The Semester's End Draweth Nigh . . .

Brace Yourselves!

Fermi Paradox: The Solution!

Mangan Reformed the Answer?

Enrico Fermi looked up into the night sky and asked, "Where is everybody?"

He had seen a paradox. No, not Canis Major and Canis Minor! Not a pair of dogs! A paradox! Roughly (not ruffly!):

Given the age of the universe, there ought to be an enormous number of far superior civilizations out there that have mastered the science of hyperdrive space travel and therefore should have the ability to contact us, so why haven't they?

Theorists have postulated a barrier they call "The Great Filter." This hypothesized barrier stops even all great civilizations dead in their tracks.

What could this barrier be?

My old friend Dennis Mangan has an answer, beginning with the current Ebola crisis, about which he asks:

Is Ebola our Great Filter? No, probably not. However many people die, it won't wipe out the earth.

But this whole episode [with its politicization of the disease] suggests another explanation of the identity of the Great Filter. It's leftism. All civilizations eventually become leftist, and after that they accomplish nothing, or even actively die off.

I think Dennis is onto something here. Leftists glorify 'victims,' and what greater victory for victimology than to fail the "Great Filter Test"? "The entire universe is set against us!" they can then complain! Complain to whom is another question, one that would seemingly presuppose some argument from design. Bad design, though, and a culpable designer. A form of Gnosticism with no way out . . .

But anyway, if the best can't pass through the Great Filter, why should we?

Pete Hale Links Me to Alvin Plantinga!

Pete's Hale and Handsome Hand
Don't press that button!
Google Images

I don't seem to have a complete photo of my old Ozark friend Pete Hale, who's now a physicist working on some technological device with which he, like Cartoon Network's Mojo Jojo, aims to destroy the universe, so in lieu of a complete Pete, here's Mojo Jojo instead:

Mojo Jojo

Google Images

I'll try to stifle an impulse to veer off on a tangent about another bad chimp, one who goes by the name of Bruno Littlemore and has a connection to Pete by way of Pete's multi-talented son Benjamin, so I'll rather stay the straight course, which today deals with an article Pete read and notified me about:

Interesting interview involving atheism, evolution, BRussell, beer, and refrigerators, at the very least . . .

That long phrase includes an allusion to how BRussell spouts off about a celestial teapot -- which somehow makes me think of Brussels sprouts, oddly enough, for they're not everyone's cup of tea -- but the central point for me actually concerns a beer in the refrigerator, as described by Alvin Plantinga in an interview for the NYT Opinionator site by Gary Gutting on the rationality of theism, an interview in which Plantinga argues:

I'm interested in the fact that beliefs cause (or at least partly cause) actions. For example, my belief that there is a beer in the fridge (together with my desire to have a beer) can cause me to heave myself out of my comfortable armchair and lumber over to the fridge . . . . [H]ere's the important point: It's by virtue of its material, neurophysiological properties that a belief causes the action. It's in virtue of those electrical signals sent via efferent nerves to the relevant muscles, that the belief about the beer in the fridge causes me to go to the fridge. It is not by virtue of the content (there is a beer in the fridge) the belief has . . . . [b]ecause if this belief -- this structure -- had a totally different content (even, say, if it was a belief that there is no beer in the fridge) but had the same neurophysiological properties, it would still have caused that same action of going to the fridge. This means that the content of the belief isn't a cause of the behavior. As far as causing the behavior goes, the content of the belief doesn't matter . . . . Materialism can't be sensibly believed, at least if, like most materialists, you also believe in evolution . . . . Evolution will have resulted in our having beliefs that are adaptive; that is, beliefs that cause adaptive actions. But as we've seen, if materialism is true, the belief does not cause the adaptive action by way of its content: It causes that action by way of its neurophysiological properties. Hence it doesn't matter what the content of the belief is, and it doesn't matter whether that content is true or false. All that's required is that the belief have the right neurophysiological properties. If it's also true, that's fine; but if false, that's equally fine . . . . [Therefore e]volution will select for belief-producing processes that produce beliefs with adaptive neurophysiological properties, but not for belief-producing processes that produce true beliefs. Given materialism and evolution, any particular belief is as likely to be false as true.

