John Rumrich on Moral Order and Begetting of the Son in Milton's Paradise Lost

Living in Korea has its scholarly disadvantages for those of us doing research in the humanities, but generous overseas scholars do sometimes come to the rescue. I had recently gotten interested in a query posed by Dario Rivarossa concerning an odd contrast between two passages in Paradise Lost. In Book 5, verses 600-606, Dario noted, God states concerning His Son:

Hear all ye Angels, Progenie of Light,
Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Vertues, Powers,
Hear my Decree, which unrevok't shall stand.
This day I have begot whom I declare
My onely Son, and on this holy Hill
Him have anointed, whom ye now behold
At my right hand; your Head I him appoint;

[Thomas H. Luxon, ed., The Milton Reading Room, February 2011.]

But in Book 5, verses 833-838, as Dario also noted, the faithful angel Abdiel, arguing against Satan about the Son, maintains:

Thy self though great and glorious dost thou count,
Or all Angelic Nature joind in one,
Equal to him begotten Son, by whom
As by his Word the mighty Father made
All things, ev'n thee, and all the Spirits of Heav'n
By him created in thir bright degrees,

[Thomas H. Luxon, ed., The Milton Reading Room, February 2011.]

I agreed with Dario that, taken together, these two passages seemed odd coming from Milton because we know from the work of Milton scholars (e.g., Michael Bauman, Milton's Arianism) that Milton held to a quasi-Arian view on the Godhead, i.e., that there is no Trinity and that the Son is not co-eternal with the Father but begotten at some point in time.

That quasi-Arianism fits quite well with Paradise Lost 5.600-606, where God declares in heaven to His assembled angelic host that he has that very day begotten his Son (i.e., "This day I have begot . . . / My onely Son"), which would appear to put the process by which the Son was begotten some time after the creation of the angels. But that same quasi-Arianism appears to be in tension with Paradise Lost 5.833-838, where Abdiel reminds Satan that the begotten Son made all things, including the angels (i.e., "by whom / As by his Word the mighty Father made / All things").

The Son surely cannot be begotten twice. Even that would be beyond God's omnipotence -- assuming that the begetting was unique. But I argued, in a previous blog entry, that there might be a resolution to Milton's two statements if we read carefully. The begotten Son was the one "by whom / As by his Word the mighty Father made / All things." I suggested that we read this as distinguishing between two states of the Word of God: a pre-sonship state and a sonship state, differentiated by the event of being begotten. If so, then for Milton, 'divine sonship' will have been a role taken on by the putatively eternal Word of God in the act of being begotten by God Himself, who (I presume) becomes the Father at that point. I added that this reading of Milton raises the question as to what Milton thought the act of begetting to mean. I still haven't looked into that, but I still suggest that Milton might have thought that the Word was a power of God that became hypostasized through an emanation of God's own substance.

I asked for hermeneutic assistance from scholars on the Milton List and received a number of responses that I ought to delve further into sometime, but the most generous help came from a University of Texas (Austin) professor and Milton scholar, John Rumrich, who sent the above six photos showing pages 156-167 from Matter of Glory: A New Preface to Paradise Lost (Pittsburgh, 1987). These touched on issues beyond just the question of the Son and the Word, but I read them all carefully and responded as follows, but to understand my points clearly, one would probably also need to read the pages yourself (and one can, by clicking the images):

Thanks for the pages . . . . [W]hat you sent was thought-provoking.

I found the distinction between natural order and positive decree interesting, though the distinction was somewhat obscured by the point that from God's perspective of absolute power, even natural order is a matter of positive decree. I am familiar with the tradition of divine voluntarism from reading Hans Blumenberg, but of course, Milton's God is not the arbitrarily voluntarist deity of some forms of nominalism, for Milton appeals to God's intrinsic goodness and reason (so we're not talking Ibn Hazm of Pope Benedict's critique of Islamic theology). And you make this point, too, about God's goodness. I also understand your point about the transition from a naturally good order to a morally good order, an interesting point that I had previously considered only with respect to the tree of knowledge.

