Food Nonsense

Culture of Consumers

Nothing is better than wisdom.
A loaf of bread is better than nothing.
A loaf of bread is better than wisdom.

Speaking of Ravens . . .

The Raven

Wikipedia

Here's quite a large raven of Ravenden, Arkansas, though the locals who named the town might not have distinguished so clearly between ravens and crows.

Gypsy Scholar: Fraudulent 'Genocidal' Blogger

Scholar and his Books

Gerbrand van den Eeckhout (1621-1674)

Wikipedia

I received a sharp if misguided reprimand yesterday from a conveniently anonymous critic who came riding up on his high horse and dispensing 'just' judgment against me on a blog post dedicated to my recently deceased Uncle Bill Hodges:

I came to your page trying to find scholarly articles on 'Gypsies', turns out you are just a fraud. For all your education you're surprisingly ignorant.

Thanks for the cultural genocide.

Taken aback, initially, at the accusation that I pose an existential threat to the Romani people, I collected myself and replied:

Nice comment to leave on a blog entry commemorating a good man's death.

As for your intemperate remarks, I suggest that you familiarize yourself with the expression "gypsy scholar," which is a well-known label for a scholar without tenure who moves from university to university in search of jobs. There are a lot of us.

When you're no longer ignorant of the expression and its meaning, you'll not further embarrass yourself in future encounters with gypsy scholars, nor will you continue to make ridiculous accusations of "fraud" and of "cultural genocide."

On the implausible possibility that my anonymous critic is lurking, willing to listen, and open to learning something new, a professional explanation of the expression is hereby provided:

Gypsy scholar: is an informal term given to some academics who either move several times between institutions and/or work at two or more institutions at a time. There are several possible reasons explaining the existence of gypsy scholars, among these are the fact that many teaching jobs are now either part-time or terminal (1-3 years), with tenure-track positions harder to secure, and also a high cost of housing and living. The latter appears to have become a fairly common situation in California, where the price of housing has skyrocketed (as of 2005).

We see, then, that I am the one facing an existential threat! The outraged fellow, for his part, did not respond to my reply to his comment, nor do I expect a reply to this post. No anonymous commentator need ever apologize for rudeness or false accusations -- that's the beauty of anonymity.

This particular anonymous, frustrated commentator, angered -- in his ignorance of a well-known English expression -- at failing to find what he had wrongly expected, finds himself instead aggrieved at my putative, inadvertent 'slight' against his profound misunderstanding of English and rouses himself in righteous anger to a peak fit for a fit of pique, all the wilder for its unmeasured animosity, so exaggerated as to accuse me -- despite my obvious scholarly isolation, my lonely academic wanderings -- of "cultural genocide"!

Thus have I single-handedly disposed of Romani culture, something not even the National Socialists managed to do. In the mind of my anonymous critic with a grievance, I'm obviously not a gypsy scholar, but rather a fascistic activist . . .

Advice for Squabbling Couples . . .

Professor Keith Sanford
Looking a bit conflicted himself . . .
Baylor University

In my ongoing though nonexistent series on maintaining a good marriage, I cite today a professor from my old, beloved alma mater, Baylor University, whose research results first came to my notice in this autumn's 2012 issue of Baylor Magazine, presented in its Research Briefs under the heading "Anger in disputes . . .":

"[I]f your partner is angry, you are likely to miss the fact that your partner might also be feeling sad," said Keith Sanford, Ph.D., an associate professor of psychology and neuroscience in Baylor University's College of Arts and Sciences. His study -- "The Communication of Emotion During Conflict in Married Couples" -- is published online in the American Psychological Association's Journal of Family Psychology.

Sanford found that while a partner will easily and immediately recognize expressions of anger, the spouse often will fail to notice the sadness.

"A take-home message is that there may be times where it is beneficial to express feelings of sadness during conflict, but sad feelings are most likely to be noticed if you are not simultaneously expressing anger," Sanford said. (page 21)

Good advice! Every couple has disagreements from time to time -- cross-cultural couples perhaps more often due to cultural misunderstandings -- but these are commonly expressed in agitation, even anger, when expressions of regret and sadness would communicate better what the problem is.

Keep that point in mind, whether in a bicultural marriage or not, and the next time you're yelling at your partner, be sure to scream out:

I'm so sad at you!

The message will be better understood that way. If you find expressing your more sensitive, vulnerable feelings in this manner to be rather difficult, you can always try first practicing in front of a mirror.

You see, reading this Gypsy Scholar's blog is worthwhile after all . . .

Cultural Anthropologist Terence Turner on Multiculturalism

Terence Turner

Cornell University

The cultural anthropologist Terence Turner published an article in 1993 from a leftist point of view that explicitly criticized what he called "difference multiculturalism," which sounds almost exactly like what I've called "radical multiculturalism." He favored "critical multiculturalism," of course, which has some aspects in common with what I've termed "moderate multiculturalism" (albeit, again, from a left perspective on his part). The article, "Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What Is Anthropology That Multiculturalists Should Be Mindful of It?" (Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 8, No. 4. (Nov., 1993), pp. 411-429), deserves to be read in its entirety, for it is a balanced article, but I will focus on his critique of "difference multiculturalism."

Turner acknowledges that the conservatives are largely right -- though with some "distortions" -- about the problems of "difference multiculturalism":

In sharp contrast to critical multiculturalism is the multiculturalism of the cultural nationalists and fetishists of difference, for whom culture reduces to a tag for ethnic identity and a license for political and intellectual separatism. This is the stereotype of multiculturalism that has been touted by neoconservative critics of "political correctness" in academia, who apart from their other distortions have described multiculturalism as if it were a homogeneous set of ideas and attitudes. There is no denying, however, that some participants in the multiculturalist debates have adopted positions approximating this stereotype of difference multiculturalism. (414)

The mere fact that Turner finds necessary a critique of "difference multiculturalism" indicates that this sort of multiculturalist is by no means rare, despite his reference to merely "some" proponents of multiculturalism (and thus raising skepticism about the term "stereotype"). Turner sees risks, threats, dangers in this leftist understanding of multiculturalism, namely, its devolution into crude identity politics:

The term multiculturalism [when it signifies "difference multiculturalism"] has come to be used primarily in connection with demands on behalf of black and other minority groups for separate and equal representation in college curriculums and extra-academic cultural programs and events. It has also assumed more general connotations as an ideological stance towards participation by such minorities in national "cultures" and societies, and the changing nature of national and transnational cultures themselves. As a code word for minority demands for separate recognition in academic and other cultural institutions, multiculturalism tends to become a form of identity politics, in which the concept of culture becomes merged with that of ethnic identity. From an anthropological standpoint, this move, at least in its more simplistic ideological forms, is fraught with dangers both theoretical and practical. It risks essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race; it risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasizing their boundedness and mutual distinctness; it risks overemphasizing the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimize repressive demands for communal conformity; and by treating cultures as badges of group identity, it tends to fetishize them in ways that put them beyond the reach of critical analysis -- and thus of anthropology. (411-412)

