Martyrs: Beatific Smiles, Scent Of Musk, Virgins Awaiting In Paradise

Smiling 'Martyr'

MEMRI

ALERT: Do Not Click Links If You Are Disturbed By Images Of Even The 'Happy' Dead.

In the Inquiry and Analysis Series, Report No. 990, of MEMRI (July 2, 2013), we find the article "Faces Of Death - Part II," which shows facial photos of jihadis who have died in battle and whose rigor mortis smiles (plus some likely manipulation) are given as evidence that they are martyrs already enjoying paradise, as we shall learn. First, though, let's see where these martyrdoms are taking place, and where the martyrs from from:

Over the past few months, online jihadis have been using Twitter on a daily basis to disseminate photos of martyrs killed on jihadi fronts in Syria. These martyrs are from around the world -- Italy, Spain, Belgium, Albania, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Morocco, Jordan, Libya, Kuwait, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Dagestan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Bahrain, and Algeria -- and among them are prominent sheikhs, well-known writers on online jihadi forums, scientists, students, and others, from many different terrorist/jihadi organizations.

They're in Syria and seem to have come from all over the world! What's the purpose of these photos? There are several purposes, but one aim is "portraying the martyrs as heroes who should be emulated." Why emulated? Because they're smiling. Why should that serve to attract more jihadis? Because it means that these martyrs have already entered paradise. How do we know? Just Google "martyr" and "smile" together, you'll find over 5 million sites, a large percentage of these dealing with Islamic martyrs, the smile in such cases being explained as evidence that the martyr is already enjoying paradise, such as this site, "The Smile of Gaza's martyrs is one of Quran's miracles," somewhat ungrammatically shows:

There are still more rewards; the prophet says:" The soil of the battlefield won't dry from the martyr's blood before two wives from the paradise looms and make their way to him anxiously as they were two birds who lost the accompany of their folk, in their hands a dress much better than the life and its joys . . . . How great the reward, while people are crying he smiles, smiles happily because he received his rewards."

These two wives are two of the virgins of paradise, as this Tweet posted in the MEMRI report on the Martyrs' smiles also implies:

"He refrained from marriage because he was hastening to meet the virgins under the shadows and the trees. As he died, he will be honored with the company of the Prophet Muhammad's companions and the love of the Prophet Muhammad."

Not all of the photos posted by MEMRI show smiles, but some of the 'martyrs' are described as emanating a scent of "musk," evidence of a holy death rewarded by paradise, according to this website, Miracles of the Martyrs:

[T]he martyrs' bodies remain intact because their souls feed on the Heavenly fruits. This may explain the scent of musk . . .

Again, just Google "martyr" and "musk" together, you'll find over 2.5 million sites, a large percentage of these likewise on Islamic martyrs. My point is consistent with previous posts, namely, to establish that hope of paradise, to a great extent, motivates the martyr, whether in jihad generally or suicide bombing specifically.

Not that this is the sole motive . . .

Blood of the Martyrs . . . Seed of the Church?

Coptic Christians Protest Persecution

Ed Ou for The New York Times

(Image from New York Times)

The mainstream media might finally have begun to notice the widespread persecution of Christians throughout the world, particularly in Muslim-dominated areas, for I've noticed more articles recently in the New York Times on Christians suffering in Pakistan, Indonesia, and a number of other countries, particularly Iraq, from which Christians are fleeing and which threatens to be emptied of the last remnants of what was once its Christian majority. Now, we're also beginning to hear about Egypt.

David Kirkpatrick, writing for the New York Times, has recently noted that "Egypt's Christians Fear Violence as Changes Embolden Islamists" (May 30, 2011):

"Will Christians have equal rights and full citizenship or not?" asked Sarkis Naoum, a Christian commentator in Beirut, Lebanon. A surge of sectarian violence in Cairo -- 24 dead, more than 200 wounded and three churches in flames since President Hosni Mubarak's downfall -- has turned Christian-Muslim tensions into one of the gravest threats to the revolution's stability. But it is also a pivotal test of Egypt's tolerance, pluralism and the rule of law. The revolution has empowered the majority but also opened new questions about the protection of minority rights like freedom of religion or expression as Islamist groups step forward to lay out their agendas and test their political might.

