No Free Lunch, Nor Free Launch

Oops . . . My Bad!

"There's no such thing as a free launch," as Kim Jong-un is perhaps discovering!

North Korea's Next Test: The F-Bomb!

Kim Jong-un
Still angry after all these years!
Google Images

Me and my Kimfolk tested an A-Bomb back yonder and shook the whole world in a single day. That was way back when. Now that I'm all growed up, I've tested an H-Bomb and kept the sun up all night. Talk about global warming? You ain't seen nothin yet! Next time, I'm gonna drop an F-Bomb and explode in rage. I've been gorging myself to increase my mass, cause ever-body knows Einstein's famous formular, e=mc², so when I blow my top and my bottom, I'll shake the whole dog-damn universe at the speed of light bitchin squared!

Just you wait and see. When I shout, "F*ck you, universe!", ain't nobody gonna laugh about no 'interviews' with me and my Kimfolk no more!

Kim Jong-un Far, Far Younger Than Previously Believed

Four-Year-Old Kim Jong-un
NKCT
KBS

Experts on North Korea have debated Kim Jong-un's real age ever since he assumed power three years ago, but that debate is now over as the North's media have disclosed recent photographs of a clearly very young Kim, officially said to be but four years old, going about his duties as a precocious litle dictator: left photo, proudly saluting the glorious socialist future; central photo, keeping both eyes directly on YOU; right photo, peremptorily ordering his Uncle Jang's execution. Here follows the KBS report based on the official NKCT news release:

The North Korean media has disclosed photos of its leader Kim Jong-un . . . . The North's Korean Central Television on Tuesday released . . . photos showing a four-year-old Kim [at various duties, such as] wearing an air force uniform at a performance of the Moranbong Art Troupe.

The Moranbong Art Troupe is the North Korea Wave of the Future, which Kim is shown saluting in the left-most photo above, as already described. The North's surprising disclosure of Kim's actual age has left foreign experts stunned -- and groping for appropriate ways to engage Kim in dialogue about his nuclear weapons, his ballistic missiles, and his space satellites, for he appears very reluctant to give up what he calls his "toys."

I suggest seeking advice from child psychologists on how to deal with immaturity at this level . . .

Kim Jong-un 'Pissed' While Purging?

Kim Jong-un
Pissed Pistolier

Google Images

Drawing upon a report in the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, Korean reporters Kim Hyun-ki and Kim Hee-jin (JoongAng Daily, December 23, 2013) tell us that "[Kim] Jong-un [was] drunk when he ordered some purges," starting with the two aides Ri Ryong-ha and Jang Su-gil, who worked under his Uncle Jang Song-thaek:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was drunk when he ordered the execution of two aides close to his uncle Jang Song-thaek, the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun reported on Saturday . . . . [In turn, t]he Yomiuri cited a source that claimed Ri Ryong-ha, the first deputy director of the administrative department of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party, and Jang Su-gil, a deputy director of the department, were executed because they did not immediately follow an order by Kim to hand over their control of a profitable business to the military . . . . [Apparently,] when Kim made the order, Ri and Jang responded that they first had to report to director Jang -- the man in charge of the administrative department -- which made the young leader "upset" . . . . [Reportedly, w]hen Kim ordered the execution of the two aides, he was "very drunk," the source told the Yomiuri.

Kim Jong-un appears to have been pissed in both colloquial senses of the word, namely, "drunk" and "angry." The Yomiuri Shimbun (December 21, 2013) itself, translated from the Japanese by the Korean Open Source Digest (Volume VI, Issue 247, December 23, 2013), offers the same view: "Failure By Aides to Chang [i.e., Jang Song-thaek] To Immediately Carry Out Kim Jong Un's Order Infuriates Kim":

The two subordinates were Ri Ryong-ka, first deputy director of the Administration Department, and Chang Su-kil, deputy director of the same department. According to the source, they did not quickly respond to the instruction by saying, "We need to report this to Director Chang." An enraged Kim Jong Un ordered their execution though he was "dead drunk" at the time, the source said.

I'd consider altering "though" to "because." My grandfather once told me there were two kinds of drunks, the happy sort and the angry sort. Kim Song-un seems to belong to the latter category, but his impulsive character seemingly accounts for his abrupt orders, regardless whether he is drunk or not, as we see from the Yomiuri Shimbun's further report:

Touching on Kim Jong Un's alleged instruction, a South Korean government official said: "He tends to give instructions on impulse and without taking into account the reality. We doubt if he can maintain unifying power." According to concerned officials, Kim Jong Un issued an order to plant lawn[s] on the yards of citizens' residences to make the yards look like ones he saw in Switzerland during his stay in the country for study, although those [North Korean] yards are used as precious food[-]supplying fields for residents. He also ordered [underlings] to install parking lots on the premises of apartments to be built in Pyongyang by claiming, "An era of private vehicles has come." Further, WPK cadres were allegedly appalled when they heard Kim saying, "We can solve our food shortages if we eat meat instead of rice."

