of the satirical French publication Charlie Hebdo in which at least 12 individuals were murdered, four of whom were sought out by name.

The attack was carried out by two French Islamist gunmen in revenge for Charlie Hebdo's satire of the Muslim prophet Muhammad, whose likeness is forbidden by Islamic law to be depicted.

Islamists want to restrict free expression, not only free speech among Muslims but also among 'infidels,' especially among Western infidels, who know that free speech means the right to insult, or it means nothing at all.

That's why today I say, "Je suis Charlie," and I call upon everyone, especially all Westerners, to stand up in solidarity and express these words of identification: "I am Charlie."

Be brave. Speak out. Stand firm. The terrorists cannot kill us all.

Pleasant Jihadi Dreams . . .

Glorious Jihad
Memri

Memri (November 4, 2014, Clip No. 4585) recorded the words of "Islamic scholar [Hussein Muhammad Hussein] Pledg[ing] Allegiance to ISIS Emir Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Live on Al-Jazeera TV," and the man said a number of politically incorrect things about Islam that we aren't supposed to believe, let alone mention, but that he can say because he's an Islamist:

[A]ll the Arab peoples yearn for the rule of Islamic law . . . . Allah be praised, he gave me the honor to pledge allegiance to the Emir of the Believers, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, whether people like it or not . . . . Jihad is a duty carried out by the Caliphate . . . . Capturing infidel women is permitted by Islamic law . . . . Islam functions as both a religion and a state . . . . [The plan of ISIS is to] establish the Islamic State . . . . [in] all the Muslim countries . . . . The world is divided into two camps - the camp of heresy and the camp of faith. The infidels are the enemies of the Muslims . . . . If the whole world is infidel, we will be hostile toward it . . . . The world consists of Muslims and infidels. We are here, and they are there. We rule the Muslim lands, but if you attack us, you will see nothing but war - you and your lackeys . . . . The peoples that are not yet governed by the Caliphate yearn for it . . . . All of them, without exception. They yearn for the rule of Islamic law. Yes, [they yearn for] the beheading of the infidels, lowlifes, and criminals.

Very pleasant dreams . . . for Hussein Muhammad Hussein and other Islamists. Very unpleasant nightmares for the rest of us, but good to know what Islamists want. They certainly aren't trying to hide their aims, though they still practice deception. Hussein says that if non-Muslims attack the Islamic State, there will be war against the non-Muslims, but he doesn't add that there will be war against the non-Muslims anyway.

It's a game of heads I win, tails you lose . . .

David Motadel on Instability of Jihadi States

Edel Rodriguez

David Motadel, in "The Ancestors of ISIS" (NYT, September 23, 2014), explains that we can worry less if we keep the weaknesses of the Islamic State in mind:

Today's jihadist states . . . emerged at a time of crisis, and ruthlessly confront internal and external enemies. They oppress women. Despite the groups' ferocity, they have all succeeded in using Islam to build broad coalitions with local tribes and communities. They provide social services and run strict Shariah courts; they use advanced propaganda methods . . . . [T]hey are . . . radical and sophisticated. The Islamic State is perhaps the most elaborate and militant jihad polity in modern history. It uses modern state structures, including a hierarchically organized bureaucracy, a judicial system, madrasas, a vast propaganda apparatus and a financial network that allows it to sell oil on the black market. It uses violence - mass executions, kidnapping and looting, following a rationale of suppression and wealth accumulation - to an extent unknown in previous Islamic polities. And . . . its leaders have global aspirations, fantasizing about overrunning St. Peter's in Rome . . . . [But] Islamic rebel states are overall strikingly similar. They should be seen as one phenomenon; and this phenomenon has a history . . . . [Because they were c]reated under wartime conditions, and operating in a constant atmosphere of internal and external pressure, these states have been unstable and never fully functional. Forming a state makes Islamists vulnerable: While jihadist networks or guerrilla groups are difficult to fight, a state, which can be invaded, is far easier to confront. And once there is a theocratic state, . . . its rulers are [clearly] incapable of providing sufficient social and political solutions, gradually alienating its subjects . . . . [Therefore,] the international community should continue to check the expansion of groups like the Islamic State, and intervene to prevent widespread human rights abuses. But given that the United States and its allies are unlikely to commit the massive military resources necessary to defeat the Islamic State - let alone other jihadist states - the best policy might be one of containment, support of local opponents and then management of the groups' possible collapse.