Crawling out of the woodwork shaken by the revolution are even Islamists as radical as a certain Egyptian Salafi Shaykh Abu-Ishaq al-Huwayni who explains in this You Tube video translated by the site "Translating Jihad":

We are in the era of jihad. The era of jihad has come over us, and jihad in the path of Allah is a pleasure. It is a real pleasure. The companions (of the Prophet) used to compete to (perform jihad). The poverty that we’re in -- is it not due to our abandonment of jihad? But if we could conduct one, two, or three jihadist operations every year, many people throughout the earth would become Muslims. And whoever rejected this da'wa, or stood in our way, we would fight against him and take him prisoner, and confiscate his wealth, his children, and his women -- all of this means money. Every mujahid who returned from jihad, his pockets would be full. He would return with 3 or 4 slaves, 3 or 4 women, and 3 or 4 children. Multiply each head by 300 dirhams, or 300 dinar, and you have a good amount of profit. If he were to go to the West and work on a commercial deal, he would not make that much money. Whenever things became difficult (financially), he could take the head (i.e. the prisoner) and sell it, and ease his (financial) crisis. He would sell it like groceries.

The video of this man's insights into economics breaks off at this point, but I believe that we've heard enough to understand his mentality. Apparently, this statement was made over a decade ago, but in the 'freer' atmosphere of post-revolutionary Egypt, it has recently surfaced, and when the good sheik was questioned about it, he stood by his remarks. I don't know how much support he has in Egypt, but if Islamists of this sort were to take over that country and establish an Islamic state, they might not prove so popular. According to Trevor Persaud, writing "Public Enemy: Iran's Persecution Backfires" for Christianity Today (June 1, 2011), an Islamist state can inadvertently enhance the appeal of Christianity:

Islam is losing credibility after 30 years of theocracy [in Iran]. Resentment against the reigning regime is spreading and deepening -- especially since the disputed 2009 national elections.

"Before the [1979] revolution, the clerics were promising that once Iran becomes an Islamic state, it would be utopia, it would be brotherhood, and everything would be fine," . . . said [Issa Dibaj, an Iranian Christian]. But since then, Iranians "have seen nothing but war and fighting and international isolation and hatred, [and] they are thirsting for change."

"The Iranian public basically doesn't trust the government anymore," . . . said [Abe Ghaffari, executive director of Iranian Christians International], "and they don't trust the Muslim clergy anymore, because they have seen a lot of double standards and hypocrisy."

Converts in smaller communities still risk persecution from their own families, but tolerance is growing in urban areas and among the younger generation. "In fact," said Dibaj, "in places like Tehran and more educated communities, if you say, 'I have become a Christian,' they will respect you because of your courage and your independent thinking."

If anything, government persecution has made Christianity much more attractive, said . . . [Elam Ministries member David Yeghnazar]. "When government officials are on television telling people not to read the Scriptures, that generates more interest in the Scriptures."

I suppose that the Iranian government is worried, for as the article notes:

[M]ore and more Iranian Muslims are converting to Christianity. The house church movement is booming, with converts estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Evangelists are distributing large numbers of New Testaments, and satellite television continually beams Christian programs into the country.

Hundreds of thousands. Impressive, I guess, but out of a population of what, 80 million? That's still a rather minor percentage, so what is the Iranian government worried about?

Or might they have read chapter 50 of Tertullian's Apologeticus and learned of his theory on the growth of Christianity? But then, they wouldn't be persecuting Christians if they had, would they?

Or would they? Think of Iraq, which is being depopulated of Christians as they flee to escape the violence aimed at them by Islamists. Or of Pakistan, where up to 60 Christians each month convert to Islam to escape persecution.

Maybe Tertullian's blood-seed theory is not universally correct. Maybe some kinds of persecution are effective if the violence is brutal enough and if a substitute religion is offered.

I suppose we'll find out . . .

Denis MacEoin: "Suicide Bombing as Worship"

Denis MacEoin

(The Royal Literary Fund)

I read an insightful article yesterday by Denis MacEoin on suicide bombing as a form of worship, and since I want to share it -- and keep a link for myself -- I'm interrupting my posts on Hwang Sok-yong to briefly blog about MacEoin's article this busy morning.

In "Suicide Bombing as Worship: Dimensions of Jihad," Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2009, pp. 15-24), MacEoin tells us:

Preeminently, the bombers are referred to as "martyrs" (shuhada', sing. shahid) or "those who sacrifice themselves" (fida'iyun, sing. fida'i).

The latter term especially interests me, for I don't recall seeing this term "fida'iyun" translated before as "those who sacrifice themselves," and -- not knowing Arabic -- I didn't realize the religious connotations of the term, though I've posted a couple of entries specifically on Islamist praise for martyrs as sacrifices:

The Muslim Shahid as Sacrificial Intercessor

Al-Liby on Jihad as Blood Sacrifice

Or search my website for "sacrifice" for more on this issue. I'm curious to know, by the way, if the term "fida'i" is ever used by Christian Arabs in a theological sense to describe the crucified Jesus.