And cake instead of bread. Assuming that all these reports are true (and I do have some skepticism), then baby-faced Kim Jong-un lacks the smarts for the calculations necessary toward retaining and maintaining power. His immaturity and lack of self-control, exacerbated by appalling ignorance, suggests that he is not long for this world, for there are -- waiting from the sidelines and calculating their odds -- those in full possession of what the young Kim lacks.

And they will be ruthless with him . . .

Kim Jong-un: Parroting Parody or Floundering Fool?

Kim Jong-un
Parodying his Grandad?
Google Images

There has been a discussion over at the Marmot's Hole about North Korean propaganda as North Korea expert Brian Myers sees it. Myers argues that what serves as public-image propaganda these days by Kim Jong-un -- e.g., openly playing with foreigners at 'his' amusement park, publicly hanging out with a 'strange' Dennis Rodman, unnecessarily humiliating his 'corrupt' uncle on national television, and other such 'feats' -- is surprisingly bad, for it makes Kim Jong-un look not only utterly immature, but also even disrespectful of his elders in the eyes of North Koreans. One commenter disagreed with the position taken by Myers, arguing that the regime in Pyongyang could use any sort of propaganda it wished, and the North Korean people would have to swallow it, even if it were as irrational as bad mathematics, because, "Up north, 2+2 can equal 5 today, 3 tomorrow." I disagreed with that point, so I posted my own comment:

"Up north, 2+2 can equal 5 today, 3 tomorrow."

Only for small values of 5 and large values of 3.

Propaganda can be consistent with people's values or inconsistent with people's values. The former tends to be more effective.

Kim Jong-un has shown himself both publicly frivolous and impulsively brutal in a culture that expects leaders to appear serious and deliberative.

He therefore lacks gravitas, despite his girth, and looks like a parody of Kim Il-sung.

Kim Il-sung
The Original?
Google Images

My interlocutor, a reasonable fellow going by the eminently sensible moniker "George Smiley," accepted that my argument "makes sense," thereby giving me the confidence to post my views here, where truth alone is admitted through the gate and presented for posting! Falsehood must remain outside, languishing in the dust and pleading through bitter tears to be allowed entrance, but the gates are forever shut to such foul error. Unfortunately, that doesn't prevent the occasional inaccuracy from sneaking in through the sewers, but their stink eventually betrays them, and they are purged! Not like Uncle Jang Song-thaek was purged, though, for I don't even own a machine gun or a flamethrower . . .

Christmas Comes Early For Uncle Jang . . .

Jang Song Thaek

"Jingle, jangle, jingle

I can hear those 'slay' bells ring"

Yonhap News

Kevin Kim calls attention to Joshua Stanton over at One Free Korea for his intriguing insight into the Child-King's possible faux pas in having his Uncle Jang so publicly executed for plotting a coup:

The very fact that North Korea concedes that a recently-esteemed and trusted leader secretly despised and plotted against Kim Jong Un is an acknowledgement of the unthinkable. It shatters one of the most sacred illusions of North Korean propaganda. Had someone tried to overthrow Kim Jong Il (and someone probably did) Kim Jong II would never have admitted it (and he didn't). Both Jang's execution and this announcement suggest that Kim Jong Un is a much more volatile man than his father, and much less schooled in the ideology that explains his father's longevity. For once, I'm astonished by North Korea's candor.

Joshua's point is that the Kim-family's spell has been broken. Every North Korean now knows that the man closest to Kim Jong Un hated him. There may now be a lot of desperate officials who were indebted to Jang and don't want to suffer his fate, and if the Man-Child Leader is perceived as volatile, unpredictable, and brutal, then he is making a problem for himself, as I noted about a week ago:

If he's executing people on a whim, then nobody in the high elite can trust him. An intelligent dictator can be harsh, but if the rules are clear and applied consistently, people will generally obey them and thus know that they are secure. But if there are no rules and punishment is arbitrary, conditions are ripe for revolt.

But we'll see. Meanwhile, let's appreciate the "Brilliant General" for this early Christmas present . . .

Every Good Thing Must End . . .