Materialism combined with evolution does not guarantee true beliefs and thus is not conducive to the rise of rationality. An intriguing argument! Note that Plantinga dismisses neither evolution nor materialism alone but rather their combination. He also offers an elevated argument from design -- one that does not preclude evolution -- as evidence for the existence of God:

One presently rather popular argument . . . [for God's existence is the] fine-tuning [of the universe]. Scientists tell us that there are many properties our universe displays such that if they were even slightly different from what they are in fact, life, or at least our kind of life, would not be possible. The universe seems to be fine-tuned for life. For example, if the force of the Big Bang had been different by one part in 10 to the 60th, life of our sort would not have been possible. The same goes for the ratio of the gravitational force to the force driving the expansion of the universe: If it had been even slightly different, our kind of life would not have been possible. In fact the universe seems to be fine-tuned, not just for life, but for intelligent life. This fine-tuning is vastly more likely given theism than given atheism.

Fascinating argument -- even if I have heard it before. I urge readers with metaphysical leanings to take a look at this article. Meanwhile, I had to thank Pete:

Well, I want there to be a beer in my fridge, and if I've grasped Plantinga's argument, that beer being there is far more likely if I assume theism, so I believe in God -- but I've just checked, and the beer isn't there, so I can only conclude that the devil took it, and I'm now waiting for a miracle to strengthen my faith . . .

About my manner of giving thanks, Pete replied:

Ha! Yeah, absolutely. I think my only hope is to cling to smarmy old agnosticism and move on . . .

Well, that's a decision to remain in ignorance, so I still choose theism because I really want to know that my belief in a beer in my fridge is a true belief about a real beer in my fridge (though not a bottomless beer) within a universe designed for life to its fullest.

Go for the gusto, I say!

John Milton, Paradise Lost: Heavenly Motions

Light Blue Great Circle = Celestial Equator

Red Great Circle = Apparent Solar Path

Green Constellations = Zodiac Signs

(Image from Wikipedia)

I'm still trying to clarify what John Milton might have considered the structure of the prelapsarian world in Paradise Lost. The image that we see above is what Milton would have considered a postlapsarian heliocentric world, one in which the sun's apparent annual path (red great circle) passes through the zodiac signs (green contellations) at an obliquity of about 23.5 degress from the celestial equator (light blue great circle).

In the prelapsarian world of Paradise Lost, however, the sun's (apparent) path would have coincided with the celestial equator.

In such a prelapsarian world, there are either of two possibilities for the zodiac signs:

1. The zodiac is located on the celestial equator.

2. The zodiac is located on the 23.5 degree obliquity.

Alastair Fowler, on pages 35-36 of his annotated Paradise Lost (1998), assumes the first of these two possibilities. I think that Milton leaves open either possibility.

As for the term "ecliptic," so called because the sun and planets in movement can eclipse one another as they pass, Milton does use the term, but he may be using it proleptically because his references to the ecliptic are ambiguous and because there might not be any eclipses in his prelapsarian world. Or there may be eclipses, and Milton may be using the term not proleptically, but to designate a prelapsarian actuality. I see three possibilities:

A. The term "ecliptic" is not used proleptically, for prelapsarian eclipses do occur, and the prelapsarian ecliptic is coincident with the celestial equator.

B. The term "ecliptic" is used proleptically, for prelapsarian eclipses do not occur, and the prelapsarian ecliptic is coincident with the celestial equator.

C. The term "ecliptic" is used proleptically, for prelapsarian eclipses do not occur, and the prelapsarian ecliptic has about a 23.5 degree obliquity to the celestial equator.

Fowler seems to assume B, for he thinks that the sun remains constantly in the vernal equinox, which implies that the planets also do not move from their positions along the ecliptic. Fowler's understanding would thus be most accurately labeled "1B." Note, however, that "B" is a very odd use of the term "ecliptic," for not only do eclipses not occur along the celestial equator, they never will, whether in pre- or postlapsarian times. By comparison, "C" is a more reasonable use of the term "ecliptic," for eclipses will occur along the 23.5 degree obliquity in postlapsarian times.

