Monday, August 06, 2018

Bernard Lewis and John Milton


Bernard Lewis liked to quote Milton's Sonnet 19:
"that one talent which is death to hide . . . lodged with me useless."
Milton is probably alluding to his poetic talent, but I've not looked into this. Lewis seems to have quoted Milton to motivate students who lacked confidence in their talents. According to Katherine Nouri Hughes:
Bernard did me the favor and honor of taking . . . seriously [my amateur interest in the Orient]. "Being an amateur -- even a dilettante," he said, "was respectable. What possible fault is there in loving and delighting in what you engage in? There is something, however, that you must beware of." He specified by citing Milton: "that one talent which is death to hide . . . lodged with me useless." It was something he repeated many times in the seasons that followed.
Lewis to Milton -- the greats are drawn to the greats . . .

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Thursday, March 26, 2015

David Brooks on Three Kinds of Anti-Semitism

David Brooks
NYT

Since I've been speaking of religious intolerance lately, let's take a glance at an Opinion piece by David Brooks titled "How to Fight Anti-Semitism" (NYT, March 24, 2015), in which makes a threefold distinction among types of Anti-Semitism:
In the Middle East, anti-Semitism has the feel of a deranged theoretical system for making sense of a world gone astray . . . This sort of anti-Semitism thrives where there aren't that many Jews. The Jew is not a person but an idea, a unique carrier of transcendent evil: a pollution, a stain, a dark force responsible for the failures of others, the unconscious shame and primeval urges they feel in themselves, and everything that needs explaining. This is a form of derangement, a flight from reality even in otherwise sophisticated people . . .

In Europe, anti-Semitism looks like a response to alienation. It's particularly high where unemployment is rampant. Roughly half of all Spaniards and Greeks express unfavorable opinions about Jews. The plague of violence is fueled by young Islamic men with no respect and no place to go . . .

The United States is also seeing a rise in the number of anti-Semitic incidents. But this country remains an astonishingly non-anti-Semitic place. America's problem is the number of people who can't fathom what anti-Semitism is or who think Jews are being paranoid or excessively playing the victim . . .
I would alter what Brooks says about Anti-Semitism in Europe. It's not primarily a response to alienation, not among Muslims, anyway. The "young Islamic men" who turn to violence are absorbing much of the Middle East's "deranged theoretical system." This system, as described by Brooks, sounds like a religious one, given the talk of Jews as "evil," as a kind of "pollution," as a "dark force," even as the reason for this "world gone astray."

An article by Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," is good for understanding why much of the Muslim world has grown delusional about its failures. You can read this article in The Atlantic (but after clicking on the link, you have to wait for about 15 seconds for some sort of ad to disappear).

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Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Bernard Lewis on Islamic Radicals in the West

Bernard Lewis
Wikipedia

In yesterday's post, I posed the query as to what in Islam makes it so susceptible to political misuse, and in perhaps oblique response, long-time reader and occasional commentator Erdal linked to an article in Die Welt (The World) by Bernard Lewis, "Drei Phasen des islamischen Kampfes" (April 20, 2013), which translates as "Three Phases of the Islamic Struggle," and I will quote the German, then offer a translation, of a few relevant passages:
Der Angriff vom 11. September 2001 war offenkundig . . . als Beginn . . . gedacht. Der Krieg sollte mitten ins Feindeslager getragen werden. In den Augen einer fanatisierten und entschlossenen Minderheit von Muslimen hatte schnell darauf die . . . Welle des Angriffs begonnen: die Angriffe auf Europa. In diesem Zusammenhang sollten wir uns nichts vormachen: Diesmal nehmen die Attacken verschiedene Formen an, genauer -- zwei Formen: Terror und Migration . . . .

Ich möchte Ihre Aufmerksamkeit . . . auf einige . . . bedeutsame Faktoren lenken. Einer davon ist der neue Radikalismus in der islamischen Welt, der in verschiedenen Ausformungen auftritt: bei Sunniten, insbesondere Wahhabiten, und iranischen Schiiten seit der iranischen Revolution. Wir erleben das befremdliche Paradox, dass die Gefahr, die vom islamischen Radikalismus oder einem radikalen Terrorismus ausgeht, in Europa und Amerika weit größer als im Nahen Osten und Nord-Afrika ist, wo man weit besser darin ist, Extremisten unter Kontrolle zu halten.