Uncle Jang Song Thaek
Video at 8 minutes, 45 Seconds

Google Images

The current rumblings in North Korea over the party's purge of Jang Song Thaek, the uncle by marriage of the young North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, are making even the North's ordinarily boring propaganda fascinating to read -- and even more fascinating to play around with, in the interest of truth, naturally, so let's keep in mind that we're reading about an uncle and his nephew:

"Report on Enlarged Meeting of Political Bureau of Central Committee of WPK (Workers Party of Korea)," Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), translated from Korean by Korea Open Source Project, Volume VI, Issue 238, December 10, 2013

In this historic period for carrying forward the revolutionary cause of Juche[,] the chance elements and alien elements who had made their ways into the party committed such anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts as expanding their forces through factional moves and daring [to] challenge the party, while attempting to undermine the unitary leadership of the party . . . . [T]he Political Bureau of the C.C. (Central Committee), the WPK, convened its enlarged meeting and discussed the issue related to the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts committed by [Uncle] Jang Song Thaek . . . . [F]ully laid bare [were] the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts of [Uncle] Jang Song Thaek and their harmfulness and reactionary nature . . . . The entire party, whole army and all people are dynamically advancing toward the final victory in the drive for the building of a thriving nation, meeting all challenges of history and resolutely foiling the desperate moves of the enemies of the revolution under the leadership of Kim Jong Un [nephew of Jang Song Thaek] . . . . The [Uncle] Jang Song Thaek group, however, committed such anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts as gnawing at the unity and cohesion of the party . . . . [Uncle] Jang pretended to uphold the party and leader but was engrossed in such factional acts as dreaming different dreams and . . . . behaving against the elementary sense of moral obligation and conscience as a human being . . . . [for Uncle] Jang desperately worked to form a faction within the party . . . . [and] tried to increase his force and build his base . . . . [Uncle] Jang and his followers did not sincerely accept the line and policies of the party . . . . The [Uncle] Jang group weakened the party's guidance . . . . Such acts are nothing but counter-revolutionary, unpopular criminal acts of giving up the class struggle and paralyzing the function of [the] popular democratic dictatorship [of Uncle Jang's nephew, Kim Jong Un], yielding to the offensive of the hostile forces to stifle the DPRK . . . . [Uncle] Jang seriously obstructed the nation's economic affairs and the improvement of the standard of people's living . . . . The [Uncle] Jang group put under its control the fields and units which play an important role in the nation's economic development and the improvement of people's living in a crafty manner, making . . . impossible for the economic guidance organs including the Cabinet to perform their roles[,] . . . . [thereby] throwing the state financial management system into confusion and committing such [an] act of treachery as selling off precious resources of the country at cheap prices, the [Uncle Jang] group made it impossible to carry out the behests of [his father-in-law] Kim Il Sung and [his brother-in-law] Kim Jong Il on developing the industries of Juche iron, Juche fertilizer and Juche vinalon . . . . [Uncle] Jang committed irregularities and corruption and led a dissolute and depraved life . . . . abusing his power, . . . [and having] improper relations with several women . . . . [Uncle] Jang and his followers committed criminal acts baffling imagination . . . [acts] perpetrated by the group of [Uncle] Jang Song Thaek . . . . Speakers bitterly criticized in unison the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts committed by the [Uncle] Jang group and expressed their firm resolution to remain true to the idea and leadership of Kim Jong Un[, pure nephew of the corrupt Uncle Jang Song Thaek] . . . . The meeting adopted a decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee on relieving [Uncle] Jang of all posts, depriving him of all titles and expelling him and removing his name from the WPK [and his image from official photographs, of course] . . . . The party served warning[s] to [Uncle] Jang several times and dealt blows at him, watching his group's anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts[,] as it has been aware of them from long ago[, but try not to dwell on this point too much, as that might lead to groundless doubts about the party's superior wisdom]. But [anyway,] . . . [the Uncle Jang Song Thaek group] did not pay heed to [the party] . . . but went beyond [the] tolerance limit. That was why the party eliminated [Uncle] Jang and purged his group, unable to remain an onlooker to its acts any longer [-- but again, don't think about this point too deeply --] dealing telling blows at sectarian acts manifested within the party . . . . The discovery and purge of the [Uncle] Jang group, a modern day faction[,] . . . [has] made our party and revolutionary ranks purer . . . . No force on earth can deter our party, army[,] and people from dynamically advancing toward a final victory, single-mindedly united around [the pure] Kim Jong Un[, nephew of the corrupt Uncle Jang Song Thaek].

Family problems . . . (sigh) . . . every family has them. But there's a serious side to this, of course. The North might be growing unstable, motivating Kim Jong Un to distract everyone through serious provocations against South Korea.

Something to think about . . .

A Near Miss . . .

Here's Looking at You, Kid!

Google Images

My cyber-friend Malcolm Pollack, who blogs at Waka Waka Waka, landed in Seoul last Friday morning at 4:00 a.m. and was delayed at the airport until 4:00 p.m. for his flight on to China:

We are here now. Our flight from JFK touched down at Incheon at about 4 a.m. (as I write, it's about 6 a.m. local time).

