Five Theories of Korean Unification

Victor Cha
JoongAng Daily

Victor Cha finds "Five theories of unification" (JoongAng Daily, July 22,2014) in Korean history, and I'm posting them below for memory's sake:

The first theory of unification emerged after the division of Korea and throughout the Cold War. This was essentially the notion of "unification by force" . . . , or the idea that the only legitimate definition of unification was the crushing victory of one Korea over the other . . . . This "winner take all" view was held by Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung . . . . [T]he second theory of unification[, formulated after German unification, was] . . . that it was too difficult and too dangerous. Unification became something that was not desired, but something to be avoided because of its staggering costs and the terrible uncertainties . . . . This second "hard landing" theory of unification predominated Korean thinking from the end of the cold war in Europe until the Asian financial crisis in 1997 . . . . [The third theory of unification came in] 1997[, when] Kim Dae-jung put forward the idea of the sunshine policy. A strategy of unconditional engagement designed to open the North to the forces of reform. This was a policy tied to DJ's more liberal political ideology, and then carried forth by his successor Roh Moo-hyun for an entire decade . . . . [and it] was motivated by hard economic realities. Korea's liquidity crisis in 1997-98 made unification impossible, so it was best to engage the North Korean regime over the long-term, and pave the way for a gradual transition or "soft landing." What was so distinct in retrospect about the Sunshine Policy was the notion that unification should be pushed generations into the distant future . . . . [The fourth theory of unification started] with the . . . election of conservative Lee Myung-bak. Lee was a businessman, not an ideologue. He was pragmatic and saw unification in pragmatic terms . . . . This fourth theory was a pragmatic one -- that is, unification may be expensive, it may be difficult and it may be dangerous. But . . . . as traumatic as unification may be, it could very well come tomorrow or next month or next year. Koreans must start to prepare now for it, not simply wish it would go away forever . . . . [The fifth theory of unification started with] President Park. In her Dresden speech, she laid out her own theory of unification as a bonanza or jackpot for Korea and her neighbors . . . . This fifth theory of unification does not see it as winner take all . . . , or something to be feared and delayed indefinitely (sunshine), or even something that we must reluctantly prepare for. . . . Rather she paints it as something bright. (bold font and underlining mine)

There are things to keep in mind, namely, "that the stability of the regime in the North is far from certain" and that "there is a direct correlation between the increased interest in unification and South Korea's outreach to China." But this rapprochement does not "mean that Seoul will be willing to cut a deal with China on North Korea that excludes the United States[, for] without the U.S. alliance, South Korea gets treated by China like a small province."

But might not the US be willing to cut such a deal? That is tempting for some American policy-makers, I suspect, the ones who argue that Korea doesn't need US forces anymore, especially since the US forces are generally unappreciated anyway. Make an offer to pull out of Korea in return for China's support on re-unification?

But wouldn't this contradict Obama's pivot to Asia . . .

The Last Days of North Korea?

Joseph Schouweiler

Division of International Studies

Hanyang University

(Image from Hanyang University)

Twice lately, I've written on the 'inevitable' collapse of North Korea, so I'm gratified to see that the more learned Professor Joseph Schouweiler, of Hanyang University, holds a similar opinion -- as does also the ever-insightful Ms. Jodi Kiely -- thereby bolstering my confidence in my own less-well-informed predictions.

In the June 29th issue of the JoongAng Daily, Schouweiler has published a moderately long, interesting article with a nearly-eschatological-sounding title, "Entering the final days," in which he analyzes three stages in the history of North Korea, culminating in a "third and perhaps final phase of [its] existence":

We may now see the beginning of the third stage in North Korea's history. Kim Jong-il is ailing, but grooming one of his three sons as heir apparent: probably Kim Jong-un, the youngest. This entrenchment of a communist monarchy would almost be laughable if not for the tragic results suffered by the people in the North.

Kim Jong-il trained for many years under Kim Il Sung in several important party posts and government positions. Unlike the rigorous testing of the Dear Leader, his three sons are mostly inexperienced, lacking independent power bases and probably unfamiliar with the geopolitical realities facing North Korea today.

Schouweiler outlines four possible futures for North Korea, noting implosion as the most likely of these:

These [various problems] . . . along with ongoing, intensified repression point to the most distinct possibility: collapse of the whole regime, probably within the next 10 to 15 years. The only constant in the universe is change, something the Pyongyang elite still don't get.