Turner notes that multiculturalism's "cultural relativism" derives from cultural anthropology, a point that I have also previously made:

Certain aspects of the concept of culture originally developed by anthropologists (such as the distinction of culture and race) are unquestionably relevant to multiculturalist positions, but for the most part these have by now been assimilated into the common sense of Anglo-American culture in the form of vulgar cultural relativism, according to which all cultural traditions are regarded in principle as equally valuable. Apart from making ideological use of this broadly "anthropological" notion of cultural relativism as an ideological weapon against Eurocentrism, however, multiculturalism remains essentially unconcerned with culture in any of its usual anthropological senses. (413)

As we see, he considers this cultural relativism a 'vulgarization,' but he nevertheless acknowledges its derivation from anthropology, and he cites the leftist multiculturalist Todd Gitlin on its flawed consequences for the left:

The academic left has degenerated into a loose aggregation of margins -- often cannibalistic, romancing the varieties of otherness, speaking in tongues. In this new interest-group pluralism, the shopping center of identity politics makes a fetish of the virtues of the minority, which, in the end, is not only intellectually stultifying but also politically suicidal. It creates a kind of parochialism in which one is justified in having every interest in difference and no interest in commonality. One's identification with an interest group comes to be the first and final word that opens and terminates one's intellectual curiosity. As soon as I declare I am a Jew, a black, a Hispanic, a woman, a gay, I have no more need to define my point of view. (188-189; Todd Gitlin, "On the Virtues of a Loose Canon," Beyond PC: Toward a Politics of Understanding, Patricia Aufderheide, ed, 185-190. St. Paul, MN: Greywolf Press)

With identity politics and cultural relativism, the central flaws of "difference multiculturalism" becomes salient, namely, "moral relativism" and "ethnic essentialism," on which Turner quotes fellow anthropologist Richard J. Perry:

They [i.e., the "difference multiculturalists] commonly confuse cultural relativism with moral relativism . . . [and] tend to view non-Western cultures as stable, tradition-bound, timeless entities, [which] shifts us dangerously back toward viewing the others as beings who are profoundly and inherently different from ourselves . . . . The sense of the "timeless heritage" of traditional peoples, albeit respectful, is just a short step from ethnic essentialism . . . . At its worst, this romanticism tends to blur the distinction between culture and race -- a distinction that we anthropologists thought we had established several generations ago. (419; Richard J. Perry, "Why Do Multiculturalists Ignore Anthropologists?" Chronicle of Higher Education, March 1992, 4, 52)

Through these quotes from an article by Turner, a scholar on the left who cites other scholars on the left (e.g., Gitlin, Aufderheide, and Perry), we see that my views on much of what goes for multiculturalism were correct, despite my interlocutor's accusations over at the Marmot's Hole (MH) that I was a racist engaged in distorting multiculturalism.

For my summary of that MH debate, go here. For my other Gypsy Scholar posts in support of my views on what I call "radical multiculturalism," go here and here.

Criticism of Multiculturalism: Evidence of Racism?

Cypher

Figuring Me Out

Over at the Marmot's Hole blog, in a somewhat heated discussion on the pros and cons of multiculturalism, I posted the following as an elaboration of my point that multicultural ideology has roots in the relativism of cultural anthropology, adding a 'hypothetical' case to provoke reflection:

I acknowledge a difference between moderate and radical multiculturalism.

The former is grounded in human rights and allows for cultural critique. The latter, however, is grounded in cultural relativism (with roots in cultural anthropology), and it is not a figment of its opponents' imaginations.

I myself have met multiculturalists who would defend female circumcision as a cultural practice that we cannot criticize.

The big problem is that in our modern world, enclaves of an incompatible culture can form and grow within a society.

Imagine a culture that has its own language, its own religion, and its own laws, that subjugates women, practices female circumcision, and supports honor killings, and that considers its culture superior, insists that it be respected, and threatens violence to those who demur. I'm not saying that such a culture exists -- heaven forbid -- but if such a culture did exist, could one say that it wants the same things as other cultures?

In such a case, regardless what the larger society would want -- whether it supported radical or moderate multiculturalism -- it would have radical multiculturalism as a fact on the ground.

How would even moderate multiculturalists react in such circumstances? Would they subject such a culture to an explicit, fundamental, far-reaching critique, or would they keep quiet for fear of being called "racist," "imperialist," "xenophobic," or worse?

Fortunately, such a case is merely imaginary . . .

One of my interlocutors replied with an accusation that -- if read in its least negative construal -- misses my irony and accuses me of being dishonest, of obscuring the truth:

You are being disingenuous with this example. You know full well that the most strident opposition against multiculturalism is not about criticizing the multiculturalists' alleged complicity to FGM. No, it is about immigration and the desire to exclude darker-skinned people from entering the country.

I offered appreciation for my interlocutor's 'generous' response:

Thanks for the ad hominem, . . . which I'll accept as a gift freely given and assume that you don't expect a gift in return, for you are generous to a fault.

My interlocutor continued to attack my putative dishonesty and possible racism:

[L]et us not pretend as if THAT [opposition to FGM] is the problem that the opponents of multiculturalism are concerned about. If you are allowed to criticize multiculturalism because some crazies appropriate its good name, I can just as easily put you in the same category as the dyed-in-the-wool racists who clamor for higher walls along the border.

I saw no reason to continue the discussion with an interlocutor who refuses to engage me on a level other than name-calling, so I closed with these words, in which I reflected on my own callow views of earlier years:

I was an early supporter of multiculturalism, already speaking out in the 1980s in the States, then in Germany in the 1990s, also in Australia during the latter 1990s. Like . . . [my interlocutor], I suspected those opposed to multiculturalism of xenophobia, or even racism, but as I read more on what multiculturalists generally meant, I came to see myself as a "moderate" multiculturalist, for I didn't accept strong cultural relativism.

The difficulty that I have with . . . [my interlocutor] is not his multiculturalism, per se, but his resort to personal attacks -- accusing me of dishonesty and, implicitly, of racism -- whereas I don't think I've said anything that can reasonably be interpreted as a personal attack on [him] . . . .