Fowler may very well be correct in his position of 1B, of course, but Milton's language leaves open five other possibilities, i.e., 1A, 1C, 2A, 2B, or 2C.

John Milton, Paradise Lost: An Already Oblique Ecliptic?

Sun Carriage

"the Sun / Was bid turn Reines from th' Equinoctial Rode"

(Image from Wikipedia)

By now, readers will likely recognize the above quote from Paradise Lost 10.671-672. Like the sun, I'm turning to the obliquity of the zodiac today to return to a question that I posed earlier and had thought settled. In a January 12th post, I raised the possibility that the ecliptic and equatorial planes did not coincide in Milton's prelapsarian cosmos, and in the very next post, on January 13th, I offered a supporting argument. But in two follow-up posts -- January 15th and January 16th -- I believed my assertion of the possibility to have been mistaken. I had read the following lines and taken the "Starrs" to be planets, for this terminology was possible in Milton's time:

[Satan flew] his oblique way
Amongst innumerable Starrs, that shon
Stars distant, but nigh hand seemd other Worlds (PL 3.564-566)

My thought was that if Satan was traveling an already oblique ecliptic, then the 'planets' shouldn't yet be on that ecliptic since the sun (with planets in tow) had not yet been forced to move in such a way as to cause the inclement seasons (as Milton explains in PL 10.651-680).

I now think, however, that I misread the term "Starrs," for it does not mean "planets" but really does refer to "stars," the so-called 'fixed' stars, which Milton allows might be "other Worlds" (by which, he means possibly other cosmic systems). Satan is thus not yet passing by planets; rather, he has recently passed through the primum mobile and the crystalline sphere (as depicted here) and is now passing through the sphere of fixed stars. If so, then this reading does not have Milton show Satan moving past planets in his "oblique way" and therefore allows that the zodiac might have always been on an oblique ecliptic after all since the planets are not being described along Satan's path.

Such a reading could then fit with Satan's oblique movement (3.564) from the sign of Libra to the sun in Aries (3.558, 588), as described in Book 3, lines 555 through 588, for when Satan leaves the sun, he is said to speed "Down from th' Ecliptic" (PL 3.740). One might well legitimately counter that if "the ecliptic and equatorial planes coincide," as Alastair Fowler maintains in his annotated Paradise Lost (Fowler, Paradise Lost, 1998, page 35), then Satan could accurately be described as speeding down from the ecliptic in leaving the sun. Granted, this hypothetical retort could very well be correct, but Milton leaves at least room for a variant interpretation, such that the sun and planets are located in the plane of the celestial equator, to which the plane of the zodiac is already oblique by approximately 23.5 degrees.

My point is not that Milton clearly asserts that the zodiac was already oblique, merely that a close reading allows for the possibility, and that's Milton's intention, for he doesn't wish to commit himself to a definite world system that might be shown false by scientific advance.

Milton's Cosmos . . . or Universe?

A Representation of Milton's Vertical Cosmos

Walter Clyde Curry

Milton's Ontology, Cosmogony, and Physics (page 156)

(University of Kentucky Press, 1957)

(Image from Purdue University)

I learn something new every day. Today, I learned of a distinction that some make between Milton's Cosmos (above) and Milton's Universe (below). Counterintuitively, the latter is smaller than the former!

A Diagram of Milton's Universe

Paradise Lost, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes?

(Image from USCB)

In searching the internet for other depictions, I found an interactive 'map' of Milton's Cosmos at MapLib, though the 'map' is very schematic. Its usefulness comes from the markers stuck to the 'map' that reference Paradise Lost by book and line. Note that this 'map' seems to place the sun at center of the universe. If you poke around on the 'map', you'll see what I mean.

Scholars have long argued this point, i.e., the precise center of Milton's universe, whether geocentric (as depicted in the diagram above) or heliocentric (as seemingly depicted at the MapLib site).

The debate is understandable since -- as John Leonard explains in his annotated Paradise Lost -- "Milton usually depicts the universe as earth-centered, but he often hints that it is sun-centered" (page xvi). On the same page, incidently, Leonard notes that "Milton's cosmos is infinite; his universe large, but finite" (page xvi).