The 10 to 15 years seems a bit long to me because I would expect the crisis to come with Kim Jong-il's imminent death, which could be within the next year. That would be the moment for a power struggle that might bring the system down altogether. Let me supplement this point with a passage from a short piece written by Jodi Kiely on Joshua Stanton's One Free Korea:

[W]hat makes the reunification scenario more possible this time around compared to previous predictions that have fallen short throughout the years? It's obviously the brief grooming period for Kim Jong Un combined with his youth and inexperience. Should Fat Boy Kim croak within the next two years, the scene is perfectly set for a power struggle: How much loyalty will DPRK leaders and the people have for KJU? (Remember, his father had virtually decades of grooming -- enough time for a loyal following to form.) Also, how much influence can a 26-year-old kid who has spent most of his years being educated in Europe (versus China or Russia) have on leaders who no doubt hold seniority over him not only in age, but also experience within the regime? Is a military coup possible in someone's greed for power? Or will KJU act as a figurehead leader and let those in the regime control him as they see fit?

Ms. Kiely considers a military coup or Kim Jong-un as figurehead, but expects collapse. Schouweiler doesn't explicitly discuss the likelihood of a power struggle, but he gives some details that can be pressed into service on this point, for if that struggle weakens the system, the North Korean people might see an opportunity for change because they know that they have been lied to about the South:

North Koreans while suffering the ordeal of day-to-day survival are gradually learning more about freer, more prosperous lives in China and South Korea. Fraternal bonds between Beijing and Pyongyang are fraying more these days. Trade and other contact between Mainland Chinese and South Koreans is growing in leaps and bounds over those across the Manchurian-North Korean border.

This is happening concurrent with a worsening economy in the North, as pointed out by Ahn Byeong Jik, whom I quoted in a previous blog entry on North Korean collapse:

"North Korea's planned economic system has fallen, but a market economic system has not been established to take its place. Without any functioning economic system, the national economy is just drifting . . . . The most obvious signs are consecutive famines and prolonged reliance on foreign aid."

Moreover, the North Korean people realize that their lives are getting worse, and are even willing to say so, as I noted in a follow-up blog entry by quoting a North Korean man, Han Duk-soo, who voiced this remarkable complaint: "Even though the Party now claims times are good, things were not even . . . [so] bad as this during Japanese rule." Given such open skepticism about their government's competence, the North Korean people might have finally run out of their longsuffering patience with the Kim family's hereditary communist rule and thus might not put up with another succession. But everything depends on China, as Schouweiler notes:

The key to minimizing a disruptive implosion lies primarily with the government in Beijing, the lifeline for Kim Jong-il. So far, a divided Korea has served the interests of the Chinese government well: a communist buffer state on its border and profitable trade with the South. They must realize this arrangement won’t last forever. South Korea and China have the biggest long-range stake in forging a peaceful, revitalized Northeast Asia after the demise of the North.

China may exact a price, and though Schouweiler doesn't specify one, Ms. Kiely offers a rather pricy scenario:

[I]n order to prevent a China rule by proxy or invasion of North Korea after a regime collapse, the U.S. (not South Korea) would have to step in and try to hatchet out an agreement with the Mainland. Such an agreement, he believes, would require the absolute, 100% withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea which would leave the U.S. military nowhere near China or any of its borders. In such an event, perhaps then, China would back off and allow South Korea to occupy the North.

Stiff terms for the US, perhaps, but probably worth it for the Koreans . . . and the Americans will still be merely a hop away, just across that sea with the disputed name to the east of Korea and the west of Japan.

Nostalgic Blog Filler...

Nostalgia

(Image from Wikipedia)

My family and I moved to a new apartment over the weekend.

You could say that we've come down a bit in the world, leaving the spacious 23rd-floor flat for a smaller, 2nd-storey flat a few blocks away.

Physically, we have come down, of course, but materially, we've gone up in the world, for we're no longer renting. This apartment is our own -- or will be when we've paid off the loans.

But up or down, rented or owned, a new apartment requires one to rearrange one's life. I spent two days going through boxes of books, notes, photos, letters, and trivia, deciding -- at times arbitrarily -- what to save, what to discard.

In one old folder, I discovered the announcement of my birth. Yellowed with age -- an ironic reminder of old mortality for a clipping reporting a birth -- it reads:

Born to Mr. and Mrs. Bradley Hodges of Salem a son, Horace Jeffery, on May 14. The young lad weighed 8 lb. and 2 oz. Mother and son are doing fine. He has in the family one other brother. Mrs. Hodges is the former Gay Perryman of Salem.

The "lb." and "oz." look oddly familiar to me now, memories from a distant childhood when they already looked mysterious, like fragments of a broken, half-forgotten tongue that had been carried along as detritus in the stream of our English language. I recall them most distinctly on labels and recipes, but here they are, applied to me in the newspaper clipping as though I were a product being advertised. Maybe I was, but watch out for the bait-and-switch since no price is given.

That might explain the eventually absented father, leaving out of disappointment with the product, which he found overpriced and not what he'd ordered anyway.