Naturally, I'm disappointed, but I can't criticize [him] . . . without first being harsh on my younger self. I've learned in the past quarter-century not to make assumptions about others, to listen more carefully to what they say, and to attempt to meet their actual arguments rather than what I would prefer their arguments to be.

I suppose that's all I have to say on this subject, on this thread, anyway.

This is why I generally steer clear of such debates. They almost always degenerate into personal attacks and name-calling, regardless how courteous one tries to be, especially when one is dealing with anonymous or pseudonymous interlocutors, who need not concern themselves with preserving their own good name.

Perhaps they'll learn to listen better as they grow older . . . though we too often also grow harder of hearing with age.

Yi Gwang-su: Pro-Japanese?

Yi Gwang-su

(Image from dosan.org)

Professor Kim Seong-kon published another interesting article in the Korea Herald today, "Humans between angels, demons" (September 7, 2011), which again lamented the Korean tendency toward extremes:

Koreans tend to think that the world is made of left-wing progressives and right-wing conservatives only, and do not realize the existence of neutral liberals and moderate traditionalists.

Kim finds this tendency especially characteristic of the Korean left:

Historically, leftists have always been extremely exclusive and hostile toward non-leftists. And they always want a scapegoat they can condemn, so they can be immune from criticism and look honest instead.

For that reason, suggests Kim, Koreans -- especially Korean leftists -- are harshly critical of Yi Gwang-su:

Perhaps this is why Korean leftists began condemning Yi Kwangsu in the 1970s and 1980s as an unpardonable pro-Japanese intellectual. There were so many pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals during the Japanese occupation. Why, then, does only Yi Kwangsu have to be blamed and condemned so severely as if he was an unpardonable sinner?

Obviously, Korean leftists chose Yi Kwangsu, the father figure of modern Korean literature, as a scapegoat, so they could be safe and looked absolutely righteous and truthful. Besides, leftist writers surely wanted to deny the authenticity of modern Korean literature by claiming that it was wrong from the beginning and thus invalid, because it was tainted by unpatriotic activities of its leader Yi Kwangsu.

Then, they wanted to replace authentic Korean literature with left-wing literature, which they thought was the absolute truth. Once again, the "we're always right; all others are invariably wrong" mentality prevailed in the ruthless leftist campaign to criticize Yi Kwangsu.

This is an intriguing argument concerning bias among literary critics. I'm too ignorant of Korean history and Korean literature to hold a firm opinion, but Kim's point is plausible. Perhaps the Korean left did attack Yi Gwang-su not merely because he was pro-Japanese (though the degree to which he was pro-Japanese is disputed) but also because he was the founder of modern Korean literature, which needed -- or so leftists thought -- to be replaced by socialist literature. I'd be interested in knowing more on this point. At any rate, Kim goes on to mount a defense of Yi Gwang-su by drawing upon Lee Joong-o's psychological analysis and citing Yi Gwang-su's own words:

In his insightful, thought-provoking book, "Apology for Yi Kwangsu," Lee Joong-o, a psychiatrist and professor emeritus of SUNY/Buffalo points out that . . . [the "either/or" mentality of excluding others] is, in fact, a mental disease that requires therapy. Intellectuals and writers should say, "No!" when all people say "Yes!" However, many Korean intellectuals and writers do not seem to have the courage to speak up and thus remain silent, even though they know something is seriously wrong. Other people, who are opportunistic, choose to join the trend and collaborate with the leftists in condemning Yi Kwangsu, which heightens what Lee called "the national frenzy."

Granted Yi Kwangsu was undeniably pro-Japanese, we still need to listen to what he had to say. In "My Confessions" Yi writes: "When I returned to Korea at the age 30, I dreamed of being a Gandhi for my country. Therefore, my pro-Japanese activities had nothing to do with my own personal benefits, safety or political power. Naively, I thought I did it for my people; I wanted to save the 38,000 Koreans whose name was on the Japanese colonial government's elimination list at the cost of my honor."

I wouldn't go so far as to label the mentality of "either/or" as a "mental disease," nor would I entirely trust Yi Gwang-su's confessional self-justification, but I do have some empathy for the man after a year-long struggle editing his novel The Soil, which my wife translated. Based on that novel alone, I wouldn't consider him whole-heartedly pro-Japanese, for his depiction of the Japanese is mixed. I realize that he changed, however, and became more of an apologist for Japan in the latter 1930s, though I know too little about that transformation to evaluate it properly. The man is a difficult case. See the Wikipedia entry on Yi Gwang-su concerning this complex issue of his fluctuating politics. Even during his nationalist period, he was strongly critical of Korea and Koreans, so a common thread might be traced through all his political changes. We should probably recall that he had been an orphan raised by followers of the Donghak religion, which carried out guerrilla attacks against the Korean government beginning in the 1892, the year he was born, so his earliest memories would have been of conflict with the Korean state several years before the Japanese colonial period.

I suppose the crucial question to consider in reflecting upon the critics of Yi Gwang-su is which Yi Gwang-su the critic is talking about. I don't think that we will get a rounded picture of the man until Koreans come to terms with the fact that "[t]here were so many pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals during the Japanese occupation," as Kim points out, and that rounded understanding will require Koreans to develop a less exclusivist "either/or mentality."

Gerard Delanty: Europeanization as a Transformative Process

Gerard Delanty

During his Liverpool Days

(Image from University of Liverpool)

As I noted yesterday, Gerard Delanty reviewed nine books in his article on European identity, "Conceptions of Europe: A Review of Recent Trends" (European Journal of Social Theory, 6(4) 2003). The classroom discussion on this material went fairly well, though I wish that I had found time to take a look at the books themselves, but that's another matter. Speaking of time, since I'm short on that today, I'll just quote from Delanty again and briefly comment. This is from Delanty's introduction:

The nine books under consideration reflect a tendency in recent scholarship to view Europe as an object of research and of theoretical and philosophical reflection. The question of Europe has now had an impact on the diverse fields of sociology, anthropology, political science, philosophy and history which have all responded in different ways to the recognition that a transnational project engineered by nation-states is transforming those very entities that gave rise to it and something new is being created in this process. Although it is debated exactly how new, it is generally agreed that something new is emerging with the enhanced momentum of Europeanization in recent years which has led from a transformation of the state to a transformation of society and the construction of new conceptions of the self, power and culture. As several of the selected books demonstrate, this relatively new object of research and consciousness in the social and human sciences does not replace national societies but operates alongside them and is even articulated within national societies as part of their socio-cognitive self-understanding in a post-national era. Indeed, as Douglas Holmes's book shows, nations are still capable of arousing powerful expressions of belonging (see also Delanty and O'Mahony, 2002). But Europe is no longer a residual category in contemporary conceptions of the nation: it has a huge presence in all societies as an economic, legal and symbolic entity. The question of Europe is now a central dimension of the wider societal transformation of modernity, the reflection on which is also a reflection on the meaning of Europe. It is thus difficult to be specific on what we are talking about, for 'Europeanization' is not leading to a society, a state, a cultural or a geographical entity that can be specified with precision, but a process. Even if we take the now expanding European Union as the geopolitical entity, as several of our authors do, the problem still remains -- exactly what is Europe as an object of research?