Our 9:40 flight to Guangzhou has now been delayed until 4 p.m. due to bad weather in Guangzhou. We will be weary travelers indeed by the time we get there . . .

Friday being a very busy day for me, I had no freedom to drop by the airport, so I wish his time in the airport had been on a Saturday:

Sorry to hear of the delay . . . though if today were Saturday, I'd come meet you at the airport for a drink.

Have a good trip!

In response to that, I received an email:

Thanks Jeff!

This flight on Korean Air, and visit to the airport, has made me more curious than ever about Korea, and I'm sure we'll be back. (As long as Kim Young 'Un) doesn't do anything too insane.

Speaking of which, what's the mood like in the South about all this saber-rattling? Are people seriously concerned about the possibility of an attack?

I replied to the full extent of my ignorance:

Noticeable about the rhetoric emanating from the North this time are its specificity and its dire character, so people have certainly taken note. But we are reassured -- and I agree -- that the North has no desire for a war that would bring down its system. Moreover, the North has continued to welcome Chinese tourists and has emphasized [to them] that there will be no war. The North is probably aiming much of its rhetoric at its domestic audience, trying to make the 'Young'un' look like a tough leader. The only danger is the possibility of a miscalculation.

Malcolm had flown on to China by then, so I heard no more. A near miss. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un's war rhetoric waxes ever more weird, but I'm hoping for nothing worse than a "near miss" there, too . . .

North Korea's Kim Jong Un: Just a Smiling Softie of a Dictator . . .

British Association for the Study of Songun Policy
Kim Jong Un's Flaming Desire for Children to Succeed
Facebook

I know you're all wondering what's going on up in the North Country, so we're today looking at an open source intelligence report's translation of a North Korean article conveyed to us courtesy of the Korea Open Source Digest (Volume VI, Issue 27, Friday, February 8, 2013), which cites the Korean Central News Agency as announcing that a "British Organization Praises Kim Jong Un" (02/07/13):

The British Association for the Study of Songun Policy posted an article headlined "Leader Kim Jong Un's smile" and a photo of him among delegates to the celebrations of the 66th anniversary of the Korean Children's Union on its website on Jan. 30.

An association of a two or three Brits? Brits who meet to study Kim Jong Un's views on the North Korean policies of songun (military first) and juche (autonomy)? But who also find time to study his smile? Sounds promising, so let's read this report on the brilliant smile of the dear, respected leader! Of course, there will be interruptions:

"Leader Kim Jong Un's smile"

The beaming image of Kim Jong Un, leader of the DPRK, is seen very often in world media, the article said, and went on: His smile is attracting many people across the world, indeed.

Hmmm . . . so when he smiles, the whole world stops and stares for a while? Could be a theme song for a decent musical! Except that this sounds more like a report on a report. 'Indeed', this reads like British English. Let's soldier on:

His smile represents the personality of a great father embracing the people and offering them love and affection.

Lovely fellow. But is he always like this? Of course! He's the soul of dependability, as reliable as a North Korean promise:

He always meets anyone anywhere and any time with a broad smile.

Anyone! Anyone at all! Even South Korean President Lee Myung-bak? Apparently. How positively consistent! A regular hail-fellow-well-met sort of guy! What else does he do?

He strokes the cheeks of children and hears their whispers.

Uh-oh . . . that rings a few bells. Children's Union, indeed! Time to rethink our impression of this guy. I wonder if that last word, "whispers," is a misspelling, i.e., replace the first "s" with "m." (Not an intentional pun on S and M!)

He has peculiar photos taken together with ordinary soldiers and people arms in arms.

Now, this is getting outright weird: peculiar photos depicting intertwined bodies -- the young, hefty dictator with his soldiers (military first!) and other unspecified persons. That ol' son of a gun! And I'd thought he was a juche sort of guy.

He always stresses the need to put the interests of the people above anything else and gives them top priority and devotes everything to them.

Yes, everything devoted, right down to the very last inch of that hefty male! All for the the people's special needs, of course!

His smile reflects his belief that it is quite possible to build the DPRK into a thriving socialist country before long.

Quite possible! Before long! Promises you can bank on! As dependable and reliable as can be.

He said it is the firm determination of the Workers' Party of Korea to make the people lead a wealthy life under socialism to their heart's content, not suffering difficulties again.

Again? Like the mass starvation of the latter 1990s? Nah, that never happened, so he must be referring to the suffering under imperialists. I trust that the members of the Children's Union understood his point. Doubtless, he whispered it to each tiny member as he stroked cheeks and drove his dictatorial point home.