Der Wahhabismus hat vom Prestige, vom Einfluss und der Macht des Hauses Saud profitiert, das die Heiligen Stätten des Islam und die jährliche Pilgerreise kontrolliert und enorme Einnahmen aus dem Ölgeschäft zur Verfügung hat. Der Fall der iranischen Revolution liegt anders. Der Begriff Revolution wird im Nahen Osten oft gebraucht. Er ist nahezu der einzige allgemein akzeptierte Titel der Legitimation. Doch die iranische Revolution ist eine echte Revolution im Sinn der französischen oder russischen . . . . [Sie] hatte . . . enorme Auswirkungen auf die ganze Region, mit der die Iraner im Diskurs stehen -- also: auf die islamische Welt . . . .

Den islamischen Radikalen ist es gelungen, in Europa einige Verbündete zu finden. Um sie zu beschreiben, muss ich die Begriffe rechts und links verwenden, die zunehmend in die Irre führen. Sie sind schwer auf die heutigen Verhältnisse im Westen anzuwenden. Und sie sind kompletter Unsinn, wenn man sie auf die unterschiedlichen Zweige des Islam appliziert.

Die islamischen Radikalen haben eine gewisse Anziehungskraft auf die antiamerikanische Linke in Europa, für die sie gewissermaßen an die Stelle der Sowjetunion getreten sind. Die antisemitische Rechte sprechen sie an, weil sie in deren Weltsicht an die Stelle der alten Achsenmächte treten. So haben sie in beiden Gruppen Unterstützer gefunden. Bei manchen Europäern wiegt der Selbsthass schwerer als ihre Loyalität der eigenen Gesellschaft gegenüber.
Roughly translated, this says:
The attacks of September 11, 2001 were clearly intended as . . . the beginning . . . . The war should be carried into the midst of the enemy camp. In the eyes of a fanatical and resolute minority of Muslims, the . . . wave of the attack had started quickly: the attacks on Europe [and the US]. In this context, we should not delude ourselves: This time, the attacks take various forms, more precisely -- two forms: terrorism and migration . . . .

I want to draw your attention. . . to some. . . significant factors. One of them is the new radicalism in the Islamic world, which occurs in various forms: from Sunnis, particularly Wahhabis, and Iranian Shiites since the Iranian Revolution. We experience the strange paradox that the threat posed by Islamic radicalism or radical terrorism in Europe and America is far greater than in the Middle East and North Africa, where the extremists are far better kept under control.

Wahhabism has benefited from the prestige, the influence, and the power of the House of Saud, which controls the holy sites of Islam and the annual pilgrimage and has available the enormous revenues from its oil business. The case of the Iranian Revolution is different. The term revolution is often used in the Middle East. It is almost the only generally accepted title of legitimization. But the Iranian Revolution is a genuine revolution in the sense of the French or Russian . . . . [It] had . . . a huge impact on the whole region, with which the Iranians are in discourse -- i.e., on the Islamic world . . . .

Islamic radicals have managed to find some allies in Europe. To describe this, I have to use the [political] concepts right and left, which increasingly lead astray. They are difficult to apply to the current situation in the West. And they are complete nonsense when they are applied to the different branches of Islam.

The Islamic radicals have a certain attraction to the anti-American Left in Europe, for whom the Islamic radicals have effectively taken the place of the Soviet Union. The anti-Semitic right speaks to them because Islamic radicals take the place of the old Axis powers in the anti-Semitic right's worldview. So, Islamic radicals have found supporters in both groups. For some Europeans, self-hatred outweighs loyalty to their own society.
Lewis thus analyzes Muslim immigration to the West as a trend that the Islamic radicals (i.e., those whom I usually call "Islamists") intend to make use of in their long war with the West, and perhaps this is what Erdal was considering as a possible response to my question about what in Islam makes it susceptible to political misuse, i.e., the large number of Muslims in the world, and now in Europe, such even a statistically small percentage can be a large actual number.

But what radicalizes the Islamic radicals, and what leads them to consider Islamically legitimate such towering acts of terror as the 9/11 attacks? And what is there about the Western far left and radical right that makes Islamic radicals appear worthy of allying with?

I wish Lewis had said more about these issues.

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Sunday, April 06, 2008

Martin Amis: On Qutb and Islam(ism)

Qutb's Fear?
(Image from Wikipedia)

I directed my Islamism students to the article "The age of horrorism" that Martin Amis published over a year ago in The Observer (Sunday September 10 2006) as an intelligent and insightful even if nonexpert perspective on Sayyid Qutb and Islamism.