The various books considered in this review article go some distance towards answering this question as to the theoretical construction of Europe as an object of research and reflection. Although one might wish for more theoretical elaboration, there is a discernible trend to avoid purely descriptive categories or ones that are excessively normative. Until now the categories that are used to make sense of Europeanization tended on the whole to be descriptive -- describing the European project from a standpoint that did not need to question its spatial and temporal reference points -- and generally supported by strong normative positions, to which there was the occasional 'Euro-sceptical' rejoinder. The problem with such approaches is that they failed to appreciate the dynamic and creative processes that are involved in Europeanization and the fact that in recent times this process has reached a point where it needs the application of new forms of reflection and critique, and ones that cannot rely on the attribution of 'crisis'. The normative standpoint for the critique of Europeanization can no longer be the nation-state (of the books reviewed, Siedentop's is the only one that does not seem to recognize the need for a renewal in our critical concepts). This relativization of reference points is particularly a problem for comparative research, which traditionally has been cross-national and thus presupposing the existence of relatively coherent and stable national societies where, at the most, converging and diverging trends might be discerned. The emerging field of Europeanization indicates a different object of research and consciousness for which new methods and theories are required. For the moment, it seems, the most interesting studies concern the relation of national societies to the processes and dynamics of Europeanization within the context of the wider societal transformation of modernity by transnational processes. The following thematically organized essay reviews some recent contributions indicative of current trends. (Gerard Delanty, "Conceptions of Europe: A Review of Recent Trends," European Journal of Social Theory, 6(4) 2003, pages 471-473)

The interesting point here is Delanty's implication that what is needed is a study of "Europeanization" that is neither merely descriptive (e.g., the EU is composed of . . .) nor intrusively normative (e.g., the EU should stand for . . .) -- though there is a place for each of these -- but that focuses upon the transformative processes at work as "a transnational project engineered by nation-states is transforming those very entities that gave rise to it and something new is being created in this process."

One of the things transforming Europe that gets largely ignored in Delanty's review article is the degree to which large-scale immigration from Muslim lands is affecting a Europe whose native population is in decline. Some projections forecast a large Muslim presence in Europe by as early as 2050, and this will surely transform Europe in ways that need to be thought about now. Of course, Delanty's review dates from 2003, somewhat before this issue began to receive more focused attention, but I'd be curious to see what Delanty might have to say about Islam in Europe.

Maybe another time . . .

A Doctor in the House?

Dr. House

Not your old Gregory Graves

(Image from Wikipedia)

A couple of weeks ago, my cyberfriend Malcolm Pollack mentioned a cynical remark that he had made as a teenager:

Everyone needs a pack of lies to live by, and if you'd rather not create your own there's no shortage of people who'll be happy to hand you theirs.

In response, another cyberfriend, Kevin Kim, commented:

Nice to make your acquaintance, Dr. House.

Cultural Philistine that I am, I had no idea what Kevin was referring to . . . but also, as that cultural Philistine, didn't much care. Yesterday in a sermon, however, I heard another reference to Dr. House, this time to his statement that "People always lie."

"So, that's what Kevin was referring to," I found myself thinking, and resolved to find out more.

I now know a tiny bit more, courtesy of Wikipedia, but if anybody would like to save me some time and link me directly to some especially fine You Tube clip of Dr. House at his best, I'd appreciate it.

Harsh View of Arab Family

Rima Mehri

(Carr Center for Human Rights Policy)

Rima Mehri, an Arab from Lebanon, writing "Is the Arab world a graveyard for love?" for The Boston Globe (May 8, 2010), presents a rather harsh view of the Arab family:

Take the regular Arab [who is] surviving corrupt governments, political turmoil, religious intolerance, struggling economies, terrorism, and ask him what love is.

He'll say, "My family."

And yet this sacred institution lies at the heart of the instigation of fear, mistrust, and rejection of other sects. More than any other social ailment, sectarianism has turned the Arab world into a graveyard for love.

Typically, if your partner does not come with the correct religious label for the family, then it isn't love. It's more like an assault on the family honor, a social disgrace, and complete disrespect for culture and roots.

If you intermarry, you are usually ostracized for being a traitor to your parents, religion, and community. And suppose you can withstand the pressure, what happens to love when your children are rejected as second-class citizens?

Many of us come to the West to escape the intolerance of the Arab world. We get the education, acquire new attitudes, and broaden our perspectives, but we are shoved back to the starting point the moment we return to our communities.

The West makes us and the East breaks us again.

Ms. Merhi doesn't specify the the Muslim Arab family, so one could infer that she means that the problem with 'Arab' families is a cultural rather than religious one, but she keeps refering to religion as a factor, and happens to say this:

Certainly there are Arabs who would not intermarry out of religious convictions. The attack on Islam in the West makes many Muslim Arabs more protective of their religion.

This implies that the Muslim Arab family has tighter restrictions on its members, but it also blames the West by asserting a common Muslim accusation, namely, that there is an "attack on Islam in the West." The assertion is left unexplained here, but it often includes attacks on Islamism as attacks on Islam, which would be an interesting conflation to examine more closely since it implies that the Muslim making the assertion sees no difference between Islamism and Islam.

I don't know precisely what Ms. Mehri meant by her assertion of this Muslim meme, and she might not even be Muslim, but I'd like to see her explore her own obscure assumptions on this point. By "attack on Islam," does she mean the invasion of Baathist Iraq, the war against such Islamists as the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the hunt for Islamist terrorists, the laws against veils and burqas in Europe, the ridicule of Mohammad in a Danish newspaper, the rare, random physical attack on a Muslim, or all of these together? Would these all add up to an "attack on Islam" that "makes many Muslim Arabs more protective of their religion" and presses them to tighten the bonds and boundaries of the family?

Or does the problem lie more with the Arab Muslim family itself, as Ms. Mehri's article otherwise seems to imply without quite explicating.