His smile represents the pluck of the strong convinced of the final victory in the confrontation with the imperialists.

Pluck of the strong? Rather choosy of him to go only for the strong, but that perhaps means the soldiers from those peculiar photos mentioned above. They'd be more useful than unspecified persons in confronting imperialists:

He, his face beaming with a broad smile, inspected the island defence detachments stationed in the biggest hotspot aboard a small wooden boat without any escort ship when the U.S. and South Korea were staging a dangerous joint military exercise.

I guess he showed those imperialists and their puppets who the big boss is! Just come into my hotspot, his broad smile seemed to say.

This calm and composed image left unforgettable impressions on many people of the world.

The report forgot to mention what these impressions were, but they were unforgettable . . . if rather peculiar.

Only shining victory will be in store for the Korean people thanks to the broad smile of the leader.

A truly powerful smile, that! He must have a really good dentist. And here's the moral of this story: We can't all be dear, respected dictators over small countries, but we can all attract intertwined bodies if we only just take care of our teeth through brushing and flossing regularly and seeing our dentist twice a year.

Oh, and don't neglect to practice your own juche smile! The whole world smiles with you!

A Kinder, Gentler, Less Corrupt DPRK Workers' Party?

Kim Jong Un

Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries

of the Workers' Party of Korea

I receive an open-source intelligence missive on Northeast Asia each weekday, and in yesterday's Korea Open Source Digest (Volume VI, Issue 21, Thursday, 31 January 2013), I read the translation of an important address that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, presented on January 30, "Kim Jong Un Delivers Address at the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the Workers' Party of Korea." This speech was published by the (North) Korean Central News Agency, and North Korean press releases are almost invariably boring and analytically useless, but this caught my attention because Kim Jong Un raised the issue of Party corruption:

I would like to refer to some problems arising in enhancing the functions and role of Party cells . . . . The most important task facing Party cells at present is to prepare the Party members as genuine . . . and true comrades and comrades-in-arms of our Party . . . . Particular attention should be paid to implanting the Party members with love for the people and spirit of serving them devotedly . . . . It is the firm determination of our Party to respect our people and devote everything to them . . . . Party cells should . . . serve and love the people . . . . From the very beginning after he founded our Party the President saw the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices manifested among officials as the most dangerous poison a working class ruling party should guard against and ensured that a consistent struggle was waged against them. The General . . . devoted energy and soul to developing our Party into a motherly party serving the people faithfully, not a party that indulges in power abuse and bureaucracy. However, whenever the Party underlined the need to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices, Party organizations simply called meetings for criticizing ideological defects and punished some officials . . . . Abuse of power and bureaucracy are not merely a matter of personal character or work style of officials, but a matter of their ideology. When they abuse their power and work in a bureaucratic manner, officials will not merely lose their popularity among the masses and get a blot on their political integrity, but impair the Party's authority and the prestige of socialism, which will end up leading the revolution and construction to ruin . . . . The Party Central Committee is firmly determined not simply to weed out but to root out the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices that are like the poisonous weeds sprouting on the garden of socialism centered on the masses of the people. The campaign against power abuse and bureaucracy is a Party-wide undertaking in which all Party organizations and their members . . . . should wage an intensive, principled struggle against power abuse and bureaucracy . . . . Party cells should create a strict atmosphere of criticism and ideological campaign and intensify criticism from bottom up in particular to give comradely help to officials to eliminate the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices and prepare themselves as the true servants of the people. Party cells should clearly distinguish between demands of officials and bureaucracy. When abuse of power and bureaucratic practices are manifested among officials even in the slightest degree, they should not neglect them but wage a struggle against them promptly. All Party cells should not be indifferent to the abuse of power and bureaucratic practices of the officials who do not belong to them but actively struggle against them; as for serious cases, they should report on them to higher Party organizations, including the Party Central Committee, before it is too late.

Does this mean an open acknowledgement that the Workers' Party is falling into greater corruption, or is it merely one of those periodic calls for diligence, or is it advance notice of a coming purge? What it does not mean is reform. Bureaucracies never reform themselves by relying on the better nature of bureaucrats. Even the threat of punishment depends upon the workings of the bureaucracy itself, or perhaps of yet another, higher bureaucracy. What is needed for a check on bureaucratic corruption is some form of separation of powers, along with a free press to uncover and publicize bureaucratic corruption. I don't foresee that sort of reform in North Korea. But the North's elite does recognize that the system has problems, and Kim Jong Un's further remarks suggest genuine concern about disaffection among the populace:

The masses are the grass-roots foothold the Party relies on . . . . . [W]e should fully grasp the public sentiments and win over as many people as possible through efficient work with them. As rallying broad masses of people around the Party is an important issue decisive of the destiny of the Party and revolution, an amnesty was proclaimed last year . . . . It was ensured that most of the participants in the celebrations of the 66th anniversary of the Korean Children's Union were the children of ordinary workers, farmers, service personnel and intellectuals, rather than those of cadres, and the children of those who committed offences against the country were not discriminated [against] in being chosen as delegates if they were exemplary in study and organizational life of the Children's Union. The embrace that cares more for sick and wounded children, gives them love and affection, cures their sour wounds, helps them up and puts them forward again, instead of blaming them, this is the embrace of our motherly Party . . . . People have emotions and express their feelings differently according to their characters . . . . We should not indiscriminately discard people, even though they are unwilling to accept the Party's ideas. If so, it will result in a gradual decrease in the number of the people to be rallied around the Party. Party cells should not cram the Party's ideas into the heads of the masses, but educate them persuasively and perseveringly so that they would willingly accept the Party's ideas. It is very important to place trust in the people in winning over the masses. Political trust is followed by loyalty, but distrust produces betrayal . . . . [A] man may make mistakes in his work and life and even commit unforgivable crimes. No matter what serious mistakes or crimes he may make, and even though we find in him 99 per cent of demerits and only one per cent of merit or conscience, we should value his conscience, boldly trust him and lead him to start with a clean slate. People who have deep-seated mental agonies should be treated more kind-heartedly and particular attention should be paid to freeing them from worries lingering in their minds.

Implicit in these words is an acceptance of diverse opinions among non-Party members, at least in the sense that they are free to speak their minds so long as the Party has the paternalistic upper hand, but I foresee a lot of backtracking on even this minor concession to free speech if ordinary people start to argue with the Party and discover that the Party has no persuasive answers. These fine words will once again prove empty promises if people do speak out.

At the very least, however, the two issues raised by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un indicate that the leadership has an inkling that something is deeply wrong. They just don't know how to fix it . . .

The 'Eighteenth Brumaire' of Kim Jong-un . . .

"Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice.

He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy . . . "


"the second time as farce . . . "


". . . Caussidière for Danton, Louis Blanc for Robespierre, the Montagne of 1848 to 1851 for the Montagne of 1793 to 1795, the nephew for the uncle. And the same caricature occurs in the circumstances of . . ."

. . . Kim Jong-un for Kim Il-sung.

Karl Marx himself couldn't have said it any better . . . for he already did say it best in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). Unfortunately, the farce of this dead suryong tradition up North will play out like a nightmare on the brains of those living there.

For copyright purposes, I should note that the first photo is borrowed from Life Magazine and the second from DPRK State Television.

Lee Chung Min on "Misreading North Korea"

Lee Chung Min

Dean of GSIS

Yonsei University

(Image from Yonsei GSIS)

On Tuesday, I read one of the most interesting analyses of North Korea that I've come across in a long time. Lee Chung Min's Korea Herald article, "Misreading North Korea," explains in clarifying detail that "Kim Jong-il is unable to give up nuclear weapons because" he -- as second generation of the Kim Family Dynasty (i.e., KFD) -- is "beholden to the Korean People's Army" (i.e., KPA). Lee maintains:

One of the most important lessons in coping with the three North Korean crises [of the past two decades] . . . is the fact that six decades of a unique totalitarian system has resulted in structural constraints that even Kim cannot readily control.

Kim Jong-il may be "in full control of his organization, his government . . . [and] still be the one who is in charge," as National Security Adviser James Jones stated August 9th on Fox News, based on Bill Clinton's report, but as Lee notes, "more relevant is to understand what exactly Kim is in control of":

The KPA under Kim Jong-il has become a state within a state that exercises more direct political influence than any other military in the world. Although it is true that Kim "controls" the KPA and that the army remains "loyal" to him, he has created a Hydra-KPA: a military that has, for all intents and purposes, become so strong that it no longer really needs the leader that created it, but at the very same time, a military that has become so intertwined with its founding family and decades of political intrigue that the KPA has become "operationally anemic," and at its core, absolutely and thoroughly corrupted.

As senior echelons of the KPA begin to line up behind [Kim Jong-il's third son and heir-apparent,] Kim Jong-un, it has become, in reality, "three armies" under one roof: (1) the top echelons of the KPA and loyal units that serve with one sole function -- protecting and preserving the KFD at virtually all costs; (2) a two-tiered armed forces whereby a "powerful, modern" military comprises the top 20 percent marked by nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and an array of special forces but a "hollowing out, third-rate" military that comprises the remaining 80 percent with soldiers that are barely fed, have extremely limited operational training, and soldiers who are, in reality, conscripted laborers rather than professional combatants; and (3) perhaps most importantly, a military which has become totally, thoroughly and irreversibly corrupted through state-run companies attached to virtually ever[y] major organ of the armed forces not only to raise foreign currency for the "Dear Leader" and his family, but increasingly, to bolster their own private coffers.