I suppose that I ought to adopt the terminology that Leonard accepts, for he's studied this material and ought to know better than I. I'm currently writing a paper on the seasons in Paradise Lost and need to say some words about the universe's structure, though I need not be definitive on this point, for I'm merely trying to figure out the motions of the heavens.

More on this another time.

John Milton's Paradise Lost: "With tract oblique"?

Satan Contemplates Serpent

(Image from All Art)

In the image above, Satan contemplates his malicious intentions and deplores having to incarnate his spiritual substance within the serpent (PL 9.163-167), but he does so, of course, or there would be no story, and goes forth to approach Eve:

. . . With tract oblique
At first, as one who sought access, but feard
To interrupt, side-long he works his way. (PL 9.510-512)

As we noted yesterday, Satan likes "his oblique way" (PL 3.564) of motion, and we see from today's passage above that his motions can be termed oblique even when he is far from the ecliptic. Concerning yesterday's passages, then, his motion from Libra to Aries in approaching the sun is "hard to tell" (PL 3.575). Upon reflection, I think that since Satan is described as moving past planets, he must be on the ecliptic, but perhaps the ecliptic is still located upon the celestial equator, as Alastair Fowler maintains. Satan's "oblique way" might then refer to his fallen manner of approaching any of his aims. Conversely, the planets might be on an oblique ecliptic but the sun simply upon the celestial equator. That the sun cannot be moving along an oblique ecliptic is certain from what we have previously seen in Book 10, where the sun's annual motion, or apparent annual motion, is made oblique to account for the excessive summer heat and the dire winter cold. But if the sun is not moving along the ecliptic, why call it an ecliptic?

Adam himself wonders about such questions, and poses them to the angel Raphael, who says:

To ask or search I blame thee not, for Heav'n
Is as the Book of God before thee set,
Wherein to read his wondrous Works, and learne
His Seasons, Hours, or Dayes, or Months, or Yeares: (PL 8.66-69)

Asking about the celestial motions is therefore not forbidden . . . and yet:

This to attain, whether Heav'n move or Earth, [ 70 ]
Imports not, if thou reck'n right, the rest
From Man or Angel the great Architect
Did wisely to conceal, and not divulge
His secrets to be scann'd by them who ought
Rather admire; (PL 8.70-75)

Asking is okay, but searching too deeply becomes problematic. Here, Milton seems to hearken back to the long tradition of Western debate over the legitimacy of curiosity that Hans Blumenberg has analyzed so well. Milton would appear to share Augustine's concern, for he has Raphael conclude his discourse over the celestial motions with the following advice:

. . . Heav'n is for thee too high
To know what passes there; be lowlie wise:
Think onely what concernes thee and thy being;
Dream not of other Worlds, what Creatures there [ 175 ]
Live, in what state, condition or degree,
Contented that thus farr hath been reveal'd
Not of Earth onely but of highest Heav'n. (PL 8.172-178)

[Thomas H. Luxon, ed. The Milton Reading Room, January 2009]

Like Augustine, Milton would seem to think that a busybody curiosity leads one astray from what has been revealed as proper to mankind and distracts one from concern with one's soul, if I might extrapolate from Raphael's words.

Considered from a different perspective, Milton is admitting ignorance of the prelapsarian celestial motions, and probably also the postlapsarian ones, so the reader should not be surprised to find that movement "up or downe / By center, or eccentric, hard to tell" (PL 3.574-575).

John Milton's Paradise Lost: Satan Winding "his oblique way"

Ecliptic Plane

(Image from HyperPhysics)

Despite forays into realms more rectitudinal -- such as rule of law and ruse of cow -- I'm sticking close to the oblique ecliptic, somewhat as does that fallen angel Satan in his descent towards the sun as described in Book 3 of Paradise Lost, though he first surveys the scene from where he has positioned himself, at the primum mobile (outermost sphere of the cosmos) and in the constellation of Libra, diametrically opposite the constellation of Aries ("the fleecie Starr"), where the sun is located:

Round he surveys, and well might, where he stood [ 555 ]
So high above the circling Canopie
Of Nights extended shade; from Eastern Point
Of Libra to the fleecie Starr that bears
Andromeda farr off Atlantic Seas
Beyond th' Horizon; then from Pole to Pole [ 560 ]
He views in bredth, and without longer pause
Down right into the Worlds first Region throws
His flight precipitant, and windes with ease
Through the pure marble Air his oblique way
Amongst innumerable Starrs, that shon [ 565 ]
Stars distant, but nigh hand seemd other Worlds,
Or other Worlds they seemd, or happy Iles,
Like those Hesperian Gardens fam'd of old,
Fortunate Fields, and Groves and flourie Vales,
Thrice happy Iles, but who dwelt happy there [ 570 ]
He stayd not to enquire: above them all
The golden Sun in splendor likest Heaven
Allur'd his eye: Thither his course he bends
Through the calm Firmament; but up or downe
By center, or eccentric, hard to tell, [ 575 ]
Or Longitude, where the great Luminarie
Alooff the vulgar Constellations thick,
That from his Lordly eye keep distance due,
Dispenses Light from farr; they as they move
Thir Starry dance in numbers that compute [ 580 ]
Days, months, & years, towards his all-chearing Lamp
Turn swift thir various motions, or are turnd
By his Magnetic beam, that gently warms
The Univers, and to each inward part
With gentle penetration, though unseen, [ 585 ]
Shoots invisible vertue even to the deep: (PL 3.555-586)

[Thomas H. Luxon, ed. The Milton Reading Room, January 2009]

Recall that Satan is later speeding "Down from th' Ecliptic" (PL 3.740) when he leaves the sun after speaking with Uriel, as reported in a recent blog entry. In fact, we see from the above lines that Satan was descending from the outermost sphere, the primum mobile, by way of the eclipic, for he is described as starting from Libra and winding his way down past the planets ("Stars distant, but nigh hand seemd other Worlds"), though whether "By center, or eccentric" orbits is "hard to tell." Or perhaps one should describe Satan's course by "Longitude," which Alastair Fowler explains is "distance measured by degrees of arc along the ecliptic" (Fowler, John Milton: Paradise Lost, Second Edition (New York: Longman, 1998), page 204, note 576).

Given that Satan is descending by way of the ecliptic, then Milton's description of Satan's flight, namely, that he "windes with ease / Through the pure marble Air his oblique way," is significant, for the term "oblique" could indicate that the ecliptic is already oblique to the celestial equator. But this would be rather problematic since that would put the sun and planets already on the obliquity . . . if I'm reading the above passage correctly.

I'll have to return to this tomorrow.

Rémi Brague's Longer Reply on "Cosmology as a Postulate"

Rémi Brague

(Image from Nexus Instituut)

Some readers might recall a previous post on a fascinating interview that the two medievalists Christophe Cervellon and Kristell Trego conducted with Rémi Brague as a sort of introduction to his book of essays, The Legend of the Middle Ages. In that post, I called into question the heading that I thought that an editor had provided. The heading, followed by the passage, came upon the heels of Brague's remark that for modern people, "Nothing in the physical world responds to man's ethical demands":

Cosmology as a Postulate

"To be sure, for premodern man, the presence of the world, which he felt as a kosmos, was not a model to be imitated in any literal sense. Pretending to believe this to be the case is unfair, as it might be amusing to explain by the use of Kant's concepts. The role of the cosmic order is analogous to that of the postulates of practical reason. Those postulates -- liberty, the existence of a just God, and the immortality of the soul -- are of no use as a basis for moral law, which is sufficient unto itself and draws its obligation from an intrinsic authority that it has no need to borrow from elsewhere. Such postulates serve to guarantee the possibility of the supreme Good -- that is, the agreement between what the Law demands and the order of the real world. One might say that the kosmos was less a model demanding conformity than an example that shows, from the simple fact that it exists, that ethical conduct is possible. The major difference between the premodern vision of the world and Kant's morality is that realization of the good is for Kant only postulated. It remains, so to speak, in the domain of faith and hope. For men of ancient and medieval times, on the other hand, the sovereignty of the good was already given in the cosmic harmony. One only need acknowledge it."