Bae Young-dae: "Korea needs a 'culture of discussion'"

JoongAng Daily Logo

(Image from JoongAng Daily)

I've been saying this for years, so I'm gratified to see that Koreans themselves are starting to echo my words. Bae Young-dae, for instance. In a JoongAng article published yesterday, "Korea needs a 'culture of discussion'" (April 1, 2010), Bae first uses heavy irony to note that:

Koreans apparently are good at "special skills," such as talking to themselves, fistfighting and ignoring established processes.

He then explains this through a hypothesis about cultural lag:

Korea [has] proudly achieved economic growth and democratization in a very short amount of time, but the culture of discussion [has] never quite made it.

That is the dark shadow of our modernization miracle.

Conflicts have accumulated in various sectors of our society. We face conflicts between classes, ideologies, regions, generations, genders and cultures.

Political conflicts such as the Sejong City issue actually fuel the inability of Koreans to talk things out. According to a June 2009 survey by the Samsung Economic Research Institute, Korean society's conflict index was ranked fourth among the 27 members of the OECD, following Turkey, Poland and Slovakia.

There is always agreement and disagreement, optimism and pessimism, about any issue.

In Korea, however, conflicts worsen between the extremes of conservative and liberal, left and right. Justifications based on the black-and-white dichotomy often prevail.

Intellectuals are largely responsible for the culture of "bullying and browbeating" and we have no model on which to base a behavioral change.

I agree with some of this. Korea does lack a culture of discussion, and the reliance on "bullying and browbeating" is noticeable. But Bae's analysis of the reason for this fails to hit the mark, in my opinion. The aggressive dogmatism of intellectuals is just another 'symptom' of the problem, which is too deep-rooted to blame on intellectuals alone. The cause, I think, lies in Korea's hierarchical, Confucian social structure and is reinforced by the Korean language's system of 'courtesy,' which forces interlocutors to make distinctions of status and thereby judge some individuals as more worthy of being listened to, but other individuals as unworthy of respected opinions. And the problem is far-reaching. For open, honest discussion to take place, two individuals speaking in Korean would have to be of precisely the same status . . . and how often does that happen?

Perhaps I overstate the case somewhat, but I do so to make a point, and I'll soon make a better case when a translation of my article on the need for a culture of discussion is published in a Korean journal, for I can then post the original English version.

But "soon" is a relative term . . .

Culture of Discussion: Right to Insult?

Areopagitica

John Milton

(Image from Milton Reading Room)

In his defense of what we would today call free expression, John Milton utters a plea in Areopagitica for what he considers the most basic freedom:

Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties. (Thomas H. Luxon, ed. The Milton Reading Room, February, 2010)

Why should we allow him that? Because through untrammaled utterance, truth will out -- as he reminds us concerning truth only a few lines later in his text:

Let her and Fals[e]hood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors[e], in a free and open encounter. (Thomas H. Luxon, ed. The Milton Reading Room, February, 2010)

What interests me in today's post is that Milton apparently meant for this "free and open encounter" in the interest of truth to include polemics and even personal attacks, as we see in Milton's attack upon Anglican bishops in Book 1 of his Reason of Church-Government Urged against Prelaty:

I trust God will manifest it ere long to be as false a slander as your former slanders against the Scots. Noise it till ye be hoarse, that a rabble of sects will come in; it will be answered ye, No rabble sir Priest, but a unanimous multitude of good protestants will then join to the church, which now because of you stand separated. This will be the dreadful consequence of your removal. As for those terrible names of sectaries and schismatics which ye have got together, we know your manner of fight, when the quiver of your arguments, which is ever thin and weakly stored, after the first brunt is quite empty, your course is to betake ye to your other quiver of slander, wherein lies your best archery. And whom ye could not move by sophistical arguing, them you think to confute by scandalous misnaming. (John Milton, Reason of Church-Government Urged against Prelaty, in John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, edited by Merritt Y. Hughes, Hackett Publishing Co., 2003, page 659)

Whether Milton be right or wrong in the substance of his accusations, he is definitely being polemical in his leveling of personal attacks and even of insults. He accuses others of slander. He might well be accused of it himself. Certainly, his opponents could well feel themselves insulted. Consider his even more polemical tone further in the same text as he continues his attack upon Anglican bishops with words that slur the Irish and the Catholics:

The prelates which boast themselves the only bridlers of schism, God knows have been so cold and backward both there and with us to repress heresy and idolatry, that either through their carelessness or their craft, all this mischief is befallen. What can the Irish subject do less in God's just displeasure against us, then revenge upon English bodies the little care that our prelates have had of their souls. Nor hath their negligence been new in that island, but ever notorious in Queen Elizabeth's days, as Camden, their known friend, forbears not to complain. Yet so little are they touched with remorse of these their cruelties, for these cruelties are theirs, the bloody revenge of those souls which they have famished, that whenas against our brethren the Scots, who by their upright and loyal deeds have now bought themselves an honourable name to posterity, whatsoever malice by slander could invent, rage in hostility attempt, they greedily attempted; toward these murdrous Irish, the enemies of God and mankind, a cursed off-spring of their own connivence, no man takes notice but that they seem to be very calmly and indifferently affected. Where then should we begin to extinguish a rebellion that hath his cause from the misgovernment of the church. Where but at the church's reformation and the removal of that government which persues and wars with all good Christians under the name of schismatics, but maintains and fosters all papists and idolaters as tolerable Christians. (John Milton, Reason of Church-Government Urged against Prelaty, in John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, edited by Merritt Y. Hughes, Hackett Publishing Co., 2003, page 663-664)

Although Milton is blaming the bishops for an indifference to the souls of those under the sway of English rule, an indifference that left the Irish in their Catholic faith, he clearly has disdain for the Irish themselves, as well as for Catholics generally and for . . . idolaters (whoever might be intended by this slur). Obviously, Milton is hardly above slander, insults, and polemics generally.

Should such ad hominem attacks be permitted?

I would say yes. Strictly speaking, they stand mostly outside a culture of discussion, for they are usually poor arguments for or against a substantive position, but they should be protected speech because the defensive wall constructed to guard free discussion needs to be at least as encompassing as the wall built around the Torah in Rabbinical Judaism.