I especially called attention to what Amis wrote on two things, the first on Qutb's unreliable recollection of his Atlantic crossing on the way to America (a sojourn of two years, 1948-1950):
Sayyid was presumably still sorely shaken by the birth of Israel (after the defeat of Egypt and five other Arab armies), but at first, on the Atlantic crossing, he felt a spiritual expansion. His encyclopedic commentary, In the Shade of the Koran, would fondly and ramblingly recall the renewal of his sense of purpose and destiny. Early on, he got into a minor sectarian battle with a proselytising Christian; Sayyid retaliated by doing a bit of proselytising himself, and made some progress with a contingent of Nubian sailors. Then came the traumatic incident with the drunken, semi-naked woman. Sayyid thought she was an American agent hired to seduce him, or so he later told his biographer, who wrote that 'the encounter successfully tested his resolve to resist experiences damaging to his identity as an Egyptian and a Muslim'. God knows what the episode actually amounted to. It seems probable that the liquored-up Mata Hari, the dipsomaniacal nudist, was simply a woman in a cocktail dress who, perhaps, had recently drunk a cocktail. Still, we can continue to imagine Sayyid barricading himself into his cabin while, beyond the door, the siren sings her song.
I recall reading this anecdote by Qutb elsewhere, perhaps somewhere in Paul Berman's writings. Berman and Amis both find Qutb to be an unreliable narrator, and Qutb's remembrance of a drunken, half-naked woman trying to break through his locked door to force him into having sex with her struck me as entirely unbelievable, no more reliable than his 'memory' of Americans cheering in the streets in 1949 upon learning that Hasan al-Banna had died -- a riotous uproar that Qutb supposedly heard as he lay in a hospital room during an illness.

Qutb's belief that the sexually aggressive woman was an American agent sent to seduce him suggests a paranoid aspect to his thinking, an aspect that seems to pervade much Islamist discourse. Perhaps the Islamists' utopian vision -- or anyone's utopian vision, for that matter -- gives rise to a paranoid mindset, as one attempts to make sense of history and explain why the utopia that one seeks to realize has been so successfully blocked. There must be malevolent forces opposed to the truth, the just, the right. Such a view can even provide the utopian believer with a satisfying if grossly inflated sense of self-significance. In Qutb's case, while he might appear to others as just an unknown writer in an underdeveloped part of the world, he knew himself to actually be of such profound significance that the great superpower America had understood that he must be stopped.

The second thing that I called my students' special attention to was what Amis wrote on the totalizing demands of Islam . . . or does he mean Islamism?
Like fundamentalist Judaism and medieval Christianity, Islam is totalist. That is to say, it makes a total claim on the individual. Indeed, there is no individual; there is only the umma -- the community of believers. Ayatollah Khomeini, in his copious writings, often returns to this theme. He unindulgently notes that believers in most religions appear to think that, so long as they observe all the formal pieties, then for the rest of the time they can do more or less as they please. 'Islam', as he frequently reminds us, 'isn't like that.' Islam follows you everywhere, into the kitchen, into the bedroom, into the bathroom, and beyond death into eternity. Islam means 'submission' - the surrender of independence of mind. That surrender now bears the weight of well over 60 generations, and 14 centuries.
The second passage raises questions about just where to draw the line between Islam and Islamism. If Islam does make total demands, even political ones -- or perhaps especially political ones, then wouldn't Islam itself demand the struggle to make shariah into the law of all lands? Perhaps we can think of the difference in the way that Bernard Lewis distinguished between quietists and activists in Islam -- except that I want to reverse Lewis's distinction. Just as Muhammad's career had two phases, a quietist one in Mecca and an activist one in Medina (Lewis sees the activist first, the quietist second), so Islam has two faces: quietist and activist. In Mecca, Muhammad called for converts but forced nobody to submit, for in his powerlessness, he could not do so. In Medina, however, Muhammad demanded converts and did force others to submit, for in his power, he could do so. What we're calling "Islam" corresponds more to the quietist phase, and what we're calling "Islamism" corresponds more to the activist phase. Maybe. But since I'm rather at odds with the expert Lewis on this analogy, perhaps I'm no more reliable than Qutb.

At any rate, as I told my students, we have a couple of interesting passages that raise questions about the character of Islamism.

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