Hmmm . . . and those are its weaknesses? A theocratic state will collapse because it can't offer social and political solutions? Saudi Arabia has been around for while. So has Iran. Even if the Islamic State lasts only 35 years - as long as Iran has thus far - that's plenty of time to foment mischief in the world. Plus, the Islamic State has purged its territorial conquests of non-Muslims, so even if it eventually collapses, it will have altered, possibly irreversibly, that territory's demographics.

Perhaps we are currently observing the historical process by which the non-Muslim majorities conquered by Islam's expansion became minorities in their own lands and eventually disappeared . . .

Jihadi Readings of Qur'anic Verses Regarding Jihad

Page of Koran
Memri

The Director of South Asia Studies Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute, Tufail Ahmad, writing "The Terrorist Groups' Interpretation of the Koranic Verses Regarding Jihad" (Memri, Inquiry and Analysis Series Report No. 1098, June 4, 2014), notes an interesting point:

Although liberal commentators argue that jihadists are inspired by radical Egyptian teacher Sayyed Qutb and Pakistani cleric Maulana Abul Aa'la Maududi among others, it doesn't appear that the jihadists are quoting these writers; most of the jihadist literature essentially cites the Koran and the Hadiths.

As evidence, Ahmad goes on to note that one Pakistani terrorist group (Jaish-e-Muhammad), visited 18 cities in Pakistan to give "lessons that taught translation and interpretation of more than 558 verses on jihad." In fact, says Ahmad, "Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Maulana Masood Azhar . . . cited several Koranic verses to explain the jihadist mission in Islam":

Allah . . . in Chapter Anfal . . . says: 'Fight them until no corruption (kufr) exists and all religion (worship) is for Allah' (Chapter Anfal, Verse 39). This verse refers to the final objective of jihad, which is to exterminate every shred of resistance that kufr offers so that Islam dominates over all other religions and all abide by the law of Allah.

The jihadist scholars cited by Ahmad take note of various liberal Muslim interpretations of Qur'anic verses, countering each one of them with withering scorn based on close readings of the Koran and Hadiths. No one seems to be citing Qutb or Maududi, as Ahmad notes, but upon reflection, that shouldn't really be surprising since the writings of Qutb and Maududi are secondary sources, lacking the divine authority to be found in the Qur'an or the revered authority found in authentic Hadiths.

For the full report, see Memri.

True Translation: Translating Knausgaard's Struggle

Karl Ove Knausgaard
Photo by Chester Higgins Jr.
The New York Times

I've previously blogged on Knausgaard, but my reason for re-blogging is more limited this time. I've just read Liesl Schillinger's review -- "His Peers' Views Are in the Details: Karl Ove Knausgaard's 'My Struggle' Is a Movement" (NYT, May 21, 2014) -- and she observes in passing:

If you are an author, editor or critic, chances are you are lining up for [the book] . . . . If you are a lay reader, you may not have heard of Mr. Knausgaard; or if you have heard of him, you may have put off tackling the books, daunted by their Proustian bulk and uncertain of what that menacing title holds in store. ("My Struggle," or "Min Kamp" in Norwegian, is "Mein Kampf" in German -- the title of Hitler's notorious manifesto.)

Interesting that the translation of Min Kamp into English is the literal My Struggle rather than the far more resonant Mein Kampf. The question I have is this: Is My Struggle a true translation? Had there been no Hitler and thus no such book as Mein Kampf, then My Struggle would have been a perfectly true translation of the title.