Whatever ideological commitment the KPA may demonstrate in public and however many soldiers may shout their lungs [out] to become "human bombs" in defense of the "Dear Leader," the reality is that the KPA poses a clear and present danger not just because it has access to nuclear devices and other WMD assets, but because it is on a path to self-destruction.

The Korean People's Army thus has as two of its three primary purpose the protection and enrichment of the Kim Family Dynasty, but there was a price to pay:

The Faustian bargain that Kim signed with the KPA as soon as he gained official power was to retain and strengthen their loyalty in exchange for giving the KPA the most prominent role as the vanguard of the DPRK.

And there is a consequence from this for the outside world:

[T]he most important and enduring reason why . . . [Kim Jong-il] isn't willing or even able to give up his nuclear weapons is due to the central role of the KPA in maintaining the Kim regime.

In short, Kim Jong-il cannot risk alienating the military's support if he wants the Kim Family Dynasty to survive. But can the "third son and anointed heir, 26-year old Kim Jong-un," retain the military's loyalty and exercise the "power and authority to effectively control the KPA" even if it is mostly a hollowed-out, third-rate military? Or rather, because it is a hollowed-out, third-rate military led by its corrupt, self-serving higher echelons down a path to self-destruction?

That is the question.

North Korea: Slow-Motion Collapse?

North Korea Today Header

(Image from NKT)

On June 7th, I asked if a "North Korean Collapse [is] Already Underway?" I think that the evidence points to this, for I daily receive updates on North Korea from the US Army's open-source intelligence gathering, which offers unclassified information to interested individuals, and this service has alerted me to the North Korea Today website, an excellent source for stories from the daily lives of North Koreans that reveals how deeply dsyfunctional the North Korean system has become, so dysfunctional that many North Koreans are openly skeptical of their government. Let's look at some recent excerpts.

Kim Nam-joong, a North Korean man in his seventies, was meeting with a group of friends, and one of his friends offered a remark about the government's goal of achieving economic parity with other nations by 2012:

"I hear the gates to a strong nation will be opened in 2012 and our nation will become as wealthy as any other nation."

To this, Mr. Kim responded:

"I would like to see the gates open just a little bit, if not open fully." He then continued, "Do we deserve our present lives? Can anyone open the gates to a strong nation?"

Mr. Kim was arrested when his words were repeated by informers. Interestingly, people in his village raised questions about the necessity for this arrest, prompting a party leader in Pyongyang to respond:

"The Central Party is aware of what is said about the current dire situation at people's private gatherings. Little complaints are considered the seed of social instability. This is why they started cracking down on people."

Now, this might be interpreted as meaning that the North Korean government continues to exert full control, but let us note some intriguing points. The government itself acknowledges its dire economic state and fears social instability if people begin to criticize governmental policy. Mr. Kim's criticism was mild, by our free, democratic standards. Indeed, it would be no offense at all. But he had openly questioned the ability of the government to achieve its economic aim.

Or take the case of Han Duk-soo, also a man in his seventies, who seems to have been drinking a bit of alcohol and to have complained about the current hard times, apparently saying:

"During the Arduous March[, i.e., the North Korean famine of the latter 1990s], many people died in this part of Hamheung and, for some reason, people continue to die. Even collecting grassroots and tree bark requires making a long trip into the mountain. Old people like me would die on the road [if we tried to make such a trip]. If our children were relatively well off, it would be alright, but even they have nothing. I think the best solution would be for me to die as early as possible for the sake of our children. Even though the Party now claims times are good, things were not even . . . [so] bad as this during Japanese rule."

Mr. Han was arrested and interrogated for three days, then released. Interestingly, his eldest son, Han Kyung-bo, rather than being cowed by the events, angrily criticized the police for their treatment of "a weak old man," who had been caused "to suffer a great deal."

Or consider the case of a female food peddler in her forties, reporting under the pseudonym Lee Kyung-ok, who stated her opinion of governmental policy:

"They talk about opening the gates to a strong nation, but I am not convinced the gates will be opened. I don't see it. The way things are going, I do not believe we can become a strong nation. As usual, our Party will be the party of empty talk."

Her words were reported, and she was interrogated along with two others who had listened to her, but nothing could be proven about her use of "Reactionary Words," so she was released. What I find interesting in her case was that even though she is younger than the two elderly men -- being merely in her forties -- she openly and harshly expressed her disbelief in governmental policy . . . and yet escaped punishment.

