Mervyn F. Bendle on the Muslim Mind's Closing

Mervyn F. Bendle

(Image from James Cook University)

My online friend Bill Vallicella, the Maverick Philosopher, recommends this review by Mervyn F. Bendle of Robert R. Reilly's Closing of the Muslim Mind. I've not read Reilly's book, though I've half a mind to, for Bendle's review makes the book sound remarkably cogent. Here's Bendle's summary of how Reilly accounts for Islam's rejection of reason (the pages cited being from Reilly):

Islam encountered Hellenic thought in the Byzantine and Sassanid (the last pre-Islamic Persian empire) territories that it conquered in its early years . . . . [This Hellenic thought] took the form of various ancient works in logic and philosophy, natural science, medicine, engineering, mathematics, alchemy and astrology, often in translations made by Christian scholars. Muslim scholars felt compelled to engage with this thought and to marshal philosophical arguments in support of their own faith. "Thus, by the late eighth and early ninth centuries, a new kind of discourse began to affect Islamic thought that had hitherto been largely doctrinal and jurisprudential. New words were created in Arabic to take in Greek concepts. Philosophy opened the Muslim mind in a way in which it had never been before in the spirit of free inquiry and speculative thought" (p. 14).

The Mu'tazilite school emerged as champions of Hellenistic philosophy and of reason and rationalism with all that this entails about the nature of God, the universe and humanity's place within it, especially with regard to humanity's capacity to use reason to come to knowledge of the universe and of God. They were also advocates of free will who questioned predestination. When the Abbasids overthrew the Umayyads in 750 this became a politically useful position and the Mu'tazilites gained the support of the regime. Crucially, they also insisted that humanity was free to interpret revelation, and that the Qur'an was created in time -- claims that outraged traditionalists. However, once again these were politically useful views as they enhanced the authority of the Caliph and reduced the influence of the clergy. Soon the Mu'tazilites had established the first fully developed school of Islamic theology, one that felt comfortable enough to allow learned debate with Christian theologians about the relative views of the two faiths and issues of joint interest.

This triumph proved to be short-lived, and by the mid-ninth century the Ash'arites were entrenching themselves and their opposing views of God, scripture, the universe and humanity within the Sunni Muslim tradition. The emphasis shifted in all key areas; above all, God came to be seen in terms of Will alone, outside and above any notions of reason, rationality and natural law, which were all seen as subsidiary and contingent, and subject always to the divine Will. The Ash'arites were also wreaking their revenge for their previous poor treatment: "holding the Mu'tazilite doctrine became a crime punishable by death. The Mu'tazilites were expelled from court, removed from all government positions, and their works were largely destroyed" (p. 41). By the end of the century, copyists and booksellers were prohibited from trading in works of theology, philosophy and dialectical disputation associated with the Mu'tazilites: "the long process of dehellenisation and [intellectual] ossification had begun" (p. 42).

The basic point, and Islam's fundamental problem, is that Allah's will came to be understood as superior to His rationality, what Bendle and Reilly call the "dehellenization" of Islam, an outcome that I think could only lead to the denigration of reason in an irrational appeal to fideism, the consequence of which is that all issues must, ultimately, resort to superior force for justification. Insha'Allah, after all.

But the more fundamental question for me -- and I haven't read the book by Reilly -- is why Islam made this choice to elevate Allah's will above His reason. Similar debates took place in early Christianity, and still take place, but Christian theology generally defines God's nature as supremely rational, thereby subordinating His will to His reason.

I suspect that the reason for this difference lies in the different historical circumstances in the early era of these two religions. Christianity lacked political power for it first 300 years or so and had to rely on persuasion, which included rational persuasion, to find converts among educated classes. Islam, by contrast, grasped political power within the lifetime of its founder, Muhammad, and thus had little need to rely on the force of reason to persuade educated nonbelievers when a more immediately effective type of force lay ready at hand.

For early Islam, the sword was mightier than the pen, and the religion spread rapidly that way, but there was a long-term price to pay for such intellectual bankruptcy in the closing of the Muslim mind: imperial decay and worldly powerlessness.

Or so I gather, but I need to read the book . . .

J.P. Moreland: Evangelicals' Over-Commitment to the Bible

J.P. Moreland:

Recovering the Christian Mind

(Image from Kingdom Triangle Website)

In my post of two days ago, on "J.P. Moreland: 'Fighting "Bibliolatry" at the Evangelical Theological Society'", I reported on Ted Olsen's summary of Moreland's paper criticizing Evangelicals for limiting themselves to the Bible for knowledge of spiritual things.

About Olsen's report, I concluded that it was:

Interesting, at least for me. Too bad that Moreland's paper isn't (yet?) online.

An anonymous reader from La Miranda, California, left the following message:

J.P. Moreland's paper is actually now online along with some of his comments at [Kingdom Triangle Discussion Forum].

I'm curious to hear more people's reactions to it and discuss.

That led me to the nine-page paper itself, "How Evangelicals Became Over-Committed to the Bible and What Can Be Done About It" (pdf), which individuals interested can now read on their own but about which I'll say a few (inadequate) things.

Moreland begins by emphasizing his own belief in biblical inerrancy, which he does not define in this article but which he has defined elsewhere ("The Rationality of Belief in Inerrancy," Trinity Journal NS 7, Spring 1986, 75-86), then proceeds to his critique of a type of 'bibliolatry' that he calls "Evangelical Over-commitment to the Bible":

The sense that I have in mind is the idea that the Bible is the sole source of knowledge of God, morality, and a host of related important items. Accordingly, the Bible is taken to be the sole authority for faith and practice. (page 1)

Moreland's basic point is that the Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura does not entail a rejection of extrabiblical sources of knowledge. By "sola" is not meant "only" in the sense that no other source is allowed but in the sense of "ultimate" in the sense that other sources cannot contradict scriptural authority though they can add to the Christian's knowledge of spiritual things about which the Bible does not speak comprehensively.

Moreland speculates that the Protestant reluctance to draw upon the "general revelation" available to "right reason" might stem either from "an aversion to anything that smacks of Catholicism ... [or from] a commitment to a certain view of human depravity" (page 2).

In short -- if I may interpret here -- Moreland is allowing that Evangelicals might be too averse to Catholic views on the prominent role for reason in understanding spiritual things or too radical in their hypercalvinist emphasis upon human depravity's impairment of reason (or, obviously, both). This has also been my impression in my time spent among Evangelicals, but Moreland goes on to argue that the Bible itself appeals to natural moral law and that the Reformed (i.e., Calvinist) tradition has also always appealed to natural moral law despite its commitment to a strong view of human depravity.

Moreland therefore turns to historical and sociological explanations for Evangelical 'bibliolatry' that have to do with the fragmentation of knowledge consonant with the emphasis upon research in universities rather than teaching, the shift at universities from teaching wisdom to training students in critical thinking, the rise of scientism as an unreflective philosophical commitment, and the general increase in secularism as a means of dealing in the world, among other things.

In response to these developments, Moreland thinks, Evangelicals have retreated from reason into a sort of fideism (unreasoning and even irrational belief) -- if I may again interpret and briefly state his point.

In concluding, Moreland calls for more Evangelicals to give more attention to "extra-biblical knowledge" and to develop "biblical, theological, and philosophical justifications for such knowledge along with guidance for its use" (page 8).

I realize that I haven't done Moreland's paper justice, but as I told the anonymous commentor, "the essay-grading that I'm currently doing" might get in the way of any in-depth blogging for several days.

Therefore, go and read for thyself.