Milton Query Redux

In a recent post titled "Paradise Lost: Milton and Modal Logic," I posed a query for the Maverick Philosopher and anyone else with an interest in answering it:

Say that God creates Lucifer with libertarian free will and gives him a free choice between standing firm in heaven or falling into hell.

Say also that God knows by his foreknowledge that Lucifer will choose to fall into hell.

Query: Is there a difference between the following two cases:

1. God, prior to but knowing Lucifer's choice to fall, decrees that if Lucifer should fall, then Lucifer is to be punished eternally.

2. God, prior to but knowing Lucifer's choice to fall, decrees that if any angel should fall, then that angel is to be punished eternally.

My intuition is that the former case poses a problem for Lucifer's libertarian free will but that the latter case does not. I have this intuition because the former case specifies an individual, whereas the latter case refers to a class.

Is my intuition misleading me?

I then added some points for clarification:

Libertarian free will indicates a free will not subject to any causal chain, either internal or external.

God's foreknowledge foresees all future free decisions but does not cause these decisions.

What God decrees for the future will certainly occur.

That was my query. I have since received a reply from the Maverick Philosopher:

I wouldn't call this a problem in modal logic since nothing in the logic hinges on possibility and necessity and related notions.

The problem is one of theological fatalism. In both cases, God knows that L. will choose to fall at some future time t. What God or anyone knows is true. So it is true that L. will choose to fall at t. The conflict, real or apparent, with L's libertarian freedom of the will is the same in both cases.

Suppose that Jones believes that every bachelor is unmarried, and suppose that Smith is a bachelor. It doesn't follow that Jones believes that Smith is unmarried: Jones may be unacquainted with Smith.

But God is acquainted with Lucifer. So if God decrees that any angels who fall will be punished, it follows that God decrees that if L falls, he will be punished.

Alles klar?

That last expression is German for "Everything clear?" The Maverick and the Gypsy have both spent time studying and researching in Germany and thus sometimes slip a German expression into our dialogue.

Unfortunately, a bit less is clear. I now see that the issue of theological fatalism raised by God's omniscience also figures into what I was asking about. Milton assumes that theological fatalism is false, and I intended this assumption as well. But maybe this issue of omniscience and fatalism would have to be resolved first and the issue concerning God's decrees afterwards.

Yet, if we could assume that theological is fatalism false (or better, prove that it is false), then we could return to my original question, which asked if God's decrees have a different effect in the following two cases:

1. God, prior to but knowing Lucifer's choice to fall, decrees that if Lucifer should fall, then Lucifer is to be punished eternally.

2. God, prior to but knowing Lucifer's choice to fall, decrees that if any angel should fall, then that angel is to be punished eternally.

If I understand the Maverick's reply, then the second decree entails the first. This eliminates the distinction that I was attempting to make between God's decree concerning an individual and God's decree concerning a class.

My sole recourse, I suppose, would be to argue that even if the distinction does not hold, Milton thought that there was a distinction, which is really all that I need for my argument about Milton's views.

By the way, I see from the Maverick's opening remark that in calling this a problem of modal logic, I misconstrued things. I think that I see my confusion. I took the presence of the modal verb "should" to imply the need for modal logic.

Silly me.