But there was a Hitler and a Mein Kampf, a title that Knausgaard was obviously playing upon in choosing Min Kamp, so perhaps a better, truer translation would have been Mein Kampf. Native speakers of English would recognize the title and catch the allusion. Or maybe not. They might assume it were the work by Hitler. Nobody would buy it other than racist wingnuts! (It would be a bestseller.)

Maybe the best solution would be to title it Min Kamp, as a Norwegian would. That would cast a pall and light a fire, the truest translation thus being no translation at all! The allusion would have been preserved in the play on the title Mein Kampf, but the title would also be different enough for potential readers to distinguish the two.

Or one could title it My Jihad . . .

Jihadis on the Kidnapping of Nigerian Girls

Girls Kidnapped by Boko Haram
Image from Memri

Memri reports that jihadis are debating Boko Haram's action in kidnapping over 300 girls and threatening to sell them as slaves:

Reacting to the uproar over the kidnapping nearly a month ago of hundreds of high school girls by Boko Haram . . . in Nigeria, some online jihadis criticized the kidnapping, while others justified it as the legitimate use of the tactic . . . . Abdallah Muhammad Mahmoud, a frequent writer on the jihadi forums, wrote a post on the Al-Fida' forum urging Boko Haram to free the kidnapped girls, saying that the tactic may harm Muslims in general. In the post, titled "An Appeal . . . : Release the Girls," Mahmoud wrote: . . . . "From the supporters of jihad and mujahideen to the brothers . . . in Nigeria, peace be upon you. The peoples of the [Islamic] nation . . . . hear from the channels news that [which] we never hoped to hear -- namely, the kidnapping of Muslim and non-Muslim girls and your announcement that you intend to sell them as slaves . . . . [I]f you proceed with [this,] it . . . will become a dangerous precedent and will bring about grave calamities such as the nation of Islam has never heard of for centuries. Your announcement of 'imprisoning' hundreds of girls will not benefit Islam and the Muslims in any manner. On the contrary, it will reflect tragically . . . on their image . . . . Do not open the gates of evil, . . . protect your religion's reputation . . . . [and k]now that not everything that is permitted in Islam is proper to do at all times and in any manner without considering its advantages and disadvantages . . . . Preventing harm takes precedence over making gains, according to famous jurisprudential principle. We do not know what advantage for Islam and the Muslims will be gained if you do this.

Note that Abdallah Muhammad Mahmoud couches his words only in terms of not harming Islam's reputation, that he apparently accepts Boko Haram's Islamic right to kidnap and enslave, objecting only "that not everything that is permitted in Islam is proper to do at all times." Other jihadis were not so liberal:

[O]ne prominent writer on the forum, who goes by the handle rooooh, objected to this criticism. He wrote: "Honorable brothers, we are in an Islamic forum, and you are discussing an issue of Islamic law which has rules written in the Koran and Sunnah . . . . [and we know that i]mprisonment is permissible according to the consensus among Muslim scholars. Likewise, there are texts in the Quran and the Sunnah that permit it. It is not allowed to forbid something that Allah permitted . . . . [I]t remains in our law, and the international laws do not nullify it" . . . . Another member wrote in support of Boko Haram's actions: "On the contrary, [we should] imprison [as much as we can]. Ripping out the hearts of the infidels who have no morals in war is a legitimate administration of justice. As a Muslim, I think that the brothers, the mujahideen in Nigeria, did a good thing. I pray to the great Allah to give them victory and power throughout the land."

And thus stand things among jihadis, as both the liberal and radical wings agree on the permissibility of kidnapping and enslavement in Islamic holy wars.

Abubakar Shekau says: "What do you know about human rights? "

Abubakar Shekau
"Now, don't get me wrong . . ."
Google Images

This latest Boko Haram crime of abducting little girls for sale as sex slaves has some journalists finally doing their homework, as we see in Michelle Faul's article, "Nigeria Group Threatens to Sell Kidnapped Girls" (May 5, 2014, Associated Press), for she notes:

In the video, Shekau also said the students "will remain slaves with us." That appears a reference to the ancient jihadi custom of enslaving women captured in a holy war, who then can be used for sex.