At the time that I blogged on this, I stated that a cursory reading of the passage seemed to allow for the heading supplied, namely, "Cosmology as a Postulate," but that a closer reading led me to think that Brague would reject the heading as utterly counter to his point. I commented as follows:

True . . . [Brague] says that "The role of the cosmic order [for premodern men] is analogous to that of the postulates of practical reason [for Kant]," but this is not the same as calling cosmology a "postulate." Kant's postulates of "liberty, the existence of a just God, and the immortality of the soul" all "serve to guarantee the possibility of the supreme Good -- that is, the agreement between what the Law demands and the order of the real world." The similarity is thus that "the kosmos was . . . an example that shows, from the simple fact that it exists, that ethical conduct is possible." But cosmology was not a postulate because "For men of ancient and medieval times, . . . the sovereignty of the good was already given in the cosmic harmony." Since it was already given, it had no need to be postulated.

Well, as things turn out, I was utterly wrong in my construal of Brague's words -- though I take comfort in the fact that I am accustomed by now to being wrong -- for I wrote to Brague last summer, inquiring as to his meaning, and he replied with a cordial email letting me know that he was currently on vacation in the hinterlands of France but that he would reply upon returning to Paris. Here is that more recent reply:

I am back in Paris, and not really twiddling my thumbs, for I'll have to resume teaching in three weeks. Nevertheless, I keep my promise: not being a gentleman, I must pretend to act as one. The title "Cosmology as a Postulate" is not to be laid at the door of some editor. I am responsible for it. What I meant is, more or less adequately, what follows: For ancient man, moral life did not require properly speaking the well-ordered character of the world, its deserving the name of a kosmos. There are ethical theories that draw the parallel between morality and cosmological phenomena, like Plato's Timaeus or the Stoics; but others do not even mention them, which does not prevent them from building a highly respectable moral teaching: the Atomists are a good example, although Aristotle deserves pride of place among those people. The orderliness and beauty of the physical universe was a not a reason for the Ancient man to do good and avoid evil; conversely, the hypothesis (a nightmare for the ancient world-view) of a total lack of order would not be an excuse for an unlawful behaviour. See Marcus Aurelius, quoted in Wisdom . . . , p. 76-77. In the same way, moral law, according to Kant, does not need a divine Legislator. What is needed is to postulate that morality and the happiness that morality makes us worthy of, but can't guarantee us, somehow meet. Nevertheless, the beautiful order of the world shows us that Being and Goodness coincide. Perhaps I should have compared the part played by the ancient kosmos with another Kantian doctrine, i.e. his christology. For Kant, Christ is not so much a model to be imitated (President Wilson's "What would Jesus do if he were at my place?"), but rather an example that shows us that absolute conformity to the Moral Law, i.e. holiness, is possible.

Appended to this passage was Brague's "hope that this will be helpful." Certainly, it helps me to understand his point -- namely, to understand that I had seriously misunderstood and that Brague's point was almost entirely the opposite from my understanding . . . a rather humbling experience, to be sure, but I often run up against my limitations. Fortunately, like a proper Clint Eastwood character, I do know my limitations. Or at least, I'm willing to recognize them for what they are: my limitations.

Anyway, if I do now understand Brague's point, it is this: the moral law would hold for the ancient philosophers even if the cosmos were to display no such order, much as the moral law would hold for Kant even if there had been no incarnation of the Son, but both the cosmos and the Son display an excellence that is not so much to be imitated as to serve as a demonstration that an exact conformity to God's law is possible. Allow me to apply this understanding to a passage from the Brague interview that I had previously quoted only in part:

In my Wisdom of the World, I began with four ideal-typical models: the "Timaeus" model (broadly speaking, the main current of ancient philosophy from Plato to Proclus, including the Stoics), Epicurus, "Abraham," and Gnosticism. Building on generally similar descriptions of the world, each of these proposes a different response to the question "What we are doing on this earth?" Are we imitating the beautiful order of the heavenly bodies; comfortably settling in on an island of humanity within an indifferent universe; drawing ourselves closer to the creator of a good world, but obeying his law or following his Son; or, finally, fleeing, not, as Mallarmé invites us, là-bas, but to on high, toward an alien God, escaping an imperfect or prison-like world? The ancient and medieval model, which held firm for a good millennium and a half, emerged out of a compromise between "Timaeus" and "Abraham." What interests me is not so much its description (even if I have had to pursue a description in some detail), but rather the problem posed by its disappearance with the modern age. It left us alone. Nothing in the physical world responds to man's ethical demands.