The begetting of the Son is also interesting. I think that you're right about the Son being originally the Word and that the 'Sonship' was not eternal. I wonder if one might take begetting as more than metaphorical, however. Much as a baby exists prior to its begetting, so the Son exists prior to His begetting, but not differentiated from God the Father, as the Word. In being begotten, the Word is differentiated from the Father and thereby born as the Son.

This is travestied in the birth of Sin -- which began as a 'conception' in Satan's mind and was born as "Sin" because a "sign" -- the "sign" being travesty of Word. But note that "Sin" is also a pun on "Son" and thus another travesty. Interesting, how Satan gets what he wants, to be like God, except only as travesty.

Thanks again for the thought-provoking pages from your book. I have profited by them.

As noted, there's more here than just the issue of begetting, but on this particular point, I think that Rumrich is correct, namely, that in Milton's thinking, the Word existed prior to its begetting as the Son. Milton is 'heretical' in his quasi-Arianism, but he's rigorous and consistent and grounds his views in scripture and reason, so he's well worth tangling with intellectually, which offers one of the reasons for reading his works, as well as for reading good scholarly interpretations of his works.

But I really need to return soon to my inquiry concerning "and knew not eating Death" . . .

Bibliophagy: Eating the Word-Made-Flesh

Adoration of the Shepherds

Seventeenth Century

'Word Become Flesh?'

Gerard van Honthorst

In this fourth part of my series on eating books, we encounter a 'book' that has become a human being, so perhaps this is actually the fifth part in a series on books since it loosely ties in with my post on 'Bibli', the man who became a book when the book became the man.

John the Evangelist -- who might or might not also be the author John of the Book of Revelation and who might or might not also be the Apostle John of the Twelve Disciples and who is notably never specifically identified as "John" in the Gospel of John -- introduces us to the Divine Word in its process of becoming incarnate:

John 1:1 In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 2 The same was in the beginning with God. 3 All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. 4 In him was life; and the life was the light of men. 5 And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not. . . . . 14 And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth. (Authorized Version)

Note that this hymn to the Word -- or Logos -- acts as a hermeneutic key on the opening of Genesis, or is the latter the key?

Genesis 1:1 In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. 2 And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness [was] upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. 3 And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. 4 And God saw the light, that [it was] good: and God divided the light from the darkness. (Authorized Version)

God's act of speaking the creation into being in the Book of Genesis becomes the Divine Logos creating the world in the Gospel of John. This Logos becomes flesh that later offers itself for ingestion:

John 6:51 I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. 52 The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us [his] flesh to eat? 53 Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. 54 Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day. 55 For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. 56 He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. 57 As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father: so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me. 58 This is that bread which came down from heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever. (Authorized Version)

The symbolism alone is enough to give one Johannine indigestion, but some Christian traditions have read these words literally! Perhaps we should read them that way? The verses seem to insist upon it.

We have reached perhaps the extreme of bibliophagy. The word of God, often understood as a book -- namely, the Bible, if we recall Peterson's remarks -- takes on flesh and offers itself for ingestion by anyone who might wish to have eternal life! In other words, that which biblically is consistently portrayed as the highest and most holy, God, becomes that which biblically is often portrayed as the lowest and most sinful, flesh . . . and we're supposed to eat the bloody mess! No wonder several followers are reported as having abandoned Jesus at this point (John 6:60-66).

I've written an entire, overly lengthy dissertation on this 'bread-of-life' issue, but one can more briefly read a bit on my views here and here.

More on Limits to the Divine Will

Pope Benedict XVI

Open to dialogue...