This is a major step forward for mainstream media, actually recognizing a jihadi practice for what it is, i.e., not an innovation, but traditional. Perhaps Nigerians like Ms. Faul are less politically correct.

The quote in this blog post's heading, by the way, alludes to the Islamic belief that rights are bestowed by Allah and that Allah's law, or shariah, identifies those rights, including Shekau's right to abduct girls and sell them as sex slaves.

Anthony N. Celso on Never-Ending Jihadism?

Anthony N. Celso
Google Images

I came across this enlightening paper yesterday about a dark topic with a gloomy thesis:

This paper conceptualizes a wave theory of continuous jihadist warfare composed of four phases: mobilization, extremism, implosion and rebirth . . . . Each phase involves a sequence of events that characterize jihadist terror. The general evolution of the wave is easily discernible. After an initial burst of organizational dynamism and mobilization, Jihadist movements employ counterproductive violence to satisfy their millenarian ambitions. The ideological extremism of the jihadist group prompts internal divisions, popular revulsion and galvanizes opponents. This juxtaposition of forces leads to jihadist failure and a concomitant inability to create a stable Islamic state. The Algerian GIA and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), for example, suffered severe reversals at the hands of security forces and local militias. Egypt also has witnessed bursts of jihadist violence throughout the 1980’s and 1990's with high profile attacks against security services, foreigners and tourist resorts. Long thought dormant Egyptian jihadi terrorist violence has been catalyzed by the July 2013 military coup that deposed Muhammad Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood's democratically elected government. The same extremist visions that led to implosion, however, contribute inexorably to the group's regeneration. (Anthony N. Celso, "Jihadist Organizational Failure and Regeneration: The Transcendental Role of Takfiri Violence," Paper prepared for presentation at the Political Studies Association Meeting, Manchester, England. April 14-16, 2014, page 7)

Since these spasmodic waves of jihadism direct their violence against infidels and Muslim 'apostates', they would tend -- in the long run -- to clear the ground for less radical Islam's expansion, or so I extrapolate, based on Celso's analysis. Despite their irrationality, then, jihadist groups actually advance Islam's interests by spreading Islam. At the same time, they undermine Islam's ability to govern with stability, for no moderate form of Islam is ever sufficiently pure and rigorous.

Abrogation of Sura 5:8?

Logo

Professor David Bukay, of the University of Haifa, writing in the Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2007, pp. 3-11), asks "Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam"? He notes that Sura 5:8 -- which I wondered about yesterday -- is among the Qur'an's peaceful verses:

Proponents of Islamic tolerance point to a number of Qur'anic verses which admonish violence and advocate peace, tolerance, and compromise.

These peaceful verses include:

Qur. 2:256; 2:285; 3:64; 4:134; 5:5; 5:8; 5:48; 11:118; 29:46; 49:13; 60:8-9. All references are from Ahmed Ali, Al-Qur'an: A Contemporary Translation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). [Footnote 6]

But there is a complication, Bukay explains, a little hermeneutic principle called "abrogation" that is linked to stages in Muhammad's career:

The Qur'an is unique among sacred scriptures in accepting a doctrine of abrogation in which later pronouncements of the Prophet declare null and void his earlier pronouncements . . . . Rather than explain away inconsistencies in passages regulating the Muslim community, many jurists acknowledge the differences but accept that latter verses trump earlier verses. Most scholars divide the Qur'an into verses revealed by Muhammad in Mecca when his community of followers was weak and more inclined to compromise, and those revealed in Medina, where Muhammad's strength grew.

Bukay also notes a refinement of this point about these stages in Muhammad's life:

During the lifetime of Muhammad, the Islamic community passed through three stages. In the beginning from 610 until 622, God commanded restraint. As the Muslims relocated to Medina (623-26), God permitted Muslims only to fight in a defensive war. However, in the last six years of Muhammad's life (626-32), God permitted Muslims to fight an aggressive war first against polytheists, and later against monotheists like the Jews of Khaybar. Once Muhammad was given permission to kill in the name of God, he instigated battle.