Be that as it may, MacEoin's article is very interesting, albeit rather depressing, for it places the "suicide bomber" squarely within the jihad tradition of Islam in order to make sense of the act, an analysis implying that this form of 'worship' might be difficult to discourage.

Steve S. Sin: "Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea's Next Challenge against Terrorism"

Steve S. Sin

Expert on Terrorism

(Image from A Fencer's Musings)

Islamist terrorism has been in the news lately here in South Korea due to a couple of suicide bombings aimed at Korean tourists in Yemen. The first attack killed four Korean citizens, but the second attack failed to cause any Korean fatalities. In both cases, Al-Qaida has been cited by Yemen and Korean authorities as responsible for the attacks.

Robert Koehler, who writes for The Marmot's Hole, reports in a recent blog entry, "Inadequate Understanding Leads to Muslim Hostility: Expert," that a South Korean expert on the Middle East, Lee In-seop (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), has suggested to the Chosun Ilbo "that because Koreans have an insufficient basic understanding of Muslim religious culture, they frequently earn unintentionally the enmity of Muslims."

One often hears variations on this sort of 'root-cause' argument as explanation for the thousands of Islamist attacks that have occurred throughout the world over the past decade, though such an explanation apparently would not account for Islamist attacks on other Muslims, which have not been infrequent.

Whatever the root causes of Islamist enmity, the Korean government is alarmed and taking measures against the threat of Islamist terrorism here in Korea itself. According to a recent article in The Korea Times, "105 Foreigners on 'Terrorist' Watch List" (March 21, 2009), "the nation's intelligence agency is watching closely 105 foreign passport holders for possible terrorist-related activities." The Times reports that "[a]mong the 105 foreign nationals, those from the Middle East topped with 87, followed by 10 from Africa and the rest from Asia and the Pacific regions," and adds that the intelligence agency "is particularly paying attention to those foreign individuals with suspected ties with al-Qaida and is checking their entry to and exit from the country."

In a blog entry of last September, I posted on this sort of Islamist problem faced by South Korea: "Korea Herald: 'Foreign terrorists active in Korea: NIS report'" (September 23, 2008). In response to that post, I was contacted by Steve S. Sin, who blogs at A Fencer's Musings and is a specialist on terrorism and related issues in Northeast Asia. He asked me if I would be willing to proofread an article of his on the potential for Islamist terrorism in Korea, for he intended to publish it. I accepted because I wanted to learn more, not because I consider myself an expert.

I did, in fact, proofread Sin's article, from which I learned a great deal. It has since been published as "Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea's Next Challenge against Terrorism" in Asian Affairs (Number 29, January 2009) and can be read online. Basically, Sin notes that experts have no doubt that Islamist terrorists are here in South Korea, so the big question is why these terrorists have not acted. Sin suggests that the terrorists might prefer to use South Korea as a 'safe' place where they can plan operations elsewhere throughout Asia and transfer money via hawala networks that allow for the informal transfer of funds. Terrorist attacks here would put a severe damper on those activities.

However, Steve Sin emphasizes that he is speculating on this point, and I have my own concerns, for Islamist terrorists don't do cost-benefit analysis in the same way as secular thinkers, and the 'benefit' of a successful suicide bombing is an eternity spent in sexual ecstasy by repeatedly deflowering celestial virgins, so even if major Islamist groups like Al-Qaida are not intending any major 'martyrdom operations' on the Korean peninsula, we can't be certain that 'freelance' Islamists won't take matters into their own hands.

The recent attacks on Koreans in Yemen might be a harbinger of attacks in Korea itself.

Wiktorowicz on Islamist Suicide Bombings

Suicide Attack . . .

. . . or martyrdom operation?

(Image from Wikipedia)

Wiktorowicz, in his article "A Genealogy of Radical Islam" (Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:75-97, 2005), makes some interesting points about suicide bombings.