Absent that wall of protection, even a substantive statement could be taken as an insult, so if insults are not protected speech, substantive arguments could be forbidden. In a hierarchical society, the substantive words of a one lower in the hierarchy could be taken as insulting if such words question the views of someone higher in the social structure. In Korea, Japan, and China, for example, with their strongly hierarchical social structure, precisely this sort of problem arises, such that the substantive disagreement of a 'junior' with a 'senior' can be taken as an insult by the latter. Substantive critical arguments are thereby suppressed, and truth -- as Milton would say -- often suffers. This has been pointed out by Ho-Chul Lee and Mary Patricia McNulty in "Korea's Information and Communication Technology Boom, and Cultural Transition After the Crisis," for they note that Confucian hierarchy stifles free expression because debating or criticizing individuals of higher rank is considered impolite:

Traditionally, most Koreans have a modest demeanor and are shy in presenting themselves in public. Compared to many other cultures, Koreans may appear to have poor oral communication abilities, such as presentation and public speaking. Traditional Korean culture teaches that it is impolite to debate or criticize, in particular against more senior ranking persons and the elderly. Korean audiences generally remain silent and do not raise questions or express opposing opinions; both presenters and audiences for the most part feel uncomfortable discussing and debating issues. Koreans believe that a direct response can hurt the other party's feelings, and so sometimes use ambiguous expressions instead of clear "yes" and "no" answers. The traditional Korean demeanor is an obstacle to developing a culture of discussion that is a fundamental factor of democracy and also can be a hindrance in the modern business world.

For most Koreans, "saving face" is a top priority. In Korea, "saving face" means preserving one's dignity, self-respect, or good reputation and entails careful attention to the expectations of others, including adherence to the social order. Modesty is a key component of "saving face." These cultural aspects of Korean culture have stifled free discussions and debates, and due to such behaviors, Koreans are easily misunderstood and/or underestimated in western societies where a more assertive "show and tell" demeanor is positively encouraged and is the norm . . . .

Koreans' modest demeanor is closely related to East Asia's traditional culture. East Asian societies have developed to include a hierarchical social order based on Confucian values. The hierarchy puts priority on etiquette in keeping social order. Young people are expected to respect elderly people and obey them, just as lower-ranking persons are expected to show respect and obey more highly ranked persons. Under such a hierarchical structure, young and low-ranked persons are not free to express their opinions. This emphasis on courtesy and deferential behavior, particularly regarding younger and older persons, sometimes imposes a barrier to free expression . . . . (Ho-Chul Lee and Mary Patricia McNulty in "Korea's Information and Communication Technology Boom, and Cultural Transition After the Crisis," Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), April 18, 2004, page 27 [paper written when authors were at Office of the Senior Vice President for Economic Development and Chief Economist at World Bank, Washington, DC])

From this study, we see just how subjective the sense of 'feeling insulted' can be. In East Asian societies shaped by Confucian values of hierarchy, any open expression of opinion can be taken as an insult by a higher-ranking individual, and the awareness of this by lower-ranking individuals can too often suppress uncomfortable truths.

Without the right to insult, a free and critical culture of discussion can therefore not be achieved, and since the latter is necessary to the pursuit of truth, then 'insults' must be accepted as legitimate, legally protected expressions.

Culture of Discussion: Advocatus Diaboli, Quaestio Disputata, and Dialectics

Bust of Socrates

'In the Beginning'

Vatican Museum

(Image from Wikipedia)

Yesterday in a comment, I remarked that "the Medieval period sanctioned somewhat free discussion through the role of the Advocatus Diaboli," or "Devil's Advocate." Well, I was entirely wrong about that. The Advocatus Diaboli, or "Devil's Advocate," comes down to us from Renaissance times, as explained by the Catholic Encyclopedia:

A popular title given to one of the most important officers of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, established in 1587, by Sixtus V, to deal juridically with processes of beatification and canonization. His official title is Promoter of the Faith (Promotor Fidei). His duty requires him to prepare in writing all possible arguments, even at times seemingly slight, against the raising of any one to the honours of the altar. The interest and honour of the Church are concerned in preventing any one from receiving those honours whose death is not juridically proved to have been "precious in the sight of God" (see BEATIFICATION and CANONIZATION). Prospero Lamertini, afterwards Pope Benedict XIV (1740-58), was the Promoter of the Faith for twenty years, and had every opportunity to study the workings of the Church in this most important function; he was, therefore, peculiarly qualified to compose his monumental work "On the Beatification and Canonization of Saints," which contains the complete vindication of the rights of the Church in this matter, and sets forth historically its extreme care of the use of this right. No important act in the process of beatification or canonization is valid unless performed in the presence of the Promoter of the Faith formally recognized. His duty is to protest against the omission of the forms laid down, and to insist upon the consideration of any objection. The first formal mention of such an officer is found in the canonization of St. Lawrence Justinian under Leo X (1513-21). Urban VIII, in 1631, made his presence necessary, at least by deputy, for the validity of any act connected with the process of beatification or canonization. (Burtsell, Richard. "Advocatus Diaboli," The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 1, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907)

This entry is obviously dated, but I presume that it's correct about details prior to 1907. Sometime since 1907, however -- apparently during the tenure of Pope John Paul II -- the office of Advocatus Diaboli has been abolished. I learned this from Christopher Hitchens, who served in the role informally:

[Concerning the] "canonization" of "Mother" Teresa[,] . . . . I had been, as far as I know, the only witness called by the Vatican to give evidence against her . . . . The present pope, in his feverish campaign to make as many saints as possible, has abolished the traditional office of "Devil's Advocate," so I drew the job of representing the Evil One, as it were, pro bono. (Christopher Hitchens, "Less than Miraculous," Free Inquiry magazine, Volume 24, Number 2, February/March 2004)

Not having been trained as a lawyer, however, Hitchens failed, for Mother Theresa has been beatified and will undoubtedly one day undergo canonization. At any rate, what I was actually thinking about in my reference to Advocatus Diaboli was the Scholastic Quaestio Disputata (and the related Quodlibet):

The method of scholasticism sought to understand the fundamental aspects of theology, philosophy, and law. Apparently contradictory viewpoints were offered in order to show how they possibly could be synthesized through reasonable interpretation. A problem would first be "exposed," and then it would be "disputed" in order to cause a new "discovery" in the mind of the person who was seeking new personal knowledge. Each text investigated had a commentary. The master helped the student to read the text in such a way that he could really understand what it was saying. This experience was to be much more than just memorative. There were yes-and-no positions to various texts, which sought to keep the student from merely memorizing the text. Abelard developed the yes-and-no method with great precision. The two most exciting types of disputations were the quaestio disputata, which was a disputed question, and the quodlibet, which was a very subtle form of disputed question that could be publicly disputed only by a truly great master, whereas the disputed questions could be talked about by lesser minds still growing in knowledge. (T. J. German, "Scholasticism," Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, edited by Walter A. Elwell, Baker Academic, 2001, 1066b-1067a)

Apparently, the Quaestio Disputata had it origins in Graeco-Roman dialectics, but went into decline in the West with the collapse of the Roman Empire in the sixth century and only began to revive again in the late 10th century. A good study of its revival and flourishing would seem to be Brian Lawn's The Rise and Decline of the Scholastic 'Quaestio Disputata': With Special Emphasis on Its Use in the Teaching of Medicine and Science (1993).