Bukay then introduces Sura 9, a mother-of-all abrogators known as the Ultimatum Sura:

Chapter 9 of the Qur'an, in English called "Ultimatum," is the most important concerning the issues of abrogation and jihad against unbelievers. It is the only chapter that does not begin "in the name of God, most benevolent, ever-merciful." Commentators agree that Muhammad received this revelation in 631, the year before his death, when he had returned to Mecca and was at his strongest. Muhammad bin Ismail al-Bukhari (810-70), compiler of one of the most authoritative collections of the hadith, said that "Ultimatum" was the last chapter revealed to Muhammad[, which] . . . . coming at or near the very end of Muhammad's life . . . . trumps earlier revelations.

Because this chapter contains violent passages, it abrogates previous peaceful content. Muhsin Khan, the translator of Sahih al-Bukhari, says God revealed "Ultimatum" in order to discard restraint and to command Muslims to fight against all the pagans as well as against the People of the Book if they do not embrace Islam or until they pay religious taxes. So, at first aggressive fighting was forbidden; it later became permissible (2:190) and subsequently obligatory (9:5). This "verse of the sword" abrogated, canceled, and replaced 124 verses that called for tolerance, compassion, and peace.

Bukay calls attention to an important Islamic scholar's assessment:

Abu al-Kasim Hibat-Allah bin Salama (d. 1019) argued that the starting point of any investigation of the Qur'an is the science of abrogating and abrogated verses. He identified four categories of abrogation: 43 chapters unaffected by abrogation; six chapters that augmented the concept of abrogation but were themselves not abrogated; 40 chapters with abrogated wording but authority intact; and 25 chapters with both their wording and authority abrogated.

Among those suras abrogated in the fourth category are the following:

Qur. 2-3, 5, 8-9, 14, 18-9, 21-2, 24-6, 33-4, 40, 42, 51-2, 56, 58, 73, 103, 108. [Footnote 39]

That would seem to include the peaceful sura 5. If so, then jihadis will have a ready answer to this graphic novel against jihad in Syria: "Sura 5:8 has been abrogated and is therefore inapplicable. Continue the jihad!"

Graphic Novel Against Jihad in Syria

The Journey of a Mujahid with Jabhat Al-Nusra

According to Memri, Special Dispatch No. 5597 (January 10, 2014), an "Online Graphic Novel Challenges Jihadi Indoctrination In Wake Of Syria War," and Memri summarizes:

A graphic novel, "The Journey of a Mujahid with Jabhat Al-Nusra," posted on the Internet in seven installments in November and December 2013, recounts the story of Mustafa, a young Muslim living in a Western country, who goes to Syria to wage jihad. There he discovers that young men like him are callously mistreated and exploited, and sometimes even used as cannon fodder.

Memri provides some excerpts, from both the transcript and the video. The graphic novel is apparently intended for young Muslim men who've grown up in Western countries. Obviously, I've seen only excerpts, but there's an interesting verse from the Qur'an that the disillusioned young man Mustafa, the story's protagonist, reads near the end:

"Oh you who believe! Be upright for Allah, bearers of witness with justice, and let not hatred of a people incite you not to act equitably. Act equitably, that is nearer to piety, and fear Allah. Indeed, Allah is acquainted with what you do."

That's the Qur'an 5:8, and it sounds fine and peaceful enough, though I'm often disappointed by these peaceful-sounding verses when I dig a bit further and learn that the doctrine of abrogation applies to them. Does it apply here, too? I'd like to know.

I'm also curious to know who sponsored this graphic novel, but Memri apparently doesn't know.