He notes, for instance, that these began with Shi'ites, not Sunnis:

Like civilian targeting, the issue of suicide bombings or "martyrdom operations" is relatively recent. The use of suicide bombings by Muslims began in Lebanon and was popularized by Hizballah. Tactically speaking, this influenced Palestinian groups. Theologically speaking, however, it is unlikely that Hizballah directly influenced Al Qaeda and the Sunni jihadis because its arguments derived from Shi'ite traditions of martyrdom (and it focused on military and political targets). The real debate about the religious permissibility of these kinds of operations among Salafis, in fact, did not emerge until the mid-1990s and was a response to its widespread usage by Hamas and other Palestinian factions. (Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," page 92)

Wiktorowicz does not specify, but the first Muslim suicide bombing used against the US was in the 1983 attack upon the US Marine barracks in Lebanon. I don't know the "Shi'ite traditions of martyrdom" that Wiktorowicz refers to, but I strongly suspect that the justification would be similar to that used by Iran to justify sending "Iranian children, some as young as twelve years old, to the front lines . . . . [to march] in formation across minefields toward the enemy, clearing a path with their bodies" (Matthias Kuentzel, "Ahmadinejad's Demons," The New Republic Online, April 24, 2006; republished in SPME). Technically, of course, these children weren't committing suicide, for they're not dying by their own hands, but what of their intention toward dying? This is where the issue lies for those who glorify the so-called "martyrdom operations," as we shall see in a moment.

But first note that this Shi'ite method was initially adopted as a tactic by Sunni Palestinian groups in the 1990s and used in suicide attacks without any real theological justification, nor has any clear theological support ever been provided, according to Wiktorowicz:

What is interesting about the current jihadi arguments about suicide bombings is how little attention seems to be given to constructing a theological argument justifying such attacks. Instead, the vast majority of materials focus on extolling the virtues of martyrdom. Abdullah Azzam's Virtues of Martyrdom in the Path of Allah is a classic example. In it, he elaborates twenty-seven points of evidence about the benefits of martyrdom. Most writings argue that the martyr has a seat in Paradise, avoids the torture of the grave, marries seventy black eyed virgins, and can advocate on behalf of seventy relatives so that they too might reach Paradise. Scholars from all ideological persuasions agree about the virtues of martyrdom. (Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," pages 92-93)

The emotionally laden emphasis upon the virtues and rewards of martyrdom suggest that a theological problem is being papered over. Not that the question of suicide can be totally ignored:

Since the 1990s, Al Qaeda and the jihadis have been forced to . . . . [ask:] are martyrdom operations suicide? This is critical because Islam explicitly prohibits suicide. (Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," page 93)

I wish that Wiktorowicz had quoted passages in the Qur'an and hadith supporting this prohibition, for I'd like to see just how specific the prohibition is. He does cite the older generation of Salafi clerics, who tend to oppose the "martyrdom operations" as clear cases of suicide:

Some of the more senior Salafi clerics in Saudi Arabia have argued that these attacks are prohibited. Muhammad Bin Salih Bin Uthaymin (d. 2000), for example, argues that, "as for what some people do regarding activities of suicide, tying explosives to themselves and then approaching disbelievers and detonating amongst them, then this is a case of suicide . . . . So whoever commits suicide then he will be considered eternally to Hell-Fire, remaining there forever." In making this condemnation, the focus is on the act itself: consciously killing oneself. (Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," page 93)

Wiktorowicz emphasizes here that these opponents base their critique on the action taken, namely, the fact that suicide bombers consciously kill themselves by their own hands. The proponents, by contrast, emphasize the intention of those killing themselves in "martyrdom operations":

The jihadis, however, focus on the intent of the perpetrator. Although he is not as radical as Al Qaeda, Yusuf al-Qaradawi outlines the basic reasoning:

He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit, while he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation. While someone who commits suicide has lost hope with himself and with the spirit of Allah, the Mujahid [holy warrior] is full of hope with regard to Allah's spirit and mercy. He fights his enemy and the enemy of Allah with this new weapon, which destiny has put in the hands of the weak, so that they would fight against the evil of the strong and arrogant. The Mujahid becomes a "human bomb" that blows up at a specific place and time, in the midst of the enemies of Allah and the homeland, leaving them helpless in the face of the brave Shahid [martyr] who . . . sold his soul to Allah, and sought the Shahada [Martyrdom] for the sake of Allah.

Here Al Qaeda shares its view of suicide bombings as legitimate martyrdom operations with less radical, conservative Sunnis. This includes not only figures like al-Qaradawi, but also Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, the Sheikh of al-Azhar in Egypt. (Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," page 93)

The quote comes from our 'moderate' friend, Qaradawi, the Egyptian scholar whom I've previously mentioned and whose defense of the 'self-martyrdom' tactic is summed up in this central distinction: "While someone who commits suicide has lost hope with himself and with the spirit of Allah, the Mujahid [holy warrior] is full of hope with regard to Allah's spirit and mercy." One's intention, it seems, can override the fact that "Islam explicitly prohibits suicide."

I'd still like to see that prohibition, and if any reader has the sources from the Qur'an and hadith, please link to these.