(Image from Wikipedia)

Concerning yesterday's blog entry on God's will being bound by limits that are grounded in God's nature, I've done a bit more digging about online and found an interesting exchange at the Chiesa website between a Catholic scholar of Medieval philosophy and theology, Alessandro Martinetti, and a learned Muslim theologian Aref Ali Nayed: "The Church and Islam: A Sprig of Dialogue Has Sprouted in Regensburg" (Sandro Magister, Chiesa, October 30, 2006)

On this site, Sandro Magister posts material from both Martinetti and Nayed. Apparently, Nayed maintains a website of his own and had responded to Pope Benedict XVI's remarks on Ibn Hazm's supposed 'voluntarism', namely, the view that Allah's will is supremely unlimited -- that He is free to contradict himself if He wishes. Nayed's initial response is not cited in full by Magister, but Martinetti quotes from it in his article:

"Unbridled will or Logos? The God of Islam and the Christian God," Alessandro Martinetti

In this article, Martinetti first quotes Nayed's own words:

Reason as a gift from God can never be above God. That is the whole point of Ibn Hazm; a point that was paraphrased in such a mutilated way by Benedict XVI's learned sources. Ibn Hazm, like the Asharite theologians with whom he often contended, did insist upon God's absolute freedom to act. However, Ibn Hazm did recognize, like most other Muslim theologians that God freely chooses, in His compassion towards His creatures, to self-consistently act reasonably so that we can use our reason to align ourselves with His guidance and directive.

Ibn Hazm, like most other Muslim theologians, did hold that God is not externally-bound by anything, including reason. However, at no point does Ibn Hazm claim that God does not freely self-commit Himself and honors such commitments Such divine free-self-committing is Qur'anically propounded 'kataba rabukum ala nafsihi al-Rahma' (Your Lord has committed Himself to compassion). Reason need not be above God, and externally normative to Him. It can be a grace of God that is normative because of God’s own free commitment to acting consistently with it.

A person who believes the last proposition need not be an irrational or un-reasonable human-being, with an irrational or whimsical God! The contrast between Christianity and Islam on this basis is not only unfair, but also quite questionable.

Granted that the Pontiff is striving to convince a secular university that theology has a place in that reason-based setting. However, this should not go so far as to make God subject to an externally-binding reason. Most major Christian theologians, even the reason-loving [Thomas] Aquinas never put reason above God.

Martinetti then observes:

In Nayed's view, then, saint Thomas "never put reason above God." But not placing reason above God is not the same thing as asserting, as Nayed does, that "God is not externally bound by anything, including reason," and that reason "can be a grace of God that is normative because of God's own free commitment to acting consistently with it."

Saint Thomas would never have subscribed to these assertions; on the contrary, he vigorously opposed them. And together with him, the Catholic magisterium does not agree with them, but disputes them. It thus rejects the depiction of a God who "freely chooses, in his compassion towards his creatures, to act reasonably in consistency with himself so that we can use our reason to align ourselves with His guidance and directives."

If asserting that reason is not normative for God, and that God is consistent with himself only out of a supremely free decision and is not externally bound to reason; if this is the same as asserting -- as it seems to me that Nayed does -- that God could exist and act in disdain of reason if only he wished to do so by an act of supreme and limitless freedom, then it is opportune to clarify that Thomas, and with him the Catholic magisterium, rejects this conviction, glimpsing in this an irrational voluntarism incompatible with right reason and with the Catholic faith, as the pope himself remarks in his "lectio" in Regensburg....

Martinetti's point would seem to be that in the Catholic view, reason is not something external to and higher than God that God must submit to, nor is reason merely a means of relating to humanity that God arbitrarily, and in an utterly unconstrained fashion, chooses to adopt.

Rather, God is rational because He is consistent with His own nature, which is a rational nature.

To Martinetti's point, Nayed responds in a follow-up article:

"Our God and Your God is One," by Aref Ali Nayed

In this, he insists that Aquinas and Ibn Hazm agree on God's unconstrained will:

Aquinas affirms, just as most Muslim theologians do, that God is omnipotent and that His Power and Will are utterly efficacious: "God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just".

"Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order".

Nayed's citation of Aquinas here misses the point made by Martinetti. I think that when Nayed says that Islam maintains that 'Allah is bound to nothing but Himself' (if I may slightly paraphrase Nayed's citation of Aquinas), he means that Allah is bound by nothing but His own divine, unconstrained will. This is not what Aquinas means. When Aquinas says that 'God is bound to nothing but Himself' (again, my paraphrase), he means that God is bound by nothing but His own nature, which is rational.

Nayed has thus misunderstood Aquinas and thereby missed Martinetti's point.