Martin Kramer on Islamism: "a moral universe left behind by time"

Arab Protest
Sandbox

In "The Arab crisis" (Sandbox, December 17, 2013), Professor Martin Kramer, expert on the politics and culture of the Middle East, offers an intriguing analysis on the current changes disrupting the Arab world:

This is a crisis of culture[,] . . . . to be precise, the implosion of the hybrid civilization that dominated the twentieth century in the Arab world[, a hybridity that constituted a] . . . . defensive, selective adaptation of Islamic traditions to the ways of the West. The idea was that . . . [such] tradition[s] could be preserved, that . . . [their] essence could be defended, while making adjustments to modernity as needed. The [supposedly] timeless character of the political, religious, and social traditions of the region could be upheld, even as upgrades were made to accommodate modernity[, in short, then,] . . . . a hybrid of the Arab-Islamic tradition[s] with Western-style modernity . . . . [Pretending] to be revolutionary, . . . it permitted the survival of those pre-modern traditions that block progress, from authoritarianism and patriarchy to sectarianism and tribalism. This hybrid civilization has now failed, and what we have seen [in this failure] is a collapse, not of a political system, but of a moral universe left behind by time . . . . [In] the great centers of Arab-Islamic civilization, from Cairo to Damascus to Baghdad, the crisis of the political order is primarily a symptom of the collapse of their own hybrid of tradition[s] and modernity . . . . [The failure of this hybrid culture] is most dramatically evidenced by the rise of sectarianism. The Sunni-Shiite divide has lots of layers, including a disparity of power, often the legacy of [modern] colonialism. But the mindset of sectarianism is thoroughly pre-modern. Modern nationalism was devised at least in part to blunt sectarianism among Muslims[, so the] . . . . jihad of Muslim against Muslim is a huge reversal . . . . [Because] tradition[s] had to be respected, the hybrid civilization of the region tolerated the exclusion of Jews and the marginalization of Christians[, leaving] . . . . only one step from there to the defamation by Shiite of Sunni, by Sunni of Alawi, and on and on. The jihad of Muslim against Muslim, whether waged by Lebanon's Hezbollah in Syria, or by extreme Islamists in parts of Iraq and northern Syria, is a huge reversal. It is like a page taken straight out of eighth- or ninth-century Islamic history. Here we are in a Middle East where the major divide isn't over the form of government, or the nature of the economic system, or the extent of individual liberty. It is over a[n old] dispute dating from the seventh century of Islam -- the sort of thing Europe left behind when it secularized during the Enlightenment.

With this breakdown of the Middle East's hybrid civilization, we see the rise of Islamist radicalism in Muslim against Muslim -- the homefront of Islamist attacks on Western Modernity -- for ridding the world of infidelity requires not merely that one eradicate unbelief in the non-Muslim realm but also, and even more imperative, that one eradicate unbelief in the Muslim realm itself, with "unbelief" being defined as any innovation in Islamic traditions. Thus the accusation of takfir leveled by Muslim against Muslim.

Professor Kramer concludes that "millions of people [in the Middle East] . . . must reconfigure the way they see themselves and the world, not just through a political revolution, but through a cultural one," that no "power outside can deliberately accelerate or channel this transformation, " and that "we are much closer to the beginning of that process than the end," so the Middle East "will remain a cauldron for years if not decades to come."

We have a lot of ancient history to look forward to . . .

Matthew Schrier's Conversion to Islam: Cynical? Stockholm Syndrome? Or Nonpathological?

Matthew Schrier
New York Times

Was Matthew Schrier cynical, pathological, or nonpathological in his conversion decision while a captive of Islamist jihadists in Syria? Consider the following sequence described by C. J. Chivers in "American Tells of Odyssey as Prisoner of Syrian Rebels" (New York Times, August 22, 2013). First, some torture:

Now was Mr. Schrier's turn.

Wearing masks, his jailers led him out, sat him down and forced a car tire over his knees. They slid a wooden rod behind his legs, locking the tire in place. Then they rolled him over. Mr. Schrier was face down on a basement floor, he said, legs immobilized, bare feet facing up.

"Give him 115," one of his captors said in English, as they began whipping his feet with a metal cable.

When the torture ended Mr. Schrier could not walk.

Then, 'conversion':

Mr. Schrier converted to Islam in March, he said, which improved his relations with the kidnappers and brought an added benefit: His jailers gave him something to read, an English-language Koran.