At times, the criticism breaks out into the open, as in a recent case in which a group of women who had been mobilized for farming protested to the Democratic Women's Union that some people had paid bribes of 20,000 North Korean won to be exempt from mobilization:

"Why is solving the nation's food crisis the job only for the poor? Those who are rich and eating well must have the strength to work much better than us. Is 150-Day Battle a battle to offer money? How come those with money do not have to work while those without have to work so much?"

One woman is reported to have yelled:

"How can a poor person survive in this unjust world?"

The protests lasted an entire day and prevented any work. This case indicates that people recognize several things about their North Korean society. The economy is ineffective. The system is corrupt. The mobilization effort is unjust.

What these cases reveal from the daily lives of North Koreans is a system breaking down so completely that people are voicing their criticisms despite the possibility of arrest. These protests are not violent demonstrations aimed at overthrowing the North Korean government, but they are protests expressing profound skepticism about the governmental policy, and such criticisms appear to be widely held under economic suffering that seems endless.

There can be little remaining loyalty to the government or to the communist party, for indoctrination cannot feed anyone, and people know that other countries are wealthier. Indeed, even the government's own aim of "opening the gates to a strong nation" by 2012 presupposes that North Korea is economically weak. Added to this the poor health of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the difficulties in promoting the succession of 26-year-old Kim Jong-un to a position of real power, and the North's military belligerence that has angered even its ally China, one could readily conclude that the confluence of economic and political crises have rendered North Korea unstable. I won't make any predictions, but I would suggest that if the succession difficulties turn serious as Kim Jong-il declines, a power struggle could break out within the ruling elite that would utterly destabilize the entire country as the nomenklatura fragments into factions.

The next year of two may be very interesting . . . perhaps a bit too interesting for comfort if observed from a position as close to the North as where I live.

Kim Jong-un: Brilliant Comrade's First Brilliant Act?

Kim Jong-nam

'an ample target'

(Image from Yahoo Korea Gallery)

An odd report has appeared in The Korea Times: "Kim Jong-nam Survived Assassination Attempt" (June 15, 2009). According to the report, which the Times got from the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS):

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's first son Kim Jong-nam survived an assassination attempt, according to South Korean news network KBS Monday.

KBS reported that the attempt was spearheaded by aides of the North's heir apparent Kim Jeong-un [Kim Jong-un], the 26-year-old third son of Kim who was recently designated to succeed the North's head.

However, the plot that was tried out without the knowledge of Kim Jong-il failed as China foiled the attempt. KBS said Kim Jong-nam had maintained a close relationship with senior officials of China.

KBS said Kim Jong-nam could [sic: "was able to"] save his life with the help of China and added he might seek asylum in the world's most populous country [i.e., China].

This is an odd report, and I'm inclined to doubt not only its accuracy but even its veracity. It seems unlikely to me that the young son Kim Jong-un, a mere 26 years, would have garnered enough power to attempt the assassination of his eldest brother, Kim Jong-nam. Even if 'Brilliant Comrade' Kim Jong-un has amassed sufficient power already, I can't imagine that his father, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, would be happy to find out about such an attempt (whether successful or not) even if Kim Jong-nam is a big fat embarrassment to the nation -- recall that in 2001, he was detained in Japan for trying to sneak into the country to visit Disneyland. Moreover, does anyone take Kim Jong-nam seriously as a potential leader for North Korea . . . so why even go to the trouble of trying to assassinate him? But even if Kim Jong-nam does have some support -- whether in North Korea or in China, or in both countries -- why risk embarrassing powerful China, North Korea's only 'friend'?

The report thus raises many questions, but I see that The Chosun Ilbo, in "N.Korean Heir Apparent Linked to Assassination Plot" (June 16, 2009), is also reporting this and adds some details:

The plan was foiled when the Chinese government found out about it early last week. "The Chinese government warned North Korea to stop the assassination attempt, and sent intelligence and military officers to Macau and spirited Kim Jong-nam to a safe place," the sources said.

However, The Chosun Ilbo is also citing KBS, so the source is the same as for The Korea Times. I'll wait for some other confirmation before I believe this. But the rumor alone is blogworthy, and if it turns out to be untrue, I'll nevertheless be proud to have done my part in a disinformation campaign aimed at undermining North Korea's odious nomenklatura.

And just to get into the act, let's amuse ourselves by imagining not only that there was an assassination attempt but that it also got just a little bit closer than has been reported, namely, that the aides actually reached Macau and managed to fire off a few shots at Kim Jong-nam, but missed, and that an exasperated young Kim Jong-un is even now confronting his aides in disbelief:

"You missed? You missed Kim Jong-nam? How could you possibly miss hitting Kim Jong-nam?"

Missing an ample target like that would be hard to picture.