Western dialectics, of course, has its origin in the so-called Socratic Method, as explained by that wonderful source of accurate information, Wikipedia:

The Socratic method (or Method of Elenchus or Socratic Debate), named after the Classical Greek philosopher Socrates, is a form of inquiry and debate between individuals with opposing viewpoints based on asking and answering questions to stimulate rational thinking and to illuminate ideas. It is a dialectical method, often involving an oppositional discussion in which the defense of one point of view is pitted against the defense of another; one participant may lead another to contradict him or herself in some way, strengthening the inquirer's own point. ("Socratic Method," Wikipedia)

I don't generally quote Wikipedia, but the point is a simple one, anyway, about the origin of Western dialectics in the teaching style of Socrates. Plato recorded and developed the method, but Aristotle formalized it and had more influence on the Medieval revival of dialectics. Jean Leclercq tells us:

It is mostly in scholasticism that, under the influence of Aristotle's logic, . . . [monks] came to develop a speculative rhetoric . . . . In the schools, the genres never stop evolving and becoming diversified: the quaestio will give birth to the quaestio disputata, the quaestiuncula, the articulus, and the quodlibet. (Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and The Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture, Fordham University Press, 1982, page 155)

I can't claim to know much about these developments, but I take it that all of them concern variously complex ways of formally raising and answering crucial questions and are thus part of the background to our modern-day method of Western study in academics, or at least in some academic disciplines.

All of the above -- let's label them Dialectics, Quaestio Disputata, and Advocatus Diaboli for the moment -- are related to our issue, "Culture of Discussion," but all three are somewhat limited. Socrates may have confronted fellow Athenians in tha agora and queried them on what they believed themselves to know, but the method was worked out by Plato and then Aristotle more in the context of an academic discussion than society at large. This is similarly the case with the Quaestio Disputata, albeit in an even more limited manner since the 'answers' were generally already known. As for the Advocatus Diaboli, I suppose that the devil's lawyer might raise questions that could actually derail a beatification or canonization -- an unexpected answer, one might say, but the role was played by a single individual in the limited circumstances of determining sainthood.

A true "culture of discussion," however, is larger than any of these, for we're concerned with more than a limited and walled-off, institutionalized setting. We mean discussion that is freer and that pervades a culture.

Alvin Gouldner: Culture of Critical Discourse . . . and Responding to 'Insults'

Alvin Ward Gouldner

1920-1980

(Image from SpringerLink)

In yesterday's post, I quoted Bart Verschaffel rather extensively on the "Culture of Discussion," but also noted Jürgen Habermas on communicative action as a corrective to Verschaffel's rhetorical overkill in seeing discussion as a "war game" and pragmatic 'underkill' in seemingly limiting it to seminar-style settings. Habermas has a broader vision than war and seminar.

Another theorist who writes on a culture of discussion was Alvin W. Gouldner, whom I read back in the early 1980s and who described this sort of discourse in rather formal terms as the culture of critical discourse (CCD):

The culture of critical discourse is characterized by speech that is relatively more situation-free, more context or field "independent" This speech culture thus values expressly legislated meanings and devalues tacit, context‑limited meanings. Its ideal is: "one word, one meaning," for everyone and forever. The New Class's special speech variant also stresses the importance of particular modes of justification, using especially explicit and articulate rules, rather than diffuse precedents or tacit features of the speech context. The culture of critical speech requires that the validity of claims be justified without reference to the speaker's societal position or authority . . . . Most importantly, the culture of critical speech forbids reliance upon the speaker's person, authority, or status in society to justify his claims. As a result CCD de-authorizes all speech grounded in traditional societal authority, while it authorizes itself, the elaborated speech variant of the culture of critical discourse, as the standard of all "serious" speech. (Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury, 1979), 28-29)

Gouldner saw this culture of critical discourse as the 'language' of a new intellectual class encompassing the sciences as well as the humanities. I would agree with Gouldner (against Verschaffel) that scientists are part of the community, but I would go beyond Gouldner (with Habermas) to broaden the communicative community to include, potentially, everybody. But to do so, I would suggest loosening the criteria a bit and noting what critical discursive actions intellectuals share with a larger society characterized by a culture of discussion. Fundamentally, we're talking about the right of everyone to pose questions about anything and the expectation that answers should offer reasons and evidence.

One intriguing question that arises, incidentally, is how one should respond to insulting mockery. The mocker perhaps does not accept the rules for a culture of discussion in a strict sense and offers not reasons and evidence but satirical insults. What should one do if mocked? Should we follow the example of Alvin Gouldner himself:

[The sociologist Laud Humphreys] entered the Ph.D. program in sociology at Washington University [in 1965] . . . . He made rapid progress as a student (starting fieldwork for his dissertation in 1966 and writing it within two years) but seems to have developed an antagonistic relationship with Alvin Gouldner, a prominent social theorist then in his department.

Humphreys may have been the author of a sarcastic poster that portrayed Gouldner as an example of the species "Inter Alios Platonicus, or Silver-Tongued High-Priestly Bird." (Everyone in the department would have caught the reference to Gouldner's recent book Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory.) Reproduced as an appendix to the biography, the poster is satirical if not exactly witty: "Given to nesting in high places, this raptorial bird may soar to great heights before diving to feed on carrion . . . . He chews on thoughts only when personalities are not available. While devouring his prey, his song is said to be quite eloquent."

The target of this caricature was not amused. Gouldner tracked Humphreys down in the graduate student offices, punched him in the face, then kicked him when he fell down. The matter came to national attention in a New York Times article headlined "Sociology Professor Accused of Beating Student." (Scott McLemee, "Wide-Stance Sociology," Inside Higher Ed, September 12, 2007)

Confronted by insulting mockery, Gouldner seems to have believed that honor stained called for physical violence. In an earlier time, perhaps he would have challenged Humphreys to a duel. Did Gouldner betray his own principles, the rules of his very own culture of critical discourse?

I don't recall enough about Gouldner's theoretical system to say for sure, but I would argue that insults should also be protected speech in a culture of discourse. They have to be protected because feeling insulted is a subjective reaction. For example, some might feel insulted that I apply critical principles to the study of religion, but that person should have no right to attack me physically.

Moreover, even calculated insults play a role in literature and the arts and ought to be protected speech.