Finally, freedom:

[His] cell was in a basement; the mesh and welding on one window was damaged and had been only partially repaired.

Mr. Schrier . . . unraveled wires, opening a hole large enough to fit his head and one arm. But he got stuck and had to return inside and rewire the mesh . . . . After a few days, . . . Mr. Schrier opened a larger hole . . . . Mr. Schrier said, he pushed both arms out and followed with his head.

He passed through.

The article doesn't say anything about the reasons for Mr. Schrier's so-called 'conversion' -- we're left to wonder if he was cynical or caught up in profound psychological identification with his captors, a pathology known as the Stockholm Syndrome. Jihadists often pressure their non-Muslim captives to convert, promising them better treatment. There are even cases of forced conversions, as with Steve Centanni and Olaf Wiig back in 2006. The two journalists were held at gunpoint and forced to recite the shahada, Islam's conversion formula.

Odd, that the article doesn't ever broach the issue, not even to let readers know if Schrier's conversion was possibly nonpathological and genuine, and if so, for what reasons . . .

Martyrs: Beatific Smiles, Scent Of Musk, Virgins Awaiting In Paradise

Smiling 'Martyr'

MEMRI

ALERT: Do Not Click Links If You Are Disturbed By Images Of Even The 'Happy' Dead.

In the Inquiry and Analysis Series, Report No. 990, of MEMRI (July 2, 2013), we find the article "Faces Of Death - Part II," which shows facial photos of jihadis who have died in battle and whose rigor mortis smiles (plus some likely manipulation) are given as evidence that they are martyrs already enjoying paradise, as we shall learn. First, though, let's see where these martyrdoms are taking place, and where the martyrs from from:

Over the past few months, online jihadis have been using Twitter on a daily basis to disseminate photos of martyrs killed on jihadi fronts in Syria. These martyrs are from around the world -- Italy, Spain, Belgium, Albania, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Morocco, Jordan, Libya, Kuwait, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Dagestan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Bahrain, and Algeria -- and among them are prominent sheikhs, well-known writers on online jihadi forums, scientists, students, and others, from many different terrorist/jihadi organizations.

They're in Syria and seem to have come from all over the world! What's the purpose of these photos? There are several purposes, but one aim is "portraying the martyrs as heroes who should be emulated." Why emulated? Because they're smiling. Why should that serve to attract more jihadis? Because it means that these martyrs have already entered paradise. How do we know? Just Google "martyr" and "smile" together, you'll find over 5 million sites, a large percentage of these dealing with Islamic martyrs, the smile in such cases being explained as evidence that the martyr is already enjoying paradise, such as this site, "The Smile of Gaza's martyrs is one of Quran's miracles," somewhat ungrammatically shows:

There are still more rewards; the prophet says:" The soil of the battlefield won't dry from the martyr's blood before two wives from the paradise looms and make their way to him anxiously as they were two birds who lost the accompany of their folk, in their hands a dress much better than the life and its joys . . . . How great the reward, while people are crying he smiles, smiles happily because he received his rewards."

These two wives are two of the virgins of paradise, as this Tweet posted in the MEMRI report on the Martyrs' smiles also implies:

"He refrained from marriage because he was hastening to meet the virgins under the shadows and the trees. As he died, he will be honored with the company of the Prophet Muhammad's companions and the love of the Prophet Muhammad."

Not all of the photos posted by MEMRI show smiles, but some of the 'martyrs' are described as emanating a scent of "musk," evidence of a holy death rewarded by paradise, according to this website, Miracles of the Martyrs:

[T]he martyrs' bodies remain intact because their souls feed on the Heavenly fruits. This may explain the scent of musk . . .

Again, just Google "martyr" and "musk" together, you'll find over 2.5 million sites, a large percentage of these likewise on Islamic martyrs. My point is consistent with previous posts, namely, to establish that hope of paradise, to a great extent, motivates the martyr, whether in jihad generally or suicide bombing specifically.

Not that this is the sole motive . . .