In another folder, I found a letter from Senator Fulbright. I had forgotten about that. In 1989, when I received a Fulbright Grant for a year's study in Tuebingen, I had written to the senator a grateful letter, which I recorded in my journal:

Dear Senator Fulbright,

This may sound odd, but I'm writing to thank you for setting up the study abroad program, for I have just been awarded a Fulbright Scholarship to study the history of early Christianity at the University of Tuebingen, in West Germany, and I feel I ought to tell you how much it means to me to have this opportunity. Not only does it provide the first real scholarship I have ever had, it also allows me the time -- in the very place I need to be -- further to research and ultimately to complete my PhD dissertation. So I write to express my gratitude.

But I'm writing as much for another reason. I grew up in the small town of Salem, Arkansas, raised there by my grandparents, and in the late fifties, early sixties (as you know), the Ozarks were still pretty isolated. Our town lacked running water, we had only an outhouse, we took baths in washtubs, and we sometimes even washed our clothes in the town branch. About the only things we didn't do were wash our faces in frying pans or comb our hair with wagon wheels -- toothaches didn't defy natural laws either.

All of this changed fairly rapidly throughout the sixties, and we ended up having all the amenities besides a car, which we didn't need anyway, being satisfied with where we were. Still, my grandparents always expected me and my brothers to get an education, as our Uncle Harlin had. Now, Grandpa Perryman died a few years back, near Easter of '82, but Grandma's still alive, soon to be eighty-four years old, so I called her last Saturday to inform her of the good news.

And this is really why I write to you, for upon telling Grandma Perryman of my award, I was astonished to discover that she knows you. "Oh yes," she said, "the last time Senator Fulbright was campaigning in Fulton County, he came by to see me in the Assessor's Office." "He knows you?" I asked. "Oh yes, and he knew Henry, back from the days Henry was in the state legislature." "I never knew that you two knew Senator Fulbright," I said. She assured me that they did, that she still does: "Our ages are the same," she told me, "and we share the same month, April." Then she told me that what she has always liked best, "about Mr. Fulbright and his wife, is that they were always real' down-to-earth people. They had a farm near Fayetteville, and when Mrs. Fulbright would come out to greet people there, she'd be wearing the rubber boots she'd had on out where she was working in the barn. They were both real' down-to-earth. I'm real' proud you got his award."

Well, after all that, how could I resist writing you?

Sincerely Yours,

H. Jeff Hodges

I wrote that on March 28th, 1989 and received a reply written April 10, 1989:

Dear Mr. Hodges:

I deeply appreciate your cordial letter about your experiences with the Exchange Program. I was particularly interested in your reference to the University of Tuebingen from which I received an honorary degree some years ago. My wife, who is now deceased, and I had a wonderful visit there.

I was very pleased by your reference to your grandmother's comments about Betty and me as a result of our visit to Fulton County, Arkansas many years ago. I am so pleased that you enjoyed your scholarship.

Sincerely,

J. W. Fulbright

Getting the reply was nice even if Senator Fulbright did misunderstand, not realizing that I had yet to go to Tuebingen. He was 84 and feeble, having had a minor stroke, as I learned later, but that made me value the letter all the more, and I'm glad that I found it stored away in my belongings.

I also found, in yet another folder, the transit visas from my trip to Berlin. Although I took my trip in the spring of 1990, after the Berlin Wall had come down, the German 'Democratic' Republic still officially existed. The border guards, however, no longer cared to control visitors and merely waved us through the wall, through which, we entered a no man's land whose buildings still bore bullet marks from the end of the Second World War. That was history, and by the end of the year, so was East Germany, as the divided country became whole again.

My mind turned to these things not just from documents culled out of old folders but also from a copy of the Korea Observer, which I found waiting for me at Kyung Hee University yesterday. I had received a complimentary copy of the Spring 2007 edition as thanks for having translated -- from French into English -- Jean Klein's article, "Relevance of the European Model for Regulating Security Problems in Northeast Asia," a paper that deals not only with security issues but that also discusses the institutions and strategies that helped overcome the division in Europe and that might help overcome the divisions here on the Korean peninsula.

The article opens as follows:

Since the historic meeting of presidents Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, June 15, 2000, the relations between South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) and North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) have entered a new phase, and many observers are inclined to see in this event the beginning of a pragmatic policy tending to create conditions for a peaceful unification of the Korean nation. Such a unification would be consistent with a long tradition of independence, but at the end of the 19th century, Korea suffered the side-effects of the weakening Manchu Dynasty, of which it was tributary, and was thrown into the swirl of struggles engaged in by the great powers for the division and the consolidation of their spheres of influence in Asia.

Klein looks more optimistically upon such events as this meeting between the two Kims than some observers do, but he speaks as an expert on European security and takes the long view, believing -- not without evidence -- that such meetings and the institutions built upon them contribute substantively to peace, prosperity, trust, and change.

And on that happy note, I close today's post...