The medieval "worldview" -- a term designating a perspective broader than merely a 'view of the world' -- was an unstable compromise between Plato's description of a more-or-less perfectly ordered world and the Christian one of fallen-but-still-good world. That 'compromised' world served not as a model to be imitated but as an illustration that conformity with God's law was possible. With the modern age, this understanding of the cosmic order has collapsed, for the world does not seem to correspond, even as illustration, to our ethical needs.

I might need to obtain a copy of Brague's Wisdom of the World and read it carefully, comparing his views on the emergence of modernity with those of Hans Blumenberg in Legitimacy of the Modern Age.

Milton's Cosmos?

Milton's Cosmos?

As sketched by Merritt Hughes?

(Image from D.F. Felluga's Purdue Website)

On today's Milton List, a link was provided to the cosmic vision above.

That sounds rather grand, I suppose, but I'm merely referring to the sketch of Milton's 'cosmos' at the top of this post, which I've borrowed from D.F. Felluga's Purdue website -- specifically, the pages for his Fall 2000 course on "Great Narrative Works," which must have been a very interesting course indeed. Take a look for yourself.

Anyway, as I noted, the link was provided on the Milton List, and one of the list members posted a note that leads me to believe that Felluga borrowed this image from Merritt Hughes's edition of Milton's Complete Poems and Major Prose, on page 180 of the 1957 edition (New York: Odyssey Press). Perhaps someone could confirm this?

While I love sketches of this sort, I wonder how accurate it is. As Dennis Danielson remarked concerning the term "Cosmos":

[T]hat whole cosmos ("this pendent world") is an almost indiscernibly small point of light when viewed from far out on the fringes of Chaos. Thus we need some word more encompassing than "cosmos" to describe Milton's heaven, hell, chaos, and (relatively speaking) tiny cosmos.

I agree. The image above is far more than the 'cosmos'. Moreover, it makes everything look rather 'round', whereas Milton seems to depict something indescribable by any limited three-dimensional shape. Chaos, for instance, would seem to extend indefinitely down, as suggested here in PL 2.890-897, where Satan, Sin, and Death first glimpse chaos:

Before thir eyes in sudden view appear [890]
The secrets of the hoarie deep, a dark
Illimitable Ocean without bound,
Without dimension, where length, breadth, & highth,
And time and place are lost; where eldest Night
And Chaos, Ancestors of Nature, hold [895]
Eternal Anarchie, amidst the noise
Of endless Warrs, and by confusion stand. (PL 2.890-897)

Chaos would seem to extend far below the region of hell, for after Satan finally steels himself to brave the dangers of chaos and leaps into the abyss, he soon finds himself plummeting downward:

...At last his Sail-broad Vannes
He spreads for flight, and in the surging smoak
Uplifted spurns the ground, thence many a League
As in a cloudy Chair ascending rides [ 930 ]
Audacious, but that seat soon failing, meets
A vast vacuitie: all unawares
Fluttring his pennons vain plumb down he drops
Ten thousand fadom deep, and to this hour
Down had been falling, had not by ill chance [ 935 ]
The strong rebuff of som tumultuous cloud
Instinct with Fire and Nitre hurried him
As many miles aloft: (PL 2.927-938)

A "league" is about three miles, and a "fathom" is about six feet. We don't know how many leagues Satan ascended, but his fall was precipitous, dropping him some 60,000 feet instantly, it would seem, and he would have been plummeting still if not for the "ill chance" of being lifted by some 'flatulence' from deep within chaos.

Lucky, plucky Satan, who could perhaps supply us with a more accurate depiction of the cosmos and what lies beyond ... if only it were in his interest to do so...