Over at the Marmot's Hole, some folks were arguing about the rationality, or lack thereof, for belief in God. I usually stay out of those discussions there because there's too much ad hominem for my tastes, but the issue of "something from nothing" came up, i.e., whether the universe could suddenly begin to exist purely ex nihilo or whether a God were needed to perform the creative act to produce the universe ex nihilo, so I offered a speculation:
The question of the metaphysical foundation of the universe is an interesting one, at least for me. The appeal to an infinite series of universes seems to imply that our particular universe would never have been reached, for one cannot count to infinity. There would thus seem to have had to be a beginning of a finite sequence of universes.I didn't really get a response on that Marmot's Hole thread (not even a query about my allusion to the Kalam argument), and I halfway never expected one, so I've reposted here, partly out of a need to post something this morning. And yes, I realize that I've raised this sort of question here at Gypsy Scholar before and have received replies of the sort that argue that for something to just pop into existence is contrary to reason, but the question still nags at me.
But I end up in a Kantian sort of antinomy.
Either the first universe to come into existence was dependent for its existence upon something metaphysical that is extratemporal, or the first universe to come into existence was dependent upon nothing at all and popped into existence truly ex nihilo.
The former might appear more rational, for that extratemporal metaphysical entity would be the noncontingent ground of all contingent things, and we might consider 'irrational' the view that something could simply pop into existence ex nihilo, but what barrier would 'irrationality' be to utter nothingness?
The choice leaves me intellectually stumped.
I guess my problem with this argument is that I can't quite see what hindrance irrationality poses to utter nothingness.