Professor Bart Verschaffel: "Culture of Discussion"

Professor Bart Verschaffel

(Image from Productivity of Culture Symposium)

In looking around for material on the concept "culture of discussion" -- something that I've written on previously -- I came upon the transcriptions of presentations given at an ECCM Symposium on the "Productivity of Culture." The acronym "ECCM" stands for "European Capitals of Culture and Months," and I suppose that Athens is one of these capitals, for the symposium was held there from the 17th to the 21st of October in 2007, thus a little over two years ago.

One of the speakers was Professor Bart Verschaffel, a philosopher and head of the Faculty of Architecture and Planning at the University of Gent, in Belgium, and he had some very interesting, even fascinating remarks on the West's "culture of discussion" that I would like to quote at length from his text, "On the importance of the Idea of Europe and the disadvantages of its reality," though I have made paragraph breaks for ease in reading:

First of all the discussion, the primordial instrument of democracy, as invented in Greece from the 5th Centry BC on.

The discussion is a very peculiar game with amazing presuppositions. A discussion differs completely from a dialogue: it is not 'listening to what the other has to say', it is not an 'exchange' and not an 'encounter'. The discussion is a war game fought with questions and arguments to find out if somebody is right or not, this is: to find out if what somebody says is true. And because there is no criterion to recognize 'truth' with absolute certainty -- we are not sofoi but filosofei, we are not wise but we strive for wisdom -- the discussion is the game of question and argument and reply used for testing if a statement or an idea 'holds'. If it does, it is convincing because it brings evidence or clarification and argument. Many divergent and even contradictory ideas can be argued for, so that a discussion never leads to the once conclusive truth. Knowing for sure that somebody is wrong is a possible outcome of the discussion, but the first and most important lesson is that nobody is ever for once and always 'right'. Nobody owns the truth. But the discussion happens in the name of Truth. The game of the discussion is about finding out and demonstrating that somebody is wrong, because he contradicts himself or cannot bring evidence or arguments. The discussion, therefore, is a very dangerous game.

First of all because one can start a discussion about anything. Not only about practical matters and business interests, but also about 'culture' or the meanings a society lives by: about values and beauty, about the existence of god, about what is just and how to legitimate power. Or about what makes European culture 'white'? Or the minor languages so special that we have to save them from the English [language]? We all know that, starting from the ancient Greeks themselves, most societies don't like questions like these, and in general don't like the game of the discussion. They want to control what is being talked about. And probably not without a reason: playing with the meanings a society lives by is indeed unsettling and dangerous, because it suspends the 'rightness' of a culture and undermines its self-confidence.

But the discussion is even more dangerous and destabilizing for a second reason: the discussion introduces in society the reality of the game situation that confers to each participant an equal position and suspends authority. In the discussion all participants have the right to speak and only the arguments count. It doesn't matter if they are spoken by man or woman, student or professor, rich or poor, and it doesn't matter what family or party they belong to. It doesn't count who speaks. What counts is the truth and the power of the argument. The game situation of the discussion implies that very real and very effective social differences -- 'authority' -- is put between brackets (as long as the game lasts). This can indeed be threatening and destabilizing, and tempt to forbid or control the 'discussion'. Because in reality it does matter who speaks: the speakers are not equal, and they have many other interests than just finding the truth. For many societies the discussion inherently implies an aggressive lack of respect for 'real' dignity and the power at place. They would maybe promote 'dialogue' and 'mutual respect', 'exchange' and 'hospitality', and even the 'freedom of opinion', but they wouldn't want discussion -- they cannot afford to agree with the game where the others can start from radically and openly questioning your truths.

It took several hundred and even thousand years for the West to adopt principally rational discussion as a means to settle conflicts, to accept the conditions of the 'game' of discussion, and to introduce discussion as a means to prepare decision-making -- in politics, in science, in education . . . Time and again 'real' power interests, authority, institutional positions, or some kind of truth is introduced to limit free discussion. There is always some kind of belief, be it scientific or political correctness, that tries to win control. But the specificity and the importance of the intellectual culture of the West resides in this culture of discussion, that -- as implied by the game itself -- can never be appropriated by those who have invented it or who play the game. The importance of the intellectual tradition of the West doesn't come from that line of thinking that believes in the power and effectiveness of rationality and scientific triumphs, but resides in the line of thinking that promotes discussion and doubt, from Socrates and Diogenes to Montaigne and Bayle, Voltaire and Nietzsche, and Valery.

On this final point by Verschaffel, I have some doubts, for I think that rationality and science are not purely instrumental but promote discussion and doubt as part of their search for truth and are simply special cases of the larger culture of discussion. But let that be. I want to look more closely at some of Verschaffel's other points.

I dislike the metaphor of "war game," because war is a zero-sum activity in which one side gains at the expense of the other, the object being to defeat the other side. That might better fit as metaphor describing the practice of competitive debate, where each side aims to win by vanquishing the other side, for they are bellicose opponents, enemies. Discussion need not be debate in this sense of pitting mutual antagonists against one another. Since the aim is to attain truth, rather than to destroy an enemy, discussion can be a mutually beneficial 'game.'

I would also prefer a concept other than "game" for the dialogue that takes place during discussion because this concept implies an artificial situation set off from the more serious business of life. As such, players follow the rules during play but eventually finish the game and walk away from it . . . until the next time to play. But discussion of the sort under consideration here follows rules that apply to all of life. One ought to have reasons and evidence for one's positions. The 'game' never really ends.

Perhaps the views of Jürgen Habermas on communicative action better express the role of discussion as a social activity that, ideally, pervades an entire culture, though it is not the only sort of discourse, nor is culture defined solely by discourse. Verschaffel seems to think of discussion as a more narrowly circumscribed activity of the sort that takes place in seminars, but he also recognizes that it is a "dangerous game" because it, again ideally, poses questions about everything and gives every discussant an equal role. In principle, nothing is sacrosanct, and nobody is the final authority. It thus transforms individuals and even society, and is therefore potentially a destabilizing activity.

As Verschaffel notes, "most societies don't like questions like these, and in general don't like the game of the discussion," and that in part accounts for the social conflict that we see taking place in Europe between the larger European society and the Islamic society currently expanding there. The Islamic world does not tolerate open discussion about Muhammad, for example, that would raise questions about his status as moral paradigm.

This intolerance is not unexpected, for as Verschaffel notes:

It took several hundred and even thousand years for the West to adopt principally rational discussion as a means to settle conflicts, to accept the conditions of the 'game' of discussion, and to introduce discussion as a means to prepare decision-making -- in politics, in science, in education . . .

Looks like we're in for a